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Essays on Government Policy in Real Estate Markets
David Joseph Munroe
This dissertation uses administrative data to study regulatory issues in the American real
estate market. The first chapter studies spillovers from home foreclosures in Cook County,
Illinois. Random assignment of foreclosure cases to judges allows for estimation of the causal
effect of foreclosure (relative to a foreclosure case being dismissed) on neighboring foreclosure
filings and housing transactions. When a property forecloses, the local housing market is
disrupted—prices fall and more lower quality homes sell—and neighbors are more likely to
end up in default and going through the foreclosure process.
The second chapter examines how discontinuously applied transfer taxes distort the mar-
ket for real estate sales in New York and New Jersey. These transfer taxes distort not only
the price of real estate transactions that occur near the discontinuity, corresponding to sellers
bearing the entire incidence of the tax, but also the volume of sales that occur—productive
transactions that would occur if the tax were not discontinuous disappear from the market.
The third and final chapter estimates the market-level response of home equity loans to
two discontinuous mortgage policies—the home mortgage interest deduction, and real estate
appraisal regulations in the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act.
The estimates therein imply that home equity debt is very responsive to both the after-tax
interest rate as well as lender underwriting requirements.
Contents
1 Foreclosure Contagion: Measurement and Mechanisms
(with Laurence Wilse-Samson) 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Judicial Foreclosure in Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.1 Measuring Local Contagion and Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Instrumental Variables Approach and First Stage Regression . . . . . 22
1.4.3 Interpretation of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Neighborhood-Level Effects of Completed Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Contagion in Foreclosure Filings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5.2 Contagion in Completed Foreclosures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.3 Housing Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Evidence of Contagion Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6.1 Distinguishing Borrower and Lender Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6.2 Foreclosure Contagion and Negative Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.3 Foreclosure Contagion and Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.8.1 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.8.2 Adjusting Price Data for Property Quality Using Repeat Sales . . . 69
1.8.3 Monotonicity of Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.8.4 Nonlinearities in Foreclosure Contagion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
i
1.8.5 Lender Response to a Completed Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.8.6 Estimates by Proxies for Social Connectedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2 Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real Estate
Market (with Wojciech Kopczuk) 103
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.2 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.4 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.4.1 Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.4.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.4.3 Measuring the Impact on the Price Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2.4.4 Implications for Efficiency of the Equilibrium Allocation . . . . . . . 129
2.4.5 Econometric Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
2.5 Distortion to the Price Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
2.6 Unraveling: Market Distortions Local to the Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.7 Global Market Distortions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
2.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
2.9.1 Bargaining model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
2.9.2 Proportional tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.9.3 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.9.4 Robustness of incidence estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3 Response of Home Equity Debt to Mortgage Policy: Evidence from a Kink
and a Notch 197
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
3.2 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
ii
3.2.1 The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
3.2.2 FIRREA Appraisal Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
3.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
3.4.1 Estimating Response to Policy from a Kink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
3.4.2 Estimating Response to Policy from a Notch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
3.4.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
3.5.1 Graphical Evidence of Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
3.5.2 Baseline Estimates and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
3.5.3 Response of Debt to the Mortgage Interest Deduction . . . . . . . . . 223
3.5.4 Response of debt to FIRREA Appraisal Requirements . . . . . . . . 228
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
3.7 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
References 247
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Pre-Treatment Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.2 Descriptive Statistics: Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.3 Balance of Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.4 Complier Characteristics: Ratio of Subgroup First Stage Estimate to Overall
First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.5 Baseline Contagion Estimates: 2SLS Coefficient of Effect of Completed Fore-
closure on Given Outcome in Given Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.6 Constant Sample Contagion Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.7 Estimates in Years Before Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
iii
1.8 Contagion in Completed Foreclosures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.9 Baseline Housing Market Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.10 Contagion Among Loans with Lenders Implicated in Independent Foreclosure
Review Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.11 Contagion Estimates By Proxy for Borrower Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.12 Contagion Estimates By Lender Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.13 First Stage Regression of Foreclosure on Propensity to Foreclose . . . . . . . 83
1.14 Contagion Estimates Measured Since Case Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.15 Controlling for Length of Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1.16 Robustness of Contagion Estimates By Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
1.17 Robustness of Estimates by Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1.18 Contagion in Any New Filing, Omitting Each Filing Year . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1.19 Contagion in Total New Filings, Omitting Each Filing Year . . . . . . . . . . 88
1.20 Baseline Estimates for 0.25 Mile Radius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1.21 Estimates for Loans with Multiple Claimants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
1.22 Contagion in Completed Foreclosures/Dismissals Filed After Decision . . . . 91
1.23 Robustness of Price Estimates By Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1.24 Price Effects, Omitting Each Filing Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1.25 Sub-Sample Price Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1.26 Contagion Among Loans with Lenders Implicated in Independent Foreclosure
Review Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
1.27 Contagion among Borrowers in Positive vs. Negative Equity . . . . . . . . . 95
1.28 Interaction with Positive Price Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1.29 Response Among Borrowers with Conventional Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . 97
1.30 Contagion among Filings with -10% – 10% Equity versus < -10% or > 10% . 98
1.31 Contagion by Proxy for Neighborhood Homogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1.32 Contagion by Condo Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
iv
1.33 Contagion Among Borrowers with the Same Lender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1.34 Neighborhood-Level Aggregate Contagion Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.1 Real Estate Transfer Tax Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2.2 Sample Statistics for Taxable Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2.3 Median Price of Taxable Sales Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2.4 REBNY Listings Sample Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
2.5 Response to Mansion Tax, by Region and Years Since Construction . . . . . 151
2.6 Heterogeneity in Response by Notch and Sub-Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
2.7 Mansion Tax: Listings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
2.8 Mansion Tax: NYC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
2.9 NYC Mansion Tax: Placebos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
2.10 Local Incidence Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
2.11 Predicted Price Discounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
2.12 Predicted Price Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
3.1 Home Loan Statistics (1995–2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
3.2 Baseline Estimates and Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
3.3 Round Number Placebos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
3.4 Estimates by Quartile of AGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
3.5 State-Year Regressions of 1− φk on Percent-Change in After-Tax Interest Rate242
3.6 Implied Elasticity of Debt to Interest Rates at $100,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
List of Figures
1.1 Foreclosure Cases Over Time in Cook County, IL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.2 Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates . . . 78
1.3 Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates . . . 79
1.4 Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates . . . 80
v
1.5 Contagion Estimates by Income Quartile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1.6 Contagion Estimates by Social Connection Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.1 Distribution of Taxable Sales in New York State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
2.2 Distribution of Taxable Sales in New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
2.3 Distribution of NJ Sales Pre- and Post-Mansion Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2.4 New Jersey Monthly Sales Above $990,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
2.5 Incidence and Gap Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
2.6 Bunching at the notch and efficient allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
2.7 Distribution of Real-Estate Listing Prices in NYC (Sold Properties Only) . . 159
2.8 Median & 75th Percentile Price Discounts by Initial Asking Price . . . . . . 160
2.9 Predicted Price Discounts by Initial Asking Price (Relative to $1,000,000) . . 161
2.10 Predicted Dispersion of Log of Sale Price by Initial Asking Price (Relative to
$1,000,000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
2.11 Distribution of Sales in New York City around the $500,000 RPTT tax notch 176
2.12 Distribution of Taxable Sales in New York State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
2.13 New Jersey Monthly Sales Above $990,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
2.14 Distribution of Monthly Sales in New Jersey ($900k – $1M) . . . . . . . . . 179
2.15 NJ Local Incidence Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
2.16 Distribution of Real-Estate Listing Prices in NYC (Sold Properties Only) . . 181
2.17 Distribution of Real-Estate Listing Prices in NYC (All REBNY-Listed Prop-
erties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
2.18 Distribution of Sale Price by Initial Asking Price (with Quantile Regression) 183
2.19 Probability that Listed Property Sells by Initial Asking Price . . . . . . . . . 184
2.20 Median Days to Sale by Initial Asking Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
2.21 Probability of Selling Without REBNY by Initial Asking Price . . . . . . . . 186
2.22 Median Price Discount by Final Asking Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
2.23 Decomposition of Mean Price Discounts by Initial Asking Price . . . . . . . 188
vi
2.24 Dispersion of Sale Price, Conditional on First Asking Price . . . . . . . . . . 189
2.25 Dispersion of Sale Price, Conditional on Last Asking Price . . . . . . . . . . 190
2.26 Predicted Dispersion of Log of Sale Price (Median Regression in First Stage) 191
3.1 Data Over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
3.2 Conceptual Kink Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
3.3 Conceptual Notch Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
3.4 Histogram of Home Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3.5 Log of Histogram of Home Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
3.6 Kink Estimates Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
3.7 $250k Notch Estimates Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3.8 County Start Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
3.9 Loans over Time by Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
vii
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the support and advice of my dissertation committee.
I am thankful to Wojciech Kopczuk for exceptional guidance. Wojciech introduced me to
empirical public economics and provided invaluable feedback on my research. His critical eye
and enthusiasm always pushed me to do my best work. I am also indebted to Ethan Kaplan
for holding me to, and helping me achieve, high empirical standards. Like Wojciech, Ethan
gave me the confidence to trust my instincts and my training. Douglas Almond, Miguel
Urquiola, and Tomasz Piskorski all provided exceptional feedback and encouragement.
I am fortunate to have been a part of a rich academic environment at Columbia. In
addition to the guidance of my dissertation committee, I received valuable comments from
current and former Columbia faculty including Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Janet Currie, Ilyana
Kuziemko, Chris Mayer, Christian Pop-Eleches, Bernard Salanie, Eric Verhoogen, and Till
von Wachter. I am grateful for the feedback of my fellow students Corinne Low, Katherine
Meckel, Mike Mueller-Smith, Giovanni Paci, Petra Persson, Maya Rossin-Slater, Jessica Van
Parys, and Reed Walker, and to Thuy Lan Nguyen, Wataru Miyamoto, Jeong Hwan Lee,
and Tao Li for helping me get through the first year of the program. In addition to sharing a
passion for empirical public economics with me, Ferran Elias and Ben Marx provided hours
of valuable discussion. The origin of my interest in real estate topics can be traced directly
to my colleague, friend, and co-author Laurence Wilse-Samson; this dissertation would look
very different were it not for his support. The social support and friendship of Jonathan
Dingel, Donald Ngwe, Hyun Oh, Sebastien Turban, and Harold Stolper ensured that I did
not work too hard and occasionally enjoyed myself.
I am grateful for the resources that have been made available to me as a doctoral student.
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities
viii
Research Council of Canada, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and the Program for
Economic Research at Columbia University. Access to incredible data was made possible
by Chris Mayer and the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at Columbia Business School,
Chicago-based Record Information Services Inc., and the Real Estate Board of New York
and RealPlus, LLC. Special thanks to Alicia Horwath of Record Information Services and
Thomas Croke of RealPlus for assistance with the data.
Finally, I would like to thank my family. My parents, Robert and Sheila, have been
incredibly supportive throughout a decade of post-secondary schooling. They have always
encouraged me to follow my interests and do my best. I am forever indebted to my incredible
wife, Chrissy. Chrissy has made me feel loved through many work-related difficulties and
countless research-filled evenings and weekends. She is a constant source of fun and joy in
my life. This thesis would not have been possible without her inspiration and support.
ix
Dedication
To Chrissy, for believing in me.
x




1Department of Economics, Columbia University. lhw2110@columbia.edu.
1
Abstract
This paper shows that completed foreclosures cause neighboring foreclosure filings. We
estimate this relationship using administrative data on home foreclosures and sales in Cook
County, IL, instrumenting completed foreclosures with randomly assigned chancery-court
judges. A completed foreclosure causes 0.5 to 0.7 additional foreclosure filings within 0.1
miles, an effect that persists for several years. Contagion is driven by borrowers on the
margins of default, not those severely at risk. We find evidence that borrowers learn about
lender behavior from neighboring foreclosures. Finally, a foreclosure causes an increase in
housing sales among relatively low-quality properties.
2
1.1 Introduction
The housing bubble and crisis of the last decade has resulted in an unusually large number of
foreclosures in the United States. Completed foreclosures—when a mortgage borrower does
not make payments on their loan and the lending institution claims the mortgaged property—
increased dramatically starting in 2007 from 404,849 properties per year, peaking at 1.05
million completed foreclosures in 2010.2 The length and severity of this crisis have increased
academic interest in the consequences of home foreclosures and have raised questions about
how and why foreclosures spread (e.g., Guren and McQuade (2013)).
In this paper we ask whether home foreclosures are contagious: does one completed
foreclosure increase the probability that geographically neighboring borrowers end up in
the foreclosure process? The answer to this question informs our understanding of home
foreclosures, borrower and lender behavior, and appropriate policy toward mortgages and
foreclosure procedures. Foreclosure contagion is suspected of exacerbating the housing crises
during the Great Depression and the recent financial crisis (Campbell (2013)). Identifying
and understanding contagion in foreclosures will provide a better understanding of how and
why such crises spread. Furthermore, the presence of contagion is relevant to policy makers
concerned with mitigating the spread of home foreclosures.
Our chief contribution is to develop a randomly assigned instrument for foreclosures,
which we apply to administrative data to achieve credible, policy-relevant estimates of fore-
closure contagion. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to use a randomly assigned
instrument to study the local effects of foreclosures. In Chicago (Cook County), IL, where
foreclosure cases are decided in court, we use the randomization of new cases to fixed groups
of judges as an instrument for a completed foreclosure. Intuitively, our estimates compare
the neighborhoods around two types of properties going through the foreclosure process (i.e.,
2We use “foreclosure filing” to refer to the initiation of the foreclosure process by the lender, and “completed
foreclosure” to refer to a foreclosure proceeding ending with the mortgaged property being sold at auction.
However, lenders are not always successful in foreclosing on a home, and so not all filings end in completed
foreclosure—we refer to such unsuccessful foreclosure attempts as “dismissals.”
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situations in which a borrower is in default and the lender wants to claim the home as col-
lateral): properties randomly assigned to “difficult” judges that, as a result, are foreclosed
upon and sold at auction versus properties randomly assigned to “lenient” judges that dis-
miss the foreclosure case. Since our empirical strategy necessarily relies upon the comparison
of neighborhoods around homes in default that do and do not end in foreclosure, our esti-
mates speak directly to the policy question of how strongly lenders should be incentivized
to renegotiate delinquent loans.3 This instrument allows us to surmount the endogeneity
of home foreclosures—a key empirical challenge—present in existing studies of foreclosure
externalities that primarily rely on fixed effects analyses of very local neighborhoods (e.g.,
Campbell et al. (2011), who study how real estate sale prices are influenced by foreclosures
within 0.1 miles).
We develop a novel data set that matches administrative records of foreclosure court cases
to records on foreclosure filings and auctions for Cook County. This county, which contains
most of the city of Chicago, is the second-most populous in the U.S. and was relatively hard
hit by the housing crisis: the surrounding MSA experienced the 12th largest decline in city-
wide housing prices between 2007 and 2011, while 5.2% of the 1.9 million households in Cook
County experienced a completed foreclosure. Our data covers the universe of foreclosure
filings and completed foreclosures in Cook County between 2004 and 2011, allowing us to
leverage the random assignment of foreclosure judges while observing the precise location
of the associated property. We also use administrative data on residential housing sales to
assess whether a completed home foreclosure lowers neighboring housing values.
Concrete evidence on foreclosure-related externalities and contagion has been elusive,
owing to empirical challenges (Frame (2010)). Home foreclosures are known to be corre-
3There is a developed literature that uses judicial bias as an instrument, as we do herein, including: Kling
(2006) (sentencing propensities of judges to instrument for incarceration length); Autor and Houseman (2010)
(job placement rates of non-profit contractors to instrument for receiving temporary help jobs); Chang
and Schoar (2006) (judicial fixed effects to measure judge-debtor-friendliness); Dobbie and Song (2013)
(judge discharge rates to instrument for bankruptcy protection); Doyle (2007) (placement frequency of child
protection investigators to instrument for foster care); and Maestas et al. (2013) (allowance rates of disability
examiners to instrument disability insurance receipt).
4
lated with neighborhood characteristics and changes in housing prices and macroeconomic
circumstances (Mian et al. (2011); Mian and Sufi (2009)). Existing studies that find nega-
tive housing price effects of foreclosure have relied primarily on local analyses that explicitly
control for property and neighborhood characteristics (Campbell et al. (2011); Immergluck
and Smith (2006); Schuetz et al. (2008); Pennington-Cross (2006); Leonard and Murdoch
(2009); and Lin et al. (2007)) or repeat-sales analyses (Harding et al. (2009) and Gerardi
et al. (2012)). Similarly, existing studies finding evidence of foreclosure contagion rely either
on local analyses (Towe and Lawley (2013)) or aggregate analyses controlling for neigh-
borhood and zip code characteristics (Goodstein and Lee (2010)). Few studies have taken
a quasi-experimental approach to identifying the externalities associated with foreclosure.4
One notable exception is Anenberg and Kung (2014), who find a drop in real estate listing
prices immediately after foreclosed properties are listed on the market. To our knowledge,
ours is the first study to use a randomly assigned instrument to estimate contagion and local
price effects of home foreclosures.
We find evidence of foreclosure contagion using our instrumental variables strategy that
compares neighborhoods with completed foreclosures to neighborhoods where foreclosure
cases are dismissed. Relative to dismissal, a completed foreclosure raises the probability of
any new foreclosure filing within 0.1 miles by 10% per year and leads to about 0.5 new filings
per year. This foreclosure contagion effect is robust and persistent, lasting for three to four
years after the case is decided. Additionally, our estimates show that substantial contagion
in foreclosure filings occurs even in neighborhoods with no recent foreclosures—the “first”
completed foreclosure in a neighborhood substantially increases foreclosure filings in the
following years. Interestingly, there is no evidence of contagion at the height of the crisis
(2009–2011); contagion is present primarily during the peak and initial decline of the Chicago
housing market (2004–2008). We interpret this temporal pattern as evidence that contagion
4Mian et al. (2012) exploit changes at state borders in policy toward foreclosure (in particular, the
distinction between judicial vs. non-judicial states) to instrument foreclosures, although this instrument is
not randomly assigned (for example, Pence (2006) shows substantial changes in housing market conditions
at the boundaries between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states).
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operates through borrowers who are on the margin of the default decision (2004–2008), rather
than those in dire straits (2009–2011). A neighboring completed foreclosure may not be very
meaningful to a borrower who is already in negative equity (thus, relatively insensitive to a
foreclosure-induced loss of property value) or when foreclosures are common-place (and so
the marginal foreclosure conveys little information).
Contagion is not limited to new foreclosure filings—a completed foreclosure increases the
number of neighboring completed foreclosures as well. This result suggests that contagion is
costly and plays a role in the geographic spread of foreclosures. In particular, we find that, on
average, each completed foreclosures induces an additional 1.5 completed foreclosures within
four years. Taken literally, our estimates suggest that in the absence of the contagion ex-
ternality, Chicago would have experienced more than 50% (roughly 43,000) fewer completed
foreclosures between 2004 and 2010.5 We also find that a completed foreclosure increases the
number of completed foreclosures even among neighboring cases that had already begun.
While our estimates suggest that a completed foreclosure lowers neighboring residential
sale prices, our estimates are largely driven by selection into sale. Within the first year of
a case ending in a foreclosure, relative to a case that ends in dismissal, the average price of
neighboring housing sales drops by up to 40%. However, using a repeat-sales methodology
to adjust for property quality, our estimates of this effect fall substantially to zero. We
interpret this as evidence that a completed foreclosure disrupts the housing market in terms
of the types of homes that sell, causing a larger share of lower-quality homes to transact
at correspondingly lower prices than the average home in the neighborhood. At the same
time, due to the small size of our housing sales sample and the resulting imprecision of our
housing price estimates, we cannot rule out a small negative effect of completed foreclosure
on neighboring home values (holding quality constant).
We show evidence consistent with the commonly held belief that foreclosure contagion
5These figures are based on a back of the envelope calculation. Our estimates suggest that each completed
foreclosure causes more than 1 additional completed foreclosure within three years, and so an absence of
contagion suggests 50% fewer completed foreclosures.
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is driven by an increase in borrowers defaulting on their loans in response to a neighboring
foreclosure, rather than lenders filing for foreclosure against already delinquent borrowers.
There is substantial evidence that lenders and mortgage servicers—third parties employed by
creditors to manage loans—indiscriminately favor pursuing foreclosure on delinquent mort-
gages, rather than modification (see discussions in Adelino et al. (2009); Foote et al. (2008)
and Levitin and Twomey (2011)). We argue that in the absence of borrower-driven con-
tagion, lenders would not exhibit positive foreclosure contagion. Given that we do observe
positive contagion provides evidence that borrowers respond. Moreover, there is substan-
tial contagion even among mortgages serviced by lenders known for automating foreclosure
procedures and who are, thus, unlikely to respond to very local market conditions.
There are two prominent explanations of why a completed foreclosure will increase the
probability that neighbors default on their own mortgages. The first hinges on a completed
foreclosure lowering neighboring home values, thus increasing the likelihood that borrowers
are in negative equity or “underwater” on their loans—i.e., owing more than the mortgaged
property is worth (Campbell and Cocco (2011); Campbell (2013); and Goodstein et al.
(2011)). As one becomes further underwater on one’s loan, the incentive to default on
the mortgage increases: the loss on the asset grows relative to the costs associated with
foreclosure (primarily moving costs and a drop in credit score). The second explanation is
that a completed foreclosure transmits information to neighbors (Guiso et al. (2013); Towe
and Lawley (2013)). Specifically, a completed foreclosure may send a signal to neighbors
about the future of the neighborhood (influencing the expected value of the property to
the borrower), or about the foreclosure process itself (e.g., neighbors may learn about the
likelihood of a mortgage modification if they default on their loans).
Contagion is driven not by borrowers in severe negative equity, but by borrowers who are
on the margin of being underwater. We use information about loan principal and outstand-
ing balance to construct a proxy for borrowers being underwater and find that a completed
foreclosure induces additional new filings among non-underwater loans only. Moreover, this
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effect is concentrated among loans who are on the margin of being underwater with outstand-
ing debt at the time of filing within 10% of the initial principal. For example, a neighboring
foreclosure may act as a “wakeup call” for borrowers in positive equity, sending a strong
signal about the current value of their property, the future of the neighborhood, and/or
information about the foreclosure process itself. On the other hand, those who are very
underwater on their loans may already be well informed about the foreclosure process and
the consequences thereof and/or have a sufficiently large negative equity position that an
additional loss in value is negligible with respect to the default decision.
Contagion varies substantially depending on whether neighbors have mortgages serviced
by the same lender, which we interpret as evidence that information—in this case, infor-
mation about lenders—plays an important role in reducing contagion. Specifically, we find
that when a completed foreclosure occurs there are significantly fewer new foreclosure filings
among loans serviced by the same lender than loans serviced by different lenders. This differ-
ence may be driven by borrowers learning more and different information from the experience
of neighbors whose loans are serviced by the same institutions: the neighboring foreclosure
may send a signal about their lender’s behavior, lowering the perceived probability of a
successful renegotiation of the loan and, thus, reducing strategic incentives to default.
Our results suggest that policies that keep delinquent borrowers in their homes, for exam-
ple by encouraging lenders to modify delinquent loans, may reduce the spillovers associated
with home foreclosures. We are able to speak to this question since our empirical strategy
identifies foreclosure spillovers for the set of marginally delinquent loans for whom the id-
iosyncrasies of the overseeing judge matter (i.e., the cases that are likely to comply with
the instrument)—these are the cases most likely to be influenced by policy interventions. In
principle, our results provide support for government policies that encourage modification,
such as the Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) (even if there have
been considerable (and well documented) problems in implementation). For example, as
of December 2013 HAMP has achieved 27,525 successful modifications of delinquent mort-
8
gages in the Chicago MSA. However, this understates the true benefit of the program—our
contagion estimates imply that HAMP prevented an additional 44,040 completed foreclo-
sures (and the spillovers associated with these).6 Extrapolating our contagion estimates to
the national level, by successfully modifying 1.1 million delinquent mortgages, HAMP has
prevented an additional 1.76 million completed foreclosures. Of course any program must
weigh general equilibrium considerations—these include the effects on ex-ante incentives for
loan origination, and incentives for default by other borrowers. Our finding that contagion
is minimal or even negative among borrowers with the same creditors, may provide evidence
that these incentives for strategic default matter—we interpret this finding as demonstrating
that borrowers update the probability of a modification downward and are discouraged from
defaulting on their loans. As such, a policy that raises the cost of default (e.g., achieving
a reduction in loan principal only by going through bankruptcy, as suggested by Levitin
(2009)), or a more direct policy that targets the vacancy and neglect associated with REO
properties, may be preferred.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 1 we outline the judicial foreclosure
process in the state of Illinois and randomization of judges to cases in Cook County. Section
2 sketches our data sources—administrative records on court cases, geocoded administrative
records on foreclosure filings, and deed transfer records. In Section 3 we outline the empirical
strategy, which exploits the random assignment of judges for quasi-experimental identifica-
tion, the results of which we present in Section 4. Section 5 explores possible mechanisms,
and Section 6 concludes.
6HAMP numbers are from the December 2013 Making Home Affordable Program Performance Re-
port from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (available at www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/Making-Home-Affordable-Program-Performance-Report.aspx). The progress report
identifies 46,183 permanent loan modifications for the Chicago-Joliet-Naperville MSA. The report indicates
a 40.4% redefault rate (within four years) among HAMP modified loans, leaving 27,525 successful modifi-
cations. Summing our estimates of contagion in completed foreclosures from Table 1.8 suggests that each
completed foreclosure induces, on average, an additional 1.6 completed foreclosures (and 1.6 * 27,525 =
44,040).
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1.2 Judicial Foreclosure in Illinois
Cook County, Illinois, provides a good context in which to study foreclosure contagion.
Firstly, it was badly affected by the foreclosure crisis. Between 2002 and 2011, the county
saw 302,166 foreclosure proceedings initiated by lenders (“foreclosure filings”), and 134,924
completed foreclosures. These trends are illustrated in Figure 1.1. There is a sharp increase in
the number of foreclosure cases filed in Cook County (left axis) from about 1,000 per month in
2004 to more than 3,000 filings per month in 2008. At the same time, foreclosure proceedings
became more likely to end in a completed foreclosure: the completed foreclosure rate (right
axis) jumps from 45% for cases filed in 2004 to 65% in 2008. Secondly, the foreclosure process
in Cook County, IL, goes through the court system, allowing us to instrument a foreclosure
outcome using random assignment of judges to cases.
In Illinois, as in many so-called “judicial foreclosure” states, lenders must take delinquent
borrowers to court in order to claim a mortgaged property. When a borrower has missed
three mortgage payments (i.e., is in default), a lender or the third party servicing the mort-
gage may initiate the foreclosure process by filing for foreclosure on the associated property
with the chancery court (we refer to this event as a foreclosure filing). If after ninety
days the borrower has not made up all missed payments, the trial begins and the lender’s
attorney must establish that the borrower: has borrowed money from the lender; has signed
a mortgage note promising the property as collateral; and is behind on payments. At the
same time, the borrower may mount a defense, for example by disputing any of these facts
or claiming that the lender has violated lending laws (e.g., the Truth-in-Lending Act). After
hearing the arguments, the presiding judge decides the case, either dismissing the foreclosure
action or filing a judgment of foreclosure. If the case is dismissed, the borrower typically
continues to reside in the home. If a judgment of foreclosure is filed, then the case proceeds
to a foreclosure auction, which we refer to as a completed foreclosure.7 If the sale price
7Following a foreclosure judgement, a redemption period begins during which the borrower may pay off
the entire outstanding mortgage plus late fees, attorney fees, court costs, and taxes. The redemption period
ends either three months after the judgment or seven months after the initial foreclosure complaint is served,
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does not cover the outstanding balance of the mortgage then the borrower is still considered
in debt to the lender, although it is common for lenders to forgive this remaining debt. In
the vast majority of cases (around 95% for Cook County), the lending institution purchases
the property at auction for the amount of the outstanding loan—in doing so the lender need
not record a loss on their balance sheet.8
A dismissal may refer to several possible outcomes, most of which result in the property
remaining occupied by the borrower. First, if a borrower makes all missed payments within
90 days of the filing, then the case is dismissed and the mortgage is reinstated. Second,
rather than continuing to pursue an ongoing foreclosure case, the lender may modify the
terms of the mortgage to make payments more affordable to the borrower. Third, the lender
may “lose” the case by failing to adequately establish non-payment of the mortgage or that
they are owed the debt, or the borrower’s defense may be successful. Fourth, a case may
be dismissed because the lender does not take action in pursuing the foreclosure. Fifth, a
lender may accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, in which the borrower forfeits the home to
the lender without going through the courts. Finally, the borrower may negotiate a short
sale of their home: the lender accepts the proceeds from the sale of the home as payment for
the mortgage. Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and short sales are generally not an option when
there are multiple liens on the property, a fact we exploit to confirm that our results are not
driven by these outcomes in which delinquent borrowers lose their property (Agarwal et al.
(2011)).9 In our data we cannot distinguish which of these outcomes occurs; we only know
whether the case ends in dismissal or completed foreclosure. However, with the exception
of a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or a short sale, in all of these dismissal outcomes the house
whichever is later.
8See statistics for Cook County compiled by the Woodstock Institute:
blog.cookcountyil.gov/economicdevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Wodstock-Institute-Foreclosure-
Filings-2007-2012.pdf
9Anecdotally, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and short sales are uncommon in Cook County for the reason
that, in both cases, creditors are typically taking a loss, while mortgage servicers will accrue lower fees
(relevant in cases where the property is being managed by a mortgage servicer): in Illinois, by accepting
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure the lender must forgive all debt, while short sales typically transact at a price
below the outstanding debt (Ghent and Kudlyak (2011)).
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remains occupied by the borrower.
Foreclosure cases are randomly assigned to a case calendar, which restricts the set of
judges that will ever hear an action on the case. A case calendar is a weekly schedule of
court-room/judge pairings, usually made up of two or three judges. Judges typically only
hear cases associated with their case calendar. Similarly, since chancery court cases are
only assigned to one calendar, only the associated judges will oversee an action on that
case. When a case is filed, it is assigned a unique case number, sorted by property type
(single-family home, condominium, commercial property, etc.), and randomly assigned to a
case calendar.10 As of 2010, there were 12 chancery court case calendars hearing foreclosure
cases (there are additional calendars that hear only other chancery court cases). Judges are
assigned to case calendars each year by the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
There are several ways that a Cook County judge might influence the outcome of a fore-
closure case, which is necessary for the validity of our instrument.11 Firstly, the judge has
discretion to determine how long a defendant has to find a lawyer and mount a defense.
Secondly, even if a defendant does not mount a defense, the judge determines whether or not
the lender successfully establishes that the borrower is behind on payments and that the debt
is owed to the lender. Establishing these points is not trivial. Throughout the foreclosure
crisis, there have been accounts of mistakes and wrongdoing in the prosecution of foreclo-
sures (Kiel (2012)), including failures of banks to produce proper documentation or lenders
initiating foreclosure proceedings without reviewing the history of the loan (“robosigning”).
Similarly, it us up to the judge to evaluate a borrower’s defense, for example by determining
10Random assignment of cases to case calendars is performed by the Chancery Court computer sys-
tem. As described on the Chancery Court’s FAQ page, “When a case is filed in the Law Division
it is randomly assigned via a computer program to a calendar letter. You may contact the Informa-
tion Desk in Law Division to obtain the Judge’s information associated with the calendar letter.” See
www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/?section=FAQSPage
11There is substantial evidence of judicial bias in many settings: Anderson et al. (1999) illustrate important
differences across judges in decision-making—sometimes suggestive of bias (e.g., Abrams et al. (2008) or
Yang (2012)), and sometimes more generally based on “personal assessments” of case-specific information
(Iaryczower (2009)). Berdejo and Chen (2010) present evidence suggestive of unconscious judicial bias—
illustrating priming effects on judges of wars (which suppress dissents)—as well as more partisan behavior
before Presidential elections.
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whether a mortgage is legal in the first place (e.g., is not in violation of (predatory) lending
laws). Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges vary substantially in their leniency on these
issues.12
In what follows, we use the random assignment of foreclosure cases to case calendars to
instrument the outcome that the case ends in foreclosure. As discussed above, judges may
influence the outcome of a case. At the same time, the case calendar to which a foreclosure
case is randomly assigned determines the possible judges who will ever hear the case. If
judges vary sufficiently in their biases toward foreclosure, then the case calendar to which
a case is assigned may influence whether a case ends in foreclosure or dismissal.13 Thus,
our identification relies on the comparison of two delinquent borrowers going through the
foreclosure process, one of whom is randomly assigned to a “lenient” case calendar and ends in
dismissal, while the other is randomly assigned to a “strict” calendar and ends in foreclosure.
To implement this study we require data on Cook County foreclosure cases, including case
calendar assignment and the case outcome (foreclosure or dismissal).
1.3 Data
We use geocoded administrative data for Cook County from three sources: Cook County
chancery court records, foreclosure filings, and deed transfer records. Publicly available
chancery court records for 2004–2010 provide us with details of each foreclosure case, in-
cluding the information necessary to construct our instrument: the case calendar to which
the case is randomly assigned and the outcome of the case (dismissal or foreclosure). To
study neighborhood outcomes, however, we need to know the location of borrowers’ homes.
12The Washington Post observes, for example, that “[in] Suffolk and Nassau counties on Long Island and
Kings County... which have among the highest rates of foreclosure in the state and where the 81 judges
handling foreclosures have become infamous over the past few years for scrutinizing paperwork ... the level
of tolerance for document mistakes varies from judge to judge ...” (emphasis added). “Some judges chastise
banks over foreclosure paperwork”, Washington Post, 9 November 2010.
13Of course, once assigned to a case calendar, the judge within that calendar who hears a case may is
not necessarily random. For this reason, we use the case calendar (group of potential judges) as the unit of
randomization to ensure orthogonality of the instrument to unobservable characteristics. As long as there is
sufficient bias across judges to ensure that the case calendar (group) to which a case is assigned influences
the outcome, then the instrument remains valid.
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To this end, we match each chancery court foreclosure case record to the associated fore-
closure filing record (2002–2011), which has been provided to us by Chicago-based Record
Information Services, Inc. (RIS). These records allow us to observe new foreclosure filings
that occur around any given delinquent homeowner’s property, which we use to study fore-
closure contagion. To observe how completed foreclosures affect housing markets—prices
and sales volumes—we rely on deed transfer records (1995–2008) provided to us by the Paul
Milstein Center for Real Estate at the Columbia Business School. These records allow us to
observe the state of the housing market around each property going through the foreclosure
courts. Finally, we bolster the information about each neighborhood using data from the
2000 Decennial Census and Zillow housing price indices.
The Cook County chancery court makes public all court records, which include details
on each foreclosure case. We manually collected data for each of the 217,230 chancery court
cases filed between January 1 2004 and June 30 2010 from the court’s public electronic
docket.14 Each record identifies the case number (a unique identifier assigned by the court),
the type of case (e.g., foreclosure vs. other chancery case), the plaintiff (lending institution
or mortgage servicer), the defendant, and the case calendar. The records also include every
action on the case (and corresponding date), although the action descriptions are terse.
We rely on foreclosure filings from RIS to identify the location of properties going through
the foreclosure process. The RIS data span all 307,209 foreclosure cases filed between 2002
and 2011 in Cook County. These records contain the same variables as the online chancery
court records, except RIS does not collect the case calendar. However, RIS also collects
information not included in the court records, such as the type of property (single-family,
condo, etc.), details about the mortgage (type of mortgage, original loan principal, outstand-
ing balance at time of foreclosure filing), any additional lien holders identified on the filing,
and the address and latitude/longitude of the home under foreclosure. Finally, RIS also
collects a record of each foreclosure auction between 2002 and 2011 (168,577 in total). This
14www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org
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allows us to conclusively observe a foreclosure outcome and associated date.
We match the chancery court records to the RIS foreclosure filings by case id.15 The
resulting data set covers 174,187 foreclosure filings in Cook County filed between January
2004 and June 2010. For each record, we observe the date the case is filed, whether and when
the case is dismissed or foreclosed, the location of the home under foreclosure, and the above-
mentioned details of the property and mortgage. We consider a case as ending in completed
foreclosure if the RIS records indicate that a foreclosure auction occurs for that property
and mortgage, and we consider the auction date to be the end of the case. We consider a
foreclosure case as being dismissed if it does not have an associated foreclosure auction and
if the chancery court data records a dismissal action, where we take the date of the dismissal
action as the relevant “dismissal date” (see the Data Appendix for details of these variable
definitions). For our analysis, we drop 847 filings associated with Veterans Affairs mortgages
(VA), 12,755 filings made during the Cook County foreclosure moratorium of 2009,16 and
12,365 filings made during the first or last year in which a case calendar hears foreclosure
cases, as cases may be non-randomly assigned as the calendar makes the transition.17 Our
results are robust to these sample restrictions.
The majority of cases end in a completed foreclosure, while a small fraction of cases are
unresolved due to right-censoring. As can be seen in Table 1.1, which provides descriptive
statistics (imposing the above-mentioned sample restrictions), 90,653 (61.2%) cases have an
15 See the Data Appendix for more details on the cleaning process.
16Cook County enacted a moratorium on new foreclosure filings on April 16, 2009 to last through September
1, 2009. This moratorium applied to all new filings except those in which the borrower agreed not to mount
a defense prior to filing. The effect of the foreclosure moratorium can be seen in Figure 1.1: we see that
the number of cases filed dips sharply during the moratorium (left axis), while the foreclosure rate jumps
up (right axis). Interestingly, it seems the moratorium finished early—new filings spike before September 1,
2009.
17Case calendars have been added over time to ease the burden on existing calendars. In our data, we
observe the addition of six new calendars to the foreclosure roster and the phase-out of 16 calendars (that
move from hearing foreclosure cases to hearing exclusively other chancery cases). Unfortunately, the details of
these phase-in and phase-out processes are not well publicized and we observe unusually low case assignment
to these calendars during the phase-in periods. Our concern is that as new calendars are introduced to the
foreclosure process they are restricted in the type of foreclosure cases that they hear. Indeed, including cases
assigned to new case calendars in our sample brings our IV estimates closer in line with the OLS estimates,
suggesting some non-random assignment to newly introduced calendars.
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associated foreclosure auction, 50,140 end in dismissal (33.8%), and the remaining 7,427
foreclosure cases remain undecided due to right-censoring. The average length of a case is
about 373.6 days, although this is significantly longer for cases that end in foreclosure (428.7
days vs. 274.9 for dismissals). Since the Cook County chancery court records are up to
date as of the date of collection (early 2012), and the RIS foreclosure auctions are up to
date through 2011, we do not observe the end of particularly long cases. This is especially
true for cases filed in 2009 and 2010, from which 79.08% of the undecided cases originate.
We omit these undecided cases from our analyses (as well as cases for which we observe the
decision, but do not have data on our outcomes for that year).
Among dismissals, we see that only 12.0% of the borrowers “redefault”, suggesting that
the dismissal outcome does not merely delay a completed foreclosure. We define redefault as
a new foreclosure filing occurring against the same loan after the first case has been decided;
this definition excludes future defaults to the same borrower on different loans and future
defaults from different borrowers at the same property. Since dismissed cases make up our
counterfactual in studying the neighborhood-level effects of completed foreclosures, this low
rate of redefault is reassuring—in most instances dismissing a case does not merely delay
the foreclosure (for example, while the lender finds a missing mortgage note), but provides
a concrete resolution of the mortgage default within the time frame that we observe.
To study the neighborhood-level effect of completed foreclosure on housing sales and
prices we rely on deed transfer records for Cook County from 1995–2008. These records
cover the universe of real estate transactions and indicate the date of sale, the sale price,
and the property type (residential, commercial, etc.). We restrict this data to residential
real estate transactions between 2000 and 2008,18 which leaves us with 862,215 residential
real estate sales. The mean sale price for these transactions is $276,401, while the median is
$215,000. We geocode the transactions using the reported property address (using Yahoo!
Placefinder), allowing us to observe transactions near properties associated with foreclosure
18See the Data Appendix for more details.
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cases.
Finally, we add data from the 2000 Decennial Census matched by tract and the IRS
Statistics of Income (SOI) and Zillow (matched by zip code). The Census provides us with
details (as of 2000) on the population density, race, and median of the census tract in which
each property is located. The IRS Statistics of Income provide a measure of zip-code-level
income (mean adjusted gross income) derived from aggregated tax returns. These data are
available for the 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2004–2008 tax years (for 2003, we use the mean of
2002 and 2004, while for 2009+ we use the observed adjusted gross income in 2008). Zillow
provides zip-code-level housing price indices for 2000–2011.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Our primary objective is to estimate whether and to what extent a completed home foreclo-
sure is contagious, which we define in terms of the question: does one completed foreclosure
cause new foreclosure filings? To this end, we compare the number of new foreclosure fil-
ings in neighborhoods around properties going through the foreclosure process that end in
a completed foreclosure to properties that end in dismissal. An obvious concern is that
there is non-random selection into completed foreclosure (versus dismissal); we deal with
this endogeneity and omitted variable bias by instrumenting a completed foreclosure using
the random assignment of foreclosure cases to chancery court case calendars.
For each property that goes through the foreclosure courts, we measure all outcomes
annually within an x-mile radius of the property. We measure outcomes relative to the date
that the case is decided (either the date of the foreclosure auction or the date of the court
action in which the case is dismissed). For case i, let d(i) be the time period in which the case
is decided and Yi,d(i)+t be the outcome for property i measured within an x-mile radius of the
property, t periods from the decision date. In practice, we measure time in terms of years:
d(i) is the year in which case i is decided, d(i)+1 is the year after the case is decided, and so
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on.19 In our baseline specification we use a 0.1-mile radius around each property, although
our results are not sensitive to taking smaller or larger radii (of the same order of magnitude).
We choose this radius both for comparability with existing literature (e.g., Campbell et al.
(2011)) and to reduce the extent of observations with overlapping neighborhoods (see the
discussion in the following paragraph). As an example of how we construct our outcomes, one
measure of contagion we consider is the number of new foreclosure filings within a 0.1-mile
radius of each property every year since the case is decided.
One consequence of using foreclosure cases (rather than mortgages) as the unit of obser-
vation is that the neighborhoods around cases may overlap. Ideally, we would use mortgages
as the unit of observation and relate the probability of each mortgage defaulting to the
number of neighboring foreclosures (instrumented by the expected number of neighboring
foreclosures). However, in our data we only observe mortgages when they have an associ-
ated foreclosure filing; we do not observe mortgages that never enter into the foreclosure
process. With our specification, cases within 2x miles of one another will have overlapping
neighborhoods of observation. The completed foreclosure (versus dismissal) treatment will
be imperfectly assigned—e.g., the neighborhood around a case that is dismissed may overlap
with the neighborhood around a case that ends in completed foreclosure.20 However, our
instrument is still randomly assigned and will not be correlated with neighborhood overlap.
Additionally, the geographic clustering of our standard errors (discussed below) will account
for correlated shocks between observations with overlapping neighborhoods. Finally, we test
the sensitivity of our contagion estimates to this potential overlap by restricting our sample
to cases with no neighboring foreclosures or foreclosure filings within recent years of the
case’s decision (we discuss this exercise in Section 1.5.1).
To achieve our goal of comparing cases filed at the same time that have different outcomes
19We have also tried months and quarters. However, since home sales and foreclosure filings in small
geographic areas are low-frequency events, estimates using these finer units of time end up being low-powered
and imprecise.
20The extent of overlap is not trivial given the high volume of foreclosure filings in Chicago during the
crisis and the possibility of foreclosure contagion. The median observation in our sample has four neighboring
filings within 0.2 miles in the two years prior to the end of the case and one neighbor within 0.1 miles.
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(owing to the random assignment of case calendars) we include several sets of fixed effects
in our baseline specification. Filing-month fixed effects, Mm(i), where m(i) is the filing
month associated with case i, allow us to compare foreclosure and dismissal among cases
filed at roughly the same time (and, as explained below, we construct our instrument at
the filing-month level). However, cases filed in the same month may be decided in different
years. Since we do not want our estimates to be based on the comparison of cases decided
in drastically different times (e.g., the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 versus the peak
of the boom in 2006) we include year-of-observation fixed effects, ψd(i)+t.21 In our baseline
specification, we also include property-type fixed effects, Φi (single-family home, condo,
etc.), as cases are sorted by property type prior to randomization to case calendar. Finally,
we include a vector of covariates, Xi (loan principal at origination, a dummy variable for
the lender/plaintiff being a “large” plaintiff (six largest plaintiffs each representing ≥ 7000
filings), a dummy variable for the plaintiff having a “large” attorney (three largest attorneys
each representing ≥10,000 cases), whether the census tract has an above-median share of
white residents, a set of dummy variables for the quartile of median census-tract income, and
census tract population density). While these controls improve precision, our estimates are
robust to excluding both the property-type fixed effects and the covariates. The resulting
relationship we estimate is:
Yi,d(i)+t = β0 + β1Fi + βXi +Mm(i) + Φi + ψd(i)+t + ui,d(i)+t (1)
where Fi is an indicator for case i ending in foreclosure. Our goal is to estimate β1 from
Specification 1 separately for each value of t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for contagion and t ∈ {0, 1, 2}
for price and sales effects (due to data limitations).
21One concern is that the length of the case is itself endogenous. We have explored this in several ways:
in Table 1.14 we estimate the baseline effects measuring the outcome as of the date that the foreclosure case
is filed (rather than decided). While this leads to somewhat noisier estimates (the treatment is diluted by
cases that have not yet been decided) the results are generally consistent with our baseline estimates. In
Table 1.15 of the appendix we add controls for the length of the case and find that our contagion results
hold.
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We cluster our standard errors along two dimensions: filing month and census tract
(Cameron et al. (2011)). Clustering on filing month captures correlation due to macroeco-
nomic trends—cases filed in the same month may experience similar shocks. Since we also
expect correlation between properties that exist in the same geographic area, we cluster at
the census tract level. One issue with multi-way clustering that we occasionally encounter is
invalid negative variance terms (and a non-positive-definite variance matrix). As suggested
in Cameron et al. (2011), we conservatively address this by taking the maximum of the stan-
dard errors clustered only on filing month, clustered only on census tract, and clustered on
filing month and census tract (and the minimum of the corresponding first-stage F-statistics).
1.4.1 Measuring Local Contagion and Prices
We define two outcomes to test for contagion. Firstly, we consider an indicator for whether
any new foreclosure filing occurs within x miles of property i in year d(i) + t—how does a
completed foreclosure affect the probability of observing any new foreclosure filing? This
outcome is of interest when there are few filings in the neighborhood and speaks to the
question of whether a completed foreclosure influences the general state of nearby mortgages.
However, this measure is of limited interest in neighborhoods or time periods with high
filing rates filing—when all neighborhoods have at least one filing, a completed foreclosure
will have no effect on the probability of any new filing. Secondly, we consider the count of
new foreclosure filings within x miles of property i in year d(i) + t—how does a completed
foreclosure affect the total number of new filings? In both cases, we omit new foreclosure
filings at the same address or associated with the same foreclosure case, but at a different
address (e.g., a loan taken with multiple properties as collateral). We also consider the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the probability of any and total number of neighboring
completed foreclosures.
We also examine the effect of a completed foreclosure on local housing prices, although
our estimates are hampered by sample size. While important in its own right, understanding
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the pecuniary externality associated with completed foreclosure helps assess whether loss of
home equity as a channel of foreclosure contagion. We take the log of the average sale price of
all properties that sell within the x-mile radius of property i in the year of observation d(i)+t.
Importantly, we omit the delinquent property itself to ensure that our price estimates are
not influenced by an own-price discount of foreclosure (as found by Campbell et al. (2011)).
This measure does not account for selection into sale—the types of homes that sell after a
completed foreclosure may be different from the types of homes that sell after a dismissal.
This selection may drive any observed price effects. Unfortunately, a hedonic approach is
not possible since we do not observe property characteristics in our data.
While we cannot estimate selection into sale in terms of the types of homes that sell, we
can observe whether the volume of sales itself changes. For each property going through the
foreclosure process, i, we take as an outcome the count of sales, as of d(i) + t, that have
occurred within x miles of property i since the year of decision, d(i). We omit sales at the
delinquent property i itself to avoid the mechanical effect of foreclosure on sales. A change
in the quantity of sales in response to a completed foreclosure suggests that some sellers (or
buyers) are selecting into or out of the market. At the same time, observing no response of
sales volume does not prove that there is no selection.
To further explore selection into sale, we study the subset of repeat-sales (about 44%
of the sample) in our data to adjust for fixed property characteristics. We estimate the
quality-adjusted home value by netting out property-specific fixed effects—details are in the
appendix. Our estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on the log of the mean
quality-adjusted price will not be biased by selection into sales under two assumptions.
Firstly, we assume that there is not differential occurrence of repeat sales around properties
that end in completed foreclosure vs. dismissal (i.e., no selection into sample). Secondly,
we assume that the property characteristics that determine sale price are not changing dif-
ferentially for properties near a completed foreclosure vs. a dismissal (i.e., the error in the
repeat-sales adjustment is invariant to the case outcome). Our repeat-sales estimates may
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suffer from imprecision due to measurement error in the repeat-sales adjusted measure of
home value.
The means of the various outcomes, as displayed in Table 1.2, suggest foreclosure con-
tagion and a foreclosure price effect. These averages are constructed using all concluded
cases (with the above-mentioned sample restrictions) observed annually for up to five years
after the case decision for contagion outcomes, and up to two years after for price and sales;
each observation represents a case-year. The means in the upper panel of Table 1.2 sug-
gest foreclosure contagion: on average, there are 0.435 fewer new foreclosure filings per year
around properties whose cases are dismissed than properties associated with foreclosures.
There is also evidence that completed foreclosures disrupt the housing market (see the lower
panel): properties that end in foreclosure see a higher volume of neighboring sales (3.099
per year relative to 2.962 near dismissed homes). At the same time, these sales occur at a
lower average price—$157,181.90 vs. $184,212.50—although this difference is not apparent
in the repeat-sales-adjusted price. While these descriptive statistics suggest negative exter-
nalities of home foreclosure, these comparisons of means suffer from omitted variable bias
and endogeneity of home foreclosure.
1.4.2 Instrumental Variables Approach and First Stage Regression
There are several reasons home foreclosures may be endogenous to neighborhood-level char-
acteristics. A completed foreclosure is not a random event—it is the product of the choice of
a borrower to default on a loan, the choice of a lender to pursue a foreclosure, and the actions
of the associated attorneys and judges. The borrower default decision may be influenced by
local housing prices, the type of mortgage a borrower has, and the borrower’s financial posi-
tion (both in terms of balance sheet, and cash flow). For example, foreclosures may be more
likely to occur in neighborhoods with lower housing price levels and negative price growth
(Campbell and Cocco (2011)). Similarly, the lender’s decision to pursue a foreclosure versus
a loan modification depends on the home value, the probability that the borrower re-defaults
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on a modified loan, the probability that the borrower brings him/herself out of delinquency
without a modification, and, if the loan is serviced by a company that is not the creditor, the
potential fees associated with foreclosure (Foote et al. (2008), Levitin and Twomey (2011)).
Descriptive empirical evidence suggests that observable borrower and neighborhood char-
acteristics are correlated with home foreclosures. Table 1.1 shows means for various covari-
ates broken down by case outcome, where the fourth column contains the p-value on the
test of equality between the foreclosure and dismissal. Cases that end in foreclosure are
significantly less likely to be single-family homes (59.0% vs. 68.4%), more likely to have a
plaintiff that is a “large institution” (47.3% vs. 47.2%) or have a plaintiff represented by a
“large attorney” (68.7% vs. 68.2%), are less likely to have a conventional fixed-rate mortgage
(65.3% vs. 66.5%), and tend to be in neighborhoods with lower median income (43,748.26
vs. 46,409.49), a lower share of white residents (43.3% vs. 46.8%), and a lower population
density. While studies have attempted to control for omitted variable bias using very local
fixed effects analyses (see summaries in Foote et al. (2009), Towe and Lawley (2013)), ours
is the first study to directly address the endogeneity of home foreclosure with a randomly
assigned instrument.
We use a measure of the propensity to foreclose for each chancery court case calendar as
an instrument for completed foreclosure. We construct our instrumental variable to capture
the notion of judicial bias—the judges on some case calendars are more likely to foreclose
than others, all else equal—by taking the “jackknife” or “leave-one-out” foreclosure rate for
each case calendar, as is common in studies that use judicial random assignment as an instru-
mental variable (e.g., Kling (2006), Doyle (2007), Dobbie and Song (2013)). Specifically, for
each case i, filed in month m(i) and randomly assigned to calendar k, we take the foreclosure







where Km(i) is the set of all cases filed in month m(i) and assigned to calendar k, n(Km(i))
is the cardinality of set Km(i), and Fj = 1 if case j ends in a completed foreclosure. A case
calendar with “strict” judges whose cases end often in foreclosure will have a high value of
the instrument, Zi, while a calendar with “lenient” judges will have a low value. By omitting
case i when constructing the instrument, we ensure that we are not regressing the outcome
of the case on itself (resulting in a mechanical correlation in the first stage). Calculating
this instrument at the filing-month level accommodates changing case-calendar rosters and
attitudes of judges over time.22 Failing to account for these changes may violate monotonicity
of the instrument.
Our first-stage regression relates an indicator for a case ending in foreclosure to our
measure of case-calendar strictness. For each case, we regress an indicator for the case ending
in foreclosure (Fi) on the instrument. As with the second stage described in Specification
1, we include filing month fixed effects, Mm(i), property-type fixed effects, Φi and year of
observation fixed effects (Ψd(i)+t). The resulting first-stage regression is:
Fi = α0 + α1Zi + αXi +Mm(i) + Φi +Ψd(i)+t + vi (3)
We rely on the usual instrumental variables assumptions: the instrument influences the
outcome of the foreclosure case (instrument relevance), the instrument is randomly assigned
(instrument exogeneity), the instrument does not itself influence neighborhood outcomes
except through foreclosure of the house in question (exclusion restriction), and an increase
in the instrument is associated with an increase in the probability of the case ending in
foreclosure (monotonicity). We check the instrument relevance by examining the first-stage
F-statistic for all of our regressions (presented in the Tables discussed in subsequent sections)
and find a strong relationship between the instrument and completed foreclosure (Table 1.13
in the Appendix presents the coefficients from the baseline first-stage relationship: a one
percentage-point increase in the case-calendar foreclosure rate increases the probability of a
22For example, we see in Figure 1.1 that the foreclosure rate changes over time.
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completed foreclosure by 0.556 percentage points).
If the rules of the Chancery Court are followed, then the instrument should be randomly
assigned and appear independent of case characteristics. We run two sets of regressions to
check the assumption that the instrument, Zi, is exogenous. First, we regress Zi on a set of
pre-treatment covariates (controlling for property type and filing month):
Zi = γ0 + γXi +Mm(i) + Φi + ei (4)
where Zi is the instrument, Xi is a vector of fixed or pre-treatment property and case char-
acteristics, and Mm(i) and Φi are filing month and property type fixed effects. Random
assignment (conditional on filing month and property type) implies that none of the covari-
ates predict the value of the instrument (H0 : γi = 0) and nor do they jointly determine
the value of the instrument (H0 : γ1 = γ2 = ... = γk = 0). Second, we regress each of these
covariates on a full vector of case calendar dummies:
Xji = ρ0 +
￿
k
ρkκki +Mm(i) + Φi + ui (5)
where Xji is a given pre-treatment characteristic j observed for case i, and κki is a vector of
calendar-specific dummy variables such that κki = 1 if case i is assigned to calendar k. We
then test the joint significance of these dummy variables: H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = ... = ρk = 0 .
The first column of Table 1.3 presents the coefficient estimates from Specification 4 and
the p-value for the joint significance test of the covariates. We see no evidence of systematic
correlation between pre-treatment covariates and the instrument, and cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the covariates are jointly insignificant. The second column displays the p-value
for the joint significance test of case calendar dummies for Specification 5, where the out-
come variable is given by the row. Again, there is no systematic relationship between case
calendar assignment and pre-treatment covariates, with the exception of loan principal.23
23Given that we are conducting 19 significance tests in this table, we would expect to observe significance
at the 5% level about once (or 0.95 times). Moreover, the relationship between loan principal and the
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Importantly, we see no relationship between the instrument and total filings and total com-
pleted foreclosures (our two main contagion outcomes) in the year prior to the case being
filed. We conclude that, conditional on filing month and property type, case calendars are
randomly assigned.
The assumption that the instrument does not itself influence neighborhood-level outcomes
is reasonable. The outcomes we are studying are the result of the decisions of those not
involved in the court case (e.g., neighboring home owners). Moreover, while foreclosure
cases span many months, defendants will have minimal direct contact with the presiding
judges.
Finally, we find no evidence of a failure of monotonicity. The assumption maintains that
a higher value of the instrument—i.e., being assigned to a stricter case calendar—weakly
increases the probability of foreclosure for all cases. One can imagine a prejudiced judge
who is lenient toward delinquent wealthy borrowers, for example, but push for foreclosure
against defendants of lower social class. Then if there are disproportionately more of one
type of borrower, a higher value of the instrument will not mean a higher probability of
foreclosure for all cases. We explore this possibility by relating group-level foreclosure rates
(e.g., foreclosure rate among cases in predominantly white vs. non-white census tracts)
within each case calendar to the overall foreclosure rate for each calendar and find that
foreclosure rates for sub-groups are all increasing with the overall case calendar foreclosure
rate. A discussion of these results can be found in the appendix.24
instrument is economically small: a one percentage-point increase in the case-calendar-specific foreclosure
rate is associated with a drop of 0.0045 standard deviations in the instrument.
24As suggested by Mueller-Smith (2013), we have also estimated our baseline specification by construct-
ing the instrument separately for various sub-groups. If monotonicity is violated, then these results may
differ substantially. While we do not see a substantial difference in our baseline results (see Table 1.16
in the Appendix), these “monotonicity-robust” estimates are imprecise; as splitting the data into filing-
month/characteristics cells often yields few observations per cell.
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1.4.3 Interpretation of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate
Our estimate captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) for foreclosure cases in
which judges are influential, compounds the effect of all subsequent completed foreclosures
caused by the initial foreclosure, and is representative of neighborhoods with many foreclo-
sure filings. The estimate does not represent the effect of a completed foreclosure relative to
a mortgage that is in good standing; rather, the estimate represents the effect of a completed
foreclosure relative to the effect of a foreclosure case being dismissed. We argue that this
parameter is of interest to policy makers.
Firstly, as discussed in Doyle (2007), if there are heterogeneous treatment effects the pa-
rameter identified by a judicial random assignment instrumental variable (or in Doyle’s case,
rotationally assigned case workers) is the LATE for “marginal” cases—those where the judge
is likely to have an influence. Intuitively, there are cases that will always end in foreclosure
and cases that will always end in dismissal; the set of “compliers” with our instrument are
the marginal cases where the judges on the case calendar have influence on the outcome.25
We find that the characteristics of the sub-population of loans that comply with our in-
strument are consistent with cases on the margin of foreclosure or dismissal, representing
individuals who have a higher ability to pay than the typical delinquent borrower, but are
facing difficult circumstances that could be mitigated through loan modification. We stratify
the sample along several margins: tract-level quartile of income (from the 2000 Decennial
Census), whether the loan is from a “large” lender, whether the mortgage is conventional,
whether the zip code experiences positive price growth in the year that the case is filed, and
a proxy for whether the property is worth less than the loan (“underwater”).26 Our goal is to
proxy characteristics of borrowers who are likely to benefit from loan modification; creditors
25We can conceive of situations where judges will not matter. Sophisticated borrowers may always be able
to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages (and a dismissal of the case), regardless of who the judge is.
Other borrowers may resign themselves to walking away from their home and mortgage and choose not to
appear in court at all.
26We define a proxy for a borrower being underwater as whether or not the outstanding debt at filing is
larger than the initial loan principal.
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may be more willing to modify in such situations (Adelino et al. (2009)), making them more
responsive to judicial input. For each sub-sample, G, we estimate the first-stage:
Fi = α0 + α1GZi + αXi +Mm(i) + Φi +Ψd(i)+t + vi ∀i ∈ G (6)
We then take the ratio of the estimate of the first-stage relationship for group G to the
estimate for the full sample from Specification 3: ˆα1G
α̂1
. As described by Angrist and Pischke
(2008), the ratio of the sub-group-specific first stage to the full-sample first stage represents
the relative likelihood that a complier belongs to the given subgroup.
We interpret our estimates of these ratios, presented in Table 1.4, as demonstrating that
compliant cases are likely to be on the margin of completed foreclosure. The upper panel
shows that compliers are more likely to be in the upper two quartiles of income than the
general population of foreclosure cases. Taking income as a measure of a borrower’s ability
to repay their loan, these estimates suggest that compliers are more likely than the typical
borrower to be able to resume payments if the case is dismissed.
At the same time, the compliant sub-population may benefit from a mortgage modifi-
cation. Compliant borrowers are less likely to be in a zip code with positive price growth.
Falling house prices may be largely responsible for the default crisis (Mayer et al. (2009)):
borrowers may be in default because they expect to lose money on their mortgages as hous-
ing prices fall and the value of the asset drops below the cost of the debt. A modification
reducing the loan principal or the interest rate may reduce the anticipated loss, making
default and foreclosure less appealing. At the same time, compliant borrowers are not in
dire straits—they are less likely to be underwater on their loans, so a modification may be
more effective (home value is not so low that the mortgage is a lost cause) and may result in
smaller losses to lenders than modification of more severely underwater loans. Additionally,
compliers are less likely to have conventional loans. There is some suspicion that unconven-
tional mortgages are responsible for many defaults during the crisis. For example, borrowers
with low “teaser” interest rates or balloon payments may have been expecting to refinance
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their loans to avoid higher monthly payments, but found themselves without this option
during the financial crisis. In such cases, a modification may be particularly effective (by
mimicking the effect of a refinance).27 Finally, it is interesting to note that the differential
characteristics of the compliant population appear borrower specific—compliers are no more
or less likely to have a loan from a “large” lender.
Secondly, our LATE estimate does not simply identify the effect of a single completed
foreclosure, but compounds the effects of all subsequent induced foreclosures. If foreclosures
are contagious, then a completed foreclosure will lead to subsequent foreclosure filings. In
turn, some of these filings will become completed foreclosures and themselves cause new
filings. Since our empirical strategy compares the neighborhoods around cases in the fore-
closure courts each year after the case is decided and does not control for the effects of
subsequent foreclosures, our estimates will compound the effects of these subsequent foreclo-
sures. We believe that this parameter is relevant to policy makers since it represents broad
consequences of the marginal foreclosure, although is imperfect, as the 0.1 mile radius will
only partially capture the effect of successive foreclosures.
Similarly, if there is foreclosure contagion, our LATE represents neighborhoods with
several completed foreclosures. There is selection into our sample: we only observe neigh-
borhoods around properties going through the foreclosure courts. If completed foreclosures
induce subsequent filings resulting in additional observations in our data, neighborhoods with
previous completed foreclosures will be over-represented in our sample. This does not affect
the validity of the instrument—case calendars are still randomly assigned—but influences
the interpretation of the LATE. Nonetheless, we find that our contagion estimates persist
when we restrict the sample to properties with no foreclosures in the past two years within
0.1 miles.
Finally, our estimates are conditional upon a foreclosure filing having occurred in the
neighborhood. Our empirical strategy and data set necessarily rely on comparing neigh-
27 At the same time, there is debate about the importance of unconventional loans in the default decision
(c.f., Mayer et al. (2009)), so this channel may be less relevant.
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borhoods around properties that are already going through the foreclosure process. Our
estimates will not account for any externalities associated with a borrower default or a fore-
closure filing. Many have argued that it is a completed foreclosure and subsequent real-estate
ownership of the associated property that drives foreclosure-related externalities. While we
cannot speak to any spillovers from borrower default, our estimates provide a well-identified
answer to whether there are negative spillovers associated with the completed foreclosure
itself.
The LATE represented by our estimates is a relevant parameter for the policy question of
how best to address the problems of delinquent borrowers. Policymakers concerned with fore-
closures can focus on several stages of the lending process: how easy it is to originate/obtain
mortgages, how to prevent borrowers from defaulting, and what to do once a borrower has
defaulted. Our parameter, which is estimated conditional on foreclosure filing, focuses di-
rectly on the latter question.28 Moreover, the LATE is relevant for cases on the margin of
foreclosure and dismissal, and who are influenced by foreclosure court judges. These cases
are also likely to be influenced by policies discouraging foreclosure on delinquent loans.
1.5 Neighborhood-Level Effects of Completed Foreclosure
We find robust evidence of foreclosure contagion that persists over several years. Neighbor-
hoods around a completed foreclosure are 10% more likely to have at least one foreclosure
filing in a given year relative to neighborhoods around a dismissed property and experience
around 0.5 to 0.7 more total filings per year. We also find that residential properties that
transact around completed foreclosures do so at a price discount (on the order of 30–40%),
although this effect may be largely explained by negative selection into sale.
28Of course, the usual partial-equilibrium caveat applies: any change to foreclosure policy may affect ex-
ante incentives (e.g., Mayer et al. (2011)) and housing market outcomes (e.g., Pence 2006), which are not
captured in our reduced-form estimates.
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1.5.1 Contagion in Foreclosure Filings
Our estimates demonstrate that completed foreclosures are contagious. Table 1.5 presents
our baseline 2SLS estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on the probability of
observing any neighboring foreclosure filing in a year and on the annual count of neighboring
foreclosure filings within 0.1 miles of the at-risk property. The 2SLS estimates show that a
completed foreclosure increases the probability of observing any new filing within 0.1 miles
by 0.052 percentage points in the year of the decision (a 7.4% increase in the mean for
all dismissed cases). This effect increases over time to 8.2 percentage points (11.7%) in the
second year after the decision, 9.0 percentage points (12.8%) in the third, and 24.7 percentage
points (35%) in the fourth year out. Similarly, the 2SLS estimates show that a completed
foreclosure causes 0.54 to 0.70 new foreclosure filings per year in the year the case is decided
and the following three years. This contagion represents a 25–32% increase in total annual
filings relative to an average of 2.161 filings per year around dismissed properties. Note that
the instrument is strong in the year of the decision through the second year after the decision
(F-stats around 200), although is relatively weak three, four and five years out owing to the
smaller sample for these periods.
Our contagion estimates are generally not sensitive to the specification, sample, or ge-
ographic measurement of the outcome. The results are robust to excluding the covariates,
omitting the property fixed effects, dropping cases decided in the summer months (the court
automatically dismisses inactive cases during this time), using a monotonicity-robust instru-
mental variable, using the full sample and including the foreclosure moratorium, omitting
each filing year one by one, and dropping neighborhood-years with foreclosure filings above
the 99th percentile (see Tables 1.16, 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19 in the Appendix). We also estimate
our baseline results measuring outcomes within 0.25 miles of the delinquent property and
find that contagion (and price effects, discussed below) persist—See Table 1.20.29 Finally, we
29The estimates for price generally decline as we increase the radius. We find minimal effect for any new
foreclosure filing—this is due to the fact most cases have at least one new filing per year within this expanded
radius (and so there is little variation in the outcome). On the other hand, the effects for total filings tend
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confirm that our estimates are driven by dismissals where the defendant retains possession
of the property (rather than deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure or short sales). We estimate our
baseline results on the sample of cases in which the plaintiff identifies that there are addi-
tional liens against the property. Although less precise, the point-estimates for this sample
are comparable to the full-sample estimates and are not significantly different (see Table 1.21
in the Appendix).
We further explore the validity of our estimates by applying the same 2SLS procedure
to our contagion outcomes measured in the three years prior to the case being filed. If our
instrumental variable is truly randomly assigned, we should not expect to see any effect of a
case ending in foreclosure before the case has even started. We present these “pre-treatment”
estimates in Table 1.7. Reassuringly, when instrumented by case calendar leniency, a case
ending in foreclosure appears to have no relationship to local housing prices prior to the start
of the case—the point estimates are close to zero and generally insignificant.
We examine the cumulative effect of a completed foreclosure in order to appreciate the full
extent of contagion. Rather than using as an outcome the number of new foreclosure filings
per year for each year since the decision, we instead consider the total number of new filings
since the decision. These estimates are presented in the second panel of Table 1.5 and show
that a completed foreclosure leads to a significant divergence in foreclosure filings relative to
a dismissal. As noted above, in the year of the decision a completed foreclosure causes 0.691
new filings. However, neighborhoods around completed foreclosures have experienced 2.09
more foreclosure filings by the second year after the decision, and 6.45 more filings by the
fourth year after the case ends. One completed foreclosure may have a substantial impact
on the composition of a neighborhood, at least in the short and medium term.
to be larger. There are two explanations for this. First, as the radius expands, the compounding effect of
neighboring completed foreclosures (induced by the initial observation) grows—the larger radius allows for
capturing more of the neighborhood around neighboring foreclosures. Second, as the radius grows the total
base number of properties that might file for foreclosure grows. Increasing the radius 2.5 times increases
the area of the neighborhood 6.25 times, thus dramatically increasing the potential number of properties
that may be affected by the completed foreclosure. However, the estimates themselves only grow by a factor
between about 2 and 4, suggesting that the effect declines with distance.
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One concern with our findings is that they are specific to neighborhoods that are experi-
encing a wave of foreclosures. Firstly, our period of study (2004–2011) is largely made up of
the housing crisis. Secondly, since we only observe neighborhoods where a foreclosure filing
has occurred, and since we do find that foreclosures are contagious, there is likely selection
into our sample—foreclosure filings (and, thus, observations in our data) are likely to be in
neighborhoods with recent completed foreclosures. From a policy perspective, it is especially
important to understand the cumulative impact of the first foreclosure in a neighborhood.
A completed foreclosure is contagious even in a neighborhood that has not experienced
a foreclosure in recent years. We restrict our sample to cases where there have been no
completed foreclosures within 0.1 miles in the two years prior to the decision (the results are
similar if we restrict to cases with no filings within two years) and estimate the cumulative
contagion effect of a completed foreclosure, presented at the bottom of the second panel
of Table 1.5. We find clear evidence that completed foreclosures are contagious even in
neighborhoods with no other recent completed foreclosures, although these results are less
precise than when we use the full sample owing to a smaller sample size: a completed
foreclosure leads to 1.3 more filings by the end of the first year after the decision, and almost
four more filings by the third year out. Even the first completed foreclosure in a neighborhood
has externalities. Moreover, these results suggest that the contagion we observe is not an
artifact of selection into the sample (cases induced into the sample because of neighboring
prior completed foreclosures).
Similarly, these results suggest that overlapping treatment and control neighborhoods
(i.e., properties around a case that ends in dismissal may also be within the neighborhood
of a case that ends in foreclosure) is not a serious problem with our baseline estimates. No
new filings within 0.1 miles in the past two years reduces the potential for such overlapping
neighborhoods. That contagion persists in these neighborhoods is reassuring. Of course, this
is an imperfect test: cases that have no new filings within 0.1 miles in the past two years
have a median of 1 new filing per year within 0.2 miles (whose 0.1 mile radius neighborhood
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will overlap). However, the extent of overlap for such cases is not too large. For example, the
overlapping region of a case that is 0.15 miles away represents 14.4% of the total neighborhood
area. When we restrict the sample to cases with no new filings within 0.2 miles in the past
two years, thus eliminating all potential for overlap, we suffer from small sample size. The
(unreported) point estimates still suggest foreclosure contagion (around 0.6 new filings per
year in the first three years), but the estimates are very imprecise.30
Finally, we find that contagion is strongest during the peak of the housing bubble and
beginning of the crash, and disappears at the height of the foreclosure crisis. We estimate
the baseline specification restricting the data to a constant sample of cases for which we
observe a full three years after the decision.31 We present estimates for the constant sample
(cases decided in 2004 through 2008 and observed for three years after the decision) in Table
1.6. These estimates show strong evidence of contagion—a completed foreclosure increases
the probability of any neighboring filing by between 6 and 17 percentage points. Similarly,
a completed foreclosure during this period increases the total number of new filings by 1.2
in the year of the decision, increasing to 1.6 the year after, and dropping down to 1.1 and
0.7 new filings in the subsequent two years. Interestingly, contagion is stronger for this
sample than for the baseline sample. In the bottom panel of Table 1.6 we present estimates
of contagion for the complementary sample—cases decided in 2009 through 2011, which we
observe for two or fewer years after the decision. There is little evidence of contagion during
this time period; the point estimates are very small (-0.018 to 0.027 for any filing, 0.099 to
0.239 for new filings). It is not surprising that during this period of heightened foreclosure
30An additional concern relates to the length of cases—as seen in Table 1.1, cases ending in dismissal are
significantly shorter than cases that end in completed foreclosure. A possible explanation is that foreclosure
externalities are driven by borrower behavior while in default, and the effect is larger for cases ending in
completed foreclosure since these cases are longer. To rule out this explanation, we estimate our baseline
2SLS estimates, adding flexible controls for the length of the case. We try three different sets of controls—log
of the number of months, a quadratic in number of months, and dummy variables for the number of quarters
of length—and present these results in Table 1.15 in the Appendix. These estimates show contagion effects
that are comparable to our baseline estimates, although the addition of these length-of-case controls reduces
the precision of the estimates.
31 This also addresses the issue of interpretation with the baseline estimates in the top panel of Table 1.5
that the sample changes each year (e.g., for cases decided in 2010, we only observe the year of decision and
one year out).
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activity we find no effect on any new filing per year—if most neighborhoods are already
experiencing a foreclosure filing (regardless of neighboring foreclosure cases), then there will
be little movement in this outcome. However, the fact that we find no effect of a completed
foreclosure on the total number of new filings suggests that foreclosure contagion is not a
strong force during this time period.
We interpret this finding of differential contagion by time period as evidence that fore-
closure contagion acts on marginal borrowers—those on the threshold of being able to stay
in their homes. In particular, at the peak of the housing bubble and beginning of the bust,
it may be that a completed foreclosure sends a stronger signal to mortgage holders at risk
of default—for example, a signal about the future of the neighborhood and local property
values or conveys information about the foreclosure process. Conversely, during the height
of the crisis (2009–2011) it may be that mortgage holders are already well informed about
the state of their mortgages and the foreclosure process itself. Indeed, neighborhoods in the
latter period experienced 16% more filings in the year the case is decided than in the earlier
period. Similarly, in Section 1.8.4 of the Appendix, we extend our empirical method to relate
counts of new filings to lagged counts of completed foreclosures for small neighborhoods. We
find a smaller, although non-zero, contagion effect in the latter period, and also find evidence
that the marginal contagion effect of a completed foreclosure diminishes as a neighborhood
experiences more foreclosures.
1.5.2 Contagion in Completed Foreclosures
To better understand the costs of foreclosure contagion, we look for contagion in completed
foreclosures. Above, we established contagion in foreclosure filings—the result of new bor-
rower defaults and lenders pursuing foreclosure action (we take up the discussion of these
two actions in more depth in Section 1.6). However, if we do not see contagion in com-
pleted foreclosures, then contagion in filings is unlikely to be a large contributor to the
spread of a foreclosure crisis. Moreover, the costs of new filings that end in dismissal are,
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perhaps, smaller than the costs of new completed foreclosures (for example, owing to pecu-
niary externalities of completed foreclosure, moving costs associated with the displacement
of homeowners, etc.).32
We find contagion in completed foreclosures. We estimate the baseline contagion IV re-
gressions replacing the outcomes with an indicator for any neighboring completed foreclosure
(within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since the case is decided) and the count of
completed foreclosures. We present these estimates in Table 1.8 and find that a completed
foreclosure moderately increases the probability of observing any neighboring completed fore-
closure (by 13.8 percentage points three-years out). Moreover, there is a notable increase in
the number of neighboring completed foreclosures: one completed foreclosure causes between
0.28 and 0.56 additional completed foreclosures annually (or between 40 and 93 percent off of
the mean). Thus, contagion appears to play an important role in the spread of foreclosures;
mitigating completed foreclosures may reduce the depth and costs of a housing crisis.
The timing of contagion in completed foreclosures suggests that borrowers and/or lenders
who are already involved in the foreclosure process respond to nearby events. Given how
long the foreclosure process takes—from default to filing to completed court case—it may
seem strange that we find contagion in completed foreclosures in the year of the decision.
However, borrowers and lenders may respond at any stage of the foreclosure process. For
example, a neighboring completed foreclosure may influence the effort a borrower puts into
fighting an ongoing foreclosure case by conveying information about the costs of fighting
foreclosure or the probability of a successful loan modification.33
32One difficulty in studying contagion in completed foreclosures is that the response may be driven by
judges. While this is not an issue when studying contagion in foreclosure filings—an event that depends
only on the actions of the borrower and lender—judges have an influence over the outcome of a foreclosure
case. We cannot explicitly rule out judge behavior as driving contagion in completed foreclosures. However,
we do not expect judge contagion to be a dominant force—this would require judges to be well informed
about recent events in the neighborhoods around the delinquent properties associated with their cases,
which we find unlikely given the volume of cases and judicial random assignment (judges do not specialize
in neighborhoods).
33Of course, this need not be a question of effort—given a binary choice (with no effort necessary) between
keeping their home and walking away, delinquent borrowers may be swayed toward the latter by neighboring
completed foreclosures (e.g., the neighboring event reduces the borrower’s perception of the value of the
neighborhood).
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Indeed, we find that completed foreclosures influence cases that are ongoing. For each
case, i, we split neighboring completed foreclosures into two groups: completed foreclosures
among cases filed before case i is decided and cases filed after case i is decided. By focusing
on the former group, we can observe how the outcome of case i influences ongoing foreclosure
cases. We define as an outcome the count of completed foreclosures among cases filed before
the decision (and an indicator for any completed foreclosure in this group as another outcome)
and estimate our contagion model—the results are presented in the lower panel of Table
1.8.34 The estimates show that a completed foreclosure causes 0.11 to 0.60 new completed
foreclosures per year among cases that were filed before the decision in the first two years
after the decision (these cases drive the contagion in the first two years, during which there is
minimal contagion among newly filed cases). These results provide evidence that contagion
acts not only through influencing the behavior of borrowers and lenders before filing (e.g.,
encouraging borrower default), but also by changing how borrowers/lenders approach an
ongoing foreclosure case.
1.5.3 Housing Markets
Our baseline 2SLS estimates, presented in the first panel of Table 1.9, suggest that a com-
pleted foreclosure lowers the average neighboring sale price over several years. The columns
of Table 1.9 present the baseline price and sales effects for the year in which the case is
decided, and one and two years after. The estimates suggest that a completed foreclosure
depresses neighboring residential sale prices by 12.7% in the year of the foreclosure, 41.1% in
34We present similar estimates for the complementary sample—completed foreclosures among cases filed
after case i is decided—in Table 1.22 of the Appendix. These estimates (in the upper panel) show a negative
effect of a completed foreclosure on neighboring completed foreclosures for the year of decision and the year
after, with a positive effect by the 2nd year out. However, the negative effect is not a result of more cases being
dismissed—estimates in the lower panel show no (or sometimes negative) effect of a completed foreclosure on
neighboring dismissals for this sample. Thus, it appears that the negative estimate for completed foreclosures
is a result of cases taking longer to be decided after a neighboring completed foreclosure, perhaps because
those cases that are induced into filing by the neighboring foreclosure are different in some sense (e.g., more
complicated, borrower puts up a stronger defense, etc.).
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the year after and 35.8% two years out.35 However, the precision of these estimates suffers
from a smaller sample size than our contagion results (we only observe housing sales through
June 2008 and only observe prices when a home sells): they are only significant in the year
after the decision and the first-stage F-statistics are around 20. Nonetheless, these estimates
are not sensitive to the same robustness checks described in Section 1.5.1 (see Tables 1.17,
1.23, and 1.24 in the appendix). Similarly, we see no pre-filing relationship between local
housing prices and the eventual outcomes of the cases (see Table 1.7).
Our 2SLS estimates show suggestive evidence that a completed foreclosure influences the
volume of residential housing transactions in a neighborhood. The point estimates of the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the cumulative number of neighboring residential sales
since the case decision shows a large increasing trend—while this effect is not statistically
significant, it appears as though a completed foreclosure may induce additional home sales.
Keep in mind that we omit sales of the delinquent home itself from the count of sales—this is
not a mechanical increase in sales due to foreclosure auctions and REO sales. This increase
in number of sales raises the question of whether the drop in sale price after a completed
foreclosure is caused by selection into sale of lower quality (and thus, lower price) homes
or a drop in the value of neighboring properties (conditional on quality). In particular, if
this drive to sell in response to a completed foreclosure is stronger among those with lower-
quality houses (for example, because they are in a more precarious financial situation), then
we would expect a decline in average neighboring sale price.
Our repeat-sales-adjusted price results suggest that there is negative selection into resi-
dential sales after a completed foreclosure, which may explain much of the negative sale-price
effect associated with completed foreclosure. As explained in Section 3.3, we use a repeat-
sales methodology to adjust reported sale prices for property quality. We then estimate the
effect of a completed foreclosure on the log of the average neighboring quality-adjusted sale
35That the effect becomes more pronounced one year out is consistent with the theory that foreclosures
lower neighboring prices through a disamenity effect, and with existing studies that find that the housing-
price effects of foreclosure are driven by the supply-effect of the property being listed, keeping in mind that
banks generally do not list foreclosed properties on the market immediately.
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price. The point estimates of the effect of home foreclosure on the log of the mean repeat-
sales adjusted price tend to be small: 0.059 in the year of the decision, 0.003 the following
year, and are not significantly different from zero; controlling for property quality yields
smaller price effects of completed foreclosure.36 By pooling the unadjusted (i.e., baseline)
and repeat-sales-adjusted price regressions (allowing all fixed effects to vary by group) and
testing the cross-equation restriction that the effects of completed foreclosure are different
(i.e., H0 : βraw prices = βrepeat sales), we find that the treatment effects for adjusted prices are
significantly smaller (in absolute value) than for the unadjusted prices in the year after the
decision (p-values for this test are presented in the adjusted-price panel of Table 1.9). We
examine the relationship between completed foreclosure and quality more explicitly by using
as an outcome the log of the mean price at previous sale (adjusted for year-of-sale effects) for
all neighboring repeat sales observed in the given year. If completed foreclosures induce more
low-quality properties to sell, we would expect these properties to have sold at a lower price
in the past. We find a large negative, although insignificant, effect of completed foreclosure
on the price at previous sale (see the bottom of Table 1.9).
We conclude that there is negative selection into sale—when a neighboring foreclosure
occurs, the properties that do sell tend to be of a lower quality. The difference between
our repeat-sale adjusted and unadjusted baseline sale price estimates, along with the earlier
estimates that suggest an increase in sales volume after a completed foreclosure, suggest that
lower-quality homes are more likely to transact after a completed foreclosure. This may be
the case if owners of lower quality homes in a neighborhood are those who have lower income
or wealth. Given a signal that the neighborhood is declining (i.e., a neighboring completed
foreclosure), these owners may be eager to sell before the neighborhood “falls apart” in order
to avoid the liquidity shock, both from the difficulty of selling an underwater property and
36In Table 1.25 in the appendix, we confirm that the difference between the baseline and repeat-sales
adjusted estimates is not driven by a selected sample of repeat sales. We estimate the baseline price effects
for two measures of neighboring unadjusted price: mean log sale price for all non-repeat sales, and mean log
(unadjusted) sale price for all repeat sales. In both cases, the point estimates are comparable to the baseline
price effects—large and negative—although the smaller sample size reduces precision.
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the inability to borrow against an underwater home. Of course, we cannot conclude that
all foreclosure-related pecuniary externalities are driven by this selection into sale. Existing
studies of foreclosure-price externalities (e.g., Campbell et al. (2011)) find estimates one order
of magnitude smaller than our own, and, although our quality-adjusted point estimates
are generally zero or positive, given the imprecision of our estimates, we cannot rule out
that there are negative effects of completed foreclosure on the quality-adjusted value of
neighboring properties.
1.6 Evidence of Contagion Mechanisms
While our reduced-form estimates provide clear evidence of contagion, interpreting the causes
of contagion is difficult since a foreclosure filing is the result of a joint decision of the borrower,
who defaults on his/her loan, and a lender or servicer that chooses to pursue foreclosure on
the borrower’s home. Both parties may be influenced by a neighboring completed foreclosure,
which may lower the value of the asset and alter the incentives for the borrower to repay
and the lender to file for foreclosure. We study heterogeneity in the treatment effect of
foreclosures—across loan types, lender identity, and market conditions—to gain insight into
the importance of borrower and lender behavior.
1.6.1 Distinguishing Borrower and Lender Response
Our goal is to distinguish whether contagion is driven by borrowers or by lenders. We
argue that lenders would exhibit no response to a local completed foreclosure or even anti-
contagion—fewer foreclosure filings in response to a completed foreclosure. This provides a
weak test for the presence of borrower-driven contagion. We then explicitly test for borrower-
driven contagion by examining contagion among loans from lenders known for automation of
foreclosure proceedings (who are, thus, unlikely to respond to very local market conditions).
Lenders and mortgage servicers—third parties who are paid by creditors to collect mort-
gage payments and manage defaults—have three options when dealing with a delinquent
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borrower: do nothing, pursue foreclosure, or renegotiate the loan. Through foreclosure,
lenders acquire the mortgaged property and gain the benefit of the value of the property
(servicers collect fees for managing the foreclosure). Lenders or servicers may instead mod-
ify the terms of a mortgage with the goal of making the payments more affordable—e.g.,
by reducing the principal or interest rate on a loan. The benefit of modification is ensuring
that loan payments continue, at the cost of a lower lifetime value of repayment. Finally,
when faced with a borrower who is not making payments, a lender or servicer can always
do nothing, although this is generally not optimal.37 Existing empirical studies have found
that mortgage modification is uncommon (Adelino et al. (2009), Ding et al. (2009)). There
are several (non-exclusive) explanations for why lenders and servicers prefer foreclosure to
modification: borrowers may redefault on a modified loan (Adelino et al. (2009)); frequent
modification encourages strategic default among borrowers who can pay, but would benefit
from modification (Foote et al. (2008)); foreclosing and purchasing the property at auction
allows creditors to delay recognizing a loss on their balance sheets; modification requires
coordination and agreement among all creditors (e.g., multiple holders of a mortgage-backed
security or a second lien on the property), some of whom may need to accept a loss (Gelpern
and Levitin (2009)).
These incentives to file for foreclosure against delinquent borrowers are unlikely to respond
to neighboring completed foreclosures (unless borrowers themselves change their behavior),
making lender-driven contagion unlikely. In the Appendix, we adapt the simple framework of
Foote et al. (2008) and Adelino et al. (2009) to explore how the lender’s incentive to modify
or foreclose might change with a neighboring completed foreclosure. Intuitively, suppose
that a completed foreclosure does not influence the behavior of neighboring borrowers (i.e.,
no borrower-driven contagion), but lowers neighboring home values.38 A lender would be
37Inaction may be a good strategy if renegotiation and foreclosure are costly to the lender and if there
is a high probability that the default will “self cure”—i.e., the borrower will resume making payments.
Additionally, accounting rules adopted in April 2009 allow creditors to keep a delinquent loan at face value
on balance sheets if there is a reasonable chance that the loan may be repaid.
38If a completed foreclosure has no influence on neighboring home prices and if we maintain the assumption
that borrowers are unresponsive to a completed foreclosure, then lenders and servicers should not respond—
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weakly less inclined to foreclose since the collateral is worth less relative to the value of
the modified loan, although the lender may still foreclose for the reasons discussed in the
preceding paragraph. Moreover, mortgage servicers are not likely to respond to a neighboring
foreclosure at all. Servicer compensation in foreclosure depends on fees incurred during the
foreclosure process and not on the value of the home itself—servicers are indifferent to the
value of the collateral. On the other hand, since servicer compensation on a loan in good
standing is typically a function of the monthly payments collected, modifying a mortgage
entails lower future payments to the servicer and servicers do not typically recover fees for
modifying a loan. Thus, when faced with a delinquent loan, pursuing foreclosure is generally
more valuable to servicers, and the decision to take this action is orthogonal to the value
of the property. This is consistent with the discussion of Levitin and Twomey (2011) who
note that servicers have no stake in the value of the property under consideration, and will
take the action that maximizes the fees they collect, which is typically foreclosure.39 In
summary, under the assumption that borrowers do not respond to completed foreclosures, a
neighboring completed home foreclosure should (weakly) discourage foreclosure filings—the
collateral is less valuable to the lender and servicers are indifferent to home value.
The above-outlined servicer and lender incentives provide a simple test for the hypothesis
of no borrower-driven contagion, which we reject. Specifically, this null hypothesis can be
rejected if we observe positive contagion (since lenders would display weak anti-contagion).
That we observe contagion in Table 1.5 suggests that borrowers respond. Note, that while
this confirms the presence of borrower contagion, this does not rule out lender response—
when borrower default probabilities are changing, lender response is ambiguous.
To further establish that contagion is driven primarily by borrowers, we study contagion
the conditions of the neighboring loans are unchanged.
39Levitin and Twomey (2011) also point out that, although foreclosure is preferable to modification from
the servicer’s perspective, there is incentive to delay the foreclosure process. Servicers must forward missed
mortgage payments to the creditor and are repaid when the borrower resumes payment or the property is
sold at foreclosure auction. However, servicers charge late fees that are paid when payments resume or the
foreclosure occurs. Levitin and Twomey (2011) show that servicers can benefit by waiting several months to
accrue late fees before beginning the foreclosure process. Since this wait period is unlikely to be influenced
by a neighboring completed foreclosure, it does not relate to contagion.
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among loans held by lenders and servicers who are known to have automated foreclosure
filing processes. We identify foreclosure filings by all lenders/servicers investigated in the
Independent Foreclosure Review Settlement conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.40 We then redefine
our contagion outcomes in terms of new foreclosure filings among automating lenders only
and re-estimate our baseline 2SLS contagion models. The new outcomes are: the count of
new foreclosure filings among automating lenders and an indicator for any new foreclosure
filing from these lenders. Because this restriction reduces our power—we are studying filings
among a subset of lenders, which are lower frequency events—we pool all post-decision years
(d(i) + t where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and restrict the contagion effect to be constant across
all years (see Table 1.26 in the Appendix for annual estimates). Clustering our standard
errors on the census-tract dimension accommodates correlation between the same property
across different years of observation. If contagion is driven largely through lender response,
then we should find no effect of a completed home foreclosure on the number of foreclosure
filings among lenders likely to be automating foreclosures. At the same time, if contagion
is driven primarily through borrower response, then our estimates should be comparable to
our baseline full-sample contagion estimates.
We find that contagion is primarily borrower-driven—contagion in foreclosure filings per-
sists when studying loans among automating lenders. Table 1.10 presents the pooled esti-
mates for all filings (upper panel) and for filings among automating lenders. One concern
is that the total number of loans in a neighborhood from automating lenders is necessarily
smaller than the total among all lenders (as in the baseline estimates). If new filings are
proportional to the existing number of loans, then we would expect a larger response in the
40Throughout the mid- and late-2000s, many lenders and servicers adopted automated foreclosure filing
procedures (Levitin and Twomey (2011)). In many cases the delinquent borrower’s situation and background
were not given close consideration. As investigations have revealed, employees of several large mortgage
servicers and financial institutions falsely testified that they had personally inspected delinquent borrowers’
information, even though the processing speeds made it impossible for this to be true (this was the so-called
“robosigning” controversy, settled for $25bn in April 2012 between the federal government, 49 state attorneys
general and the five largest servicers). See Kiel, P. “The Great American Foreclosure Story: The Struggle
for Justice and a Place to Call Home”, ProPublica, 10 April 2012.
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total count of new filings for the baseline than for automating lenders. To address this, we
focus on the estimates of the log of total filings in the third column. We observe similar
contagion effects for the two outcomes: an increase in foreclosure filings of 9.4% per year in
the baseline sample versus an increase of 8.4% among filings from automating lenders.41
We also observe similar contagion in the probability of observing any new filing (0.062
versus 0.039). Thus, given the incentives of lenders and servicers and the finding that
contagion persists among automating lenders, we conclude that contagion is mainly borrower
driven.
1.6.2 Foreclosure Contagion and Negative Equity
We investigate whether foreclosure contagion is driven by mortgages held by individuals
who face high debt relative to the value of their property. Mortgage default theory (e.g.,
Campbell and Cocco (2011), Deng et al. (2000)) suggests that borrowers will only default
when the value of their home falls below the balance of their mortgage, putting the borrower
“underwater.” Intuitively, if the market value of a home is greater than the outstanding debt,
a homeowner who is having difficulty making mortgage payments may sell the property and
use the proceeds to pay off the debt. Conversely, underwater borrowers who are having
difficulty making payments do not have the option to sell. To the extent that foreclosures
lower or send a signal about neighboring home values, foreclosure contagion may operate
through pushing borrowers (further) underwater (Campbell (2013)).42 We use a proxy for
equity—relating the size of the initial loan to the outstanding debt at foreclosure filing—to
41Similarly, while the point estimates for total filings are different, 0.74 for the baseline and 0.115 for the
automating lenders, relative to the mean number of filings for each group (2.44 filings per year within a 0.1
mile radius for all filings, 0.37 for automating lenders), these estimates are remarkably similar (30.3% versus
a 29.7%).
42The benefit of foreclosure is muted when borrowers have more than one mortgage taken against the
property (e.g., a mortgage and a home equity loan). In Illinois, mortgages are “recourse” debt—if the
foreclosure auction generates less revenue than the value of the outstanding debt, the borrower still owes
the creditor the balance. In the majority of cases the lender purchases the property in the amount of the
outstanding debt to avoid writing down a loss (i.e., the property becomes REO), in which case borrowers
no longer owe. However, a borrower is still on the hook for any additional liens on the property. Thus, a
foreclosure will not always render borrowers debt free.
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determine whether contagion is driven by individuals who are likely to be underwater on
their loans. Understanding which borrowers are most influenced by a neighboring completed
foreclosure sheds light on the mechanism of contagion and the borrower default decision
more generally.
We examine whether foreclosure contagion is more prevalent among loans with large
outstanding debt relative to the initial balance. For each foreclosure filing, we proxy the
borrower being underwater at the time of filing by whether or not the lender’s claim against
the borrower (i.e., the outstanding debt at filing) is larger than the initial loan principal.
Although we observe the lender’s claim at the time of filing, we do not observe a direct
measure of the property value and so we proxy the value using initial loan principal.43 For
each foreclosure case we split the count of neighboring foreclosures in two—filings among
borrowers that are underwater according to our proxy (Ni,u,d(i)+t) and filings in positive





, Yi,j,d(i)+t = Ni,j,d(i)+t, and Yi,j,d(i)+t = log(Ni,j,d(i)+t) for j ∈ {u, p}, and
estimate our baseline 2SLS specification jointly allowing the time-specific fixed effects to
vary with the type of filings under consideration:
Yi,j,d(i)+t = β0+βu ·Fi ·1[j = u]+βp ·Fi ·1[j = p]+βXi+Φi+Mj,m(i)+ψj,d(i)+t+ui,d(i)+t (7)
Pooling the estimates for both outcomes allows us to test the null hypothesis that a
completed foreclosure has the same effect on underwater borrowers as borrowers in positive
equity (H0 : βu = βp).44 We assume that, were it not for their differing loan to value ratios,
borrowers in positive and negative equity respond similarly to a neighboring completed
43We have experimented with alternative definitions of underwater, for example by making assumptions
about loan-to-value ratios at origination to determine home value and adjusting this using local price indices
or comparing outstanding balance at filing to local home values. Our results are not very sensitive to these
changes.
44Using log count of filings and the probability of any filing for each group avoids the problem that we do
not observe the base number of loans in each category. Additionally, having a randomly assigned instrument
ensures that, in expectation, neighborhoods with completed foreclosures have similar numbers of underwater
borrowers as neighborhoods with dismissals.
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foreclosure, and that lender behavior does not vary along these margins (i.e., any observed
heterogeneity in estimates is driven by whether or not the neighbors are underwater on their
loans).
We find that contagion is more prevalent among borrowers who are not in negative equity.
We present the 2SLS estimates of Equation 7 in the upper panel of Table 1.11. We pool
five years of post-decision observations (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}), restricting the treatment to be
constant across all years (we present the yearly estimates in Table 1.27 of the Appendix).
These estimates show that a completed foreclosure increases the probability of observing
any non-underwater filing by 6.6 percentage points and total non-underwater filings by 9.6
percent, while having little effect on filings from underwater borrowers (0.023 and -0.3%).
The difference between the two groups is significant.45
We suspect that this finding that contagion is more prominent among borrowers who are
not underwater is driven by borrowers who are on the margin of negative equity. Since being
in negative equity is generally considered a necessary condition for default, it is unlikely
that contagion is driven by borrowers who have lots of equity in their homes. At the same
time, using loan principal at origination to proxy housing value in defining underwater and
non-underwater loans may have some error on the margins—we may be classifying borrowers
who are “just” underwater as being in positive equity. In this case of misclassification, our
estimates suggest that the response may be coming from those who are in slight negative
equity, rather than those who are very underwater. Either way, our estimates do not imply
that those who are severely underwater will not default on their loans, but that they are
not responsive to neighboring foreclosures, whereas those who are on the margin of negative
45We also examine heterogeneity by local price growth, loan type and by zip-code income level (a proxy
for ability to pay). Deng et al. (2000) argue that the decision to default depends on expectations of home
value. We adjust our baseline contagion specification by interacting the foreclosure effect with an indicator
for positive zip-code-year price growth, but find no evidence that price growth matters for contagion—see
Table 1.28 in the Appendix. Campbell and Cocco (2011) argue that the probability of default is decreasing
in ability to pay (income relative to loan payments) and that incentives for default vary depending on the
structure of loan payments. We proxy ability to pay with zip-code-level median income (from the IRS SOI),
but find no discernible difference in contagion by income quartile. These results are plotted in Figure 1.5
of the appendix. We also find no significant difference between the response among neighboring borrowers
with conventional fixed-rate mortgages and those with alternative mortgage products—see Table 1.29.
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equity are responsive. For example, a borrower who is severely underwater may default
regardless of what happens to their neighbors. However, for a borrower with debt close to
100% of their home value, a nearby foreclosure may be quite important: not only might it
push them into negative equity, but it might also convey information about the foreclosure
process, lender behavior, or the future of the neighborhood (signals of less import to a
severely underwater borrower who has thought through the default decision).
We further explore if contagion is driven by individuals on the margin of negative equity
by comparing our 2SLS contagion estimates for filings among borrowers who have close
to zero equity in their home (as measured by our proxy) to contagion for filings among
borrowers with lots of equity or who are severely underwater. We define filings on the margin
of underwater as those where the absolute difference between loan principal at origination
(ρ) and the outstanding debt at filing (d) is less than 10% of principal: ρ−d
ρ
∈ [−0.1, 0.1]. As
above with underwater and non-underwater filings, we split the count of neighboring filings
in two—marginal and non-marginal filings—and estimate the analogue to Specification 7 for
these two groups. The results, presented in the lower panel of Table 1.11, demonstrate that
contagion is driven by borrowers on the margin of negative equity: a completed foreclosure
induces a 6.3 percentage point increase in the probability of observing any filing for those
on the margin versus an insignificant 0.8 for other filers, and a 10.7% increase in the number
of new filings among those on the margin, versus an insignificant drop of 3.5% (in all cases
the difference between the two groups is significant). Thus, we conclude that contagion is
operating through borrowers who are on the margin of negative equity, rather than those
who are reasonably well off or in dire straits. This interpretation is consistent with our
finding from Section 1.5.1 that contagion is pronounced for cases decided in 2004–2008 when
borrowers are less likely to be severely underwater, but not for cases decided at the depth of
the foreclosure crisis (2009–2011) when foreclosures are common and many mortgage holders
experience financial difficulty.
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1.6.3 Foreclosure Contagion and Information
Contagion may also occur because borrowers learn about the foreclosure process, including
the behavior of lenders and servicers, by observing neighboring foreclosure cases. Recent
survey evidence suggests that borrowers learn from defaults and foreclosures within their
social networks (Guiso et al. (2013)). For example, a neighbor may learn about the foreclo-
sure process, including the costs of default (and completed foreclosure), how long the process
takes, and the probability of a positive resolution (e.g., mortgage modification) by observing
his/her neighbor’s experience.46 A priori, it is not clear whether the foreclosure event would
increase or decrease the probability of neighboring filings (contagion vs. anti-contagion). For
instance, a foreclosure may lower neighbors’ perception of the probability of renegotiating
one’s loan by defaulting, thus lowering the expected value of default and discouraging this
behavior (Mayer et al. (2011) find evidence of borrowers defaulting in response to an increase
in the probability of modification).
We investigate a specific social network—neighbors with loans from the same lender.47
Individuals with the same lender may be more likely to discuss the foreclosure (and/or
mortgage renegotiation) process with one another. At the same time, a successful (or failed)
mortgage renegotiation provides a stronger signal to individuals with loans from the same
institution; it may be that a neighbor’s foreclosure discourages default among those with
loans from the same servicer/lender by lowering the perceived probability of a modifica-
tion. To test for the presence of learning-based contagion, we test whether contagion is
stronger/weaker among neighboring loans from the same lender. Under the assumptions
46Guiso et al. (2013) also find that social norms may matter for contagion. Many (82.7%) respondents to
their survey feel they have a moral obligation to repay their debts. But a neighboring default may weaken
respondents’ sense of moral responsibility and increase their probability of default. We do not expect this
social morality channel to be particularly strong in our context, as our estimates compare neighborhoods
around properties where the borrower has already defaulted—the event that sends a signal about the moral
obligation to repay.
47We have also examined heterogeneity in the treatment effect across neighborhoods where we expect
weaker and stronger social networks. We study how contagion varies with geography-based proxies for
neighbor connectivity, including racial homogeneity, population density, and housing type (drawing on the
notion of social capital outlined by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000)), although we find no systematic relationship
between contagion and these proxies. We include a discussion of these estimates in the Appendix.
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that i) individuals are aware of (at least some of) their neighbors’ lenders and ii) lenders are
not reacting to local conditions, then the difference between contagion among same-lender
and different-lender loans provides evidence of the importance of learning from neighboring
foreclosures.48 Note that this signal may be present as long as a borrower knows who his/her
neighbor’s lender is and observes the outcome of the case. Since a borrower may learn about
lender behavior by simply observing the outcome of his/her neighbor’s case, heterogeneity
in contagion along this margin provides evidence that borrowers learn from their neighbors’
experiences, but not necessarily that communication through social networks matters.
To test for a difference in contagion between same-lender and different-lender borrowers,
we estimate our 2SLS contagion effects for each subset of neighboring filings. We split the
count of neighboring foreclosures in two—filings with the same lender listed as the plaintiff
(Ni,s,d(i)+t) and filings with any other lender listed as the plaintiff (Ni,o,d(i)+t), and redefine our




, Yi,j,d(i)+t = Ni,j,d(i)+t,
or Yi,j,d(i)+t = log(Ni,j,d(i)+t) for j ∈ {s, o}. We then estimate our baseline 2SLS specification
jointly allowing the time-specific fixed effects to vary with lender type:
Yi,j,d(i)+t = β0+βs ·Fi ·1[j = s]+βo ·Fi ·1[j = o]+βXi+Φi+Mj,m(i)+ψj,d(i)+t+ui,d(i)+t (8)
Pooling the estimates for both outcomes (same-lender filings and other-lender filings) allows
us to test the null hypothesis that a completed foreclosure has the same effect on mortgages
held by the same lender as mortgages held by other lenders (H0 : βs = βo).
The 2SLS estimates of βs and βo from Specification 8, presented in Table 1.12 (pooling
all years; see Table 1.33 for yearly estimates), suggest that lender-specific local networks
matter. The estimates show that contagion is primarily driven by foreclosure filings among
loans held by different lenders—0.061 percentage point increase in the probability of any
48Our same-lender and different-lender estimates are robust to restricting the sample to lenders known for
automating the foreclosure process, suggesting that lenders are not driving the patterns we observe in these
estimates.
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new filing on a loan from a different lender versus an (insignificant) increase of 0.006 for
loans from the same lender, 0.770 additional foreclosure filings from different lenders versus
a drop in filings of 0.184 among loans held by the same lender, and an increase of 0.085
in the log of total filings among different lenders versus 0.008 for filings on loans from the
same lender. In the first two cases, the difference between the estimates are statistically
significantly different from zero.
We interpret these same-plaintiff results as evidence that borrowers learn about lenders
from the experience of their neighbors.49 Given that there is general contagion among loans
from other lenders, it appears that borrowers experience anti-contagion when a neighbor
from the same lender ends up in a completed foreclosure. A possible explanation for this
difference is that the neighboring foreclosure sends different information to different individ-
uals: contagion among those with different lenders is consistent with the foreclosure lower-
ing neighboring home values or sending a broad signal about the general direction of the
neighborhood (i.e., the value of the neighborhood is deteriorating). Anti-contagion among
borrowers with the same plaintiff is consistent with borrowers revising downward the prob-
ability of a positive outcome (i.e., not losing their home) when a neighboring borrower with
the same lender is unsuccessful. This lowered expectation of a positive outcome decreases
the value of (strategic) defaults.50
49Another possibility is that lenders are aware of the externalities of completed foreclosures and do not
pursue new filings in neighborhoods where they have had a recent successful foreclosure (while other lenders
do not react). However, we find this to be a less likely explanation for two reasons. Firstly, we still observe,
on average, a positive and significant number of foreclosure filings around foreclosed properties in the year
of and years after the foreclosure decision. Thus, it does not appear that lenders are avoiding foreclosure
externalities altogether. Secondly, the anti-contagion effect among filings from the same lender persist for
several years after the decision, which represents a long time for lenders to be waiting to avoid foreclosure
externalities (while other lenders continue to file in spite of these externalities.
50Given our instrument, it is also conceivable that borrowers learn about the impact of a given judge
on foreclosure outcomes. However, we do not expect that foreclosure contagion is driven by a completed
foreclosure revealing information about a specific judge. Firstly, given the random assignment of judges
to foreclosure cases, the probability that a given borrower ends up with a given judge is low—thus, the
neighboring borrower’s expectations about the outcome of default should not change substantially. Secondly,
if learning about judges is the primary driver of foreclosure contagion, then we would not expect to observe
differential contagion among individuals with the same lenders.
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1.7 Conclusion
We provide clean estimates of the effect of a completed foreclosure on neighboring resi-
dential sale prices and on neighboring foreclosure filings in Cook County, IL. We exploit a
randomly assigned instrument—the set of judges who hear a foreclosure case—to compare
neighborhood-level outcomes around a delinquent property that ends in completed foreclo-
sure to a delinquent property whose foreclosure claim is dismissed.
We find robust evidence of foreclosure contagion. A completed foreclosure leads to about
0.5 to 0.70 more foreclosure filings per year within 0.1 miles and increases the probability of
observing any neighboring foreclosure filing by about 10%. Moreover, a completed foreclosure
causes between 0.25 and 0.5 new completed foreclosures per year. These contagion effects
persist for at least four years after the case is decided.
Contagion is primarily driven by borrowers who are on the threshold of default. We find
contagion among loans held by lenders who are known to automate foreclosure filings and are
likely unresponsive to very local conditions, which we interpret as evidence that foreclosure
contagion is driven by borrowers. Contagion is strongest not during the depths of the crisis,
but at the end of the housing boom and beginning of the crash. Moreover, contagion is
most prevalent among borrowers who are on the cusp of being underwater and not those
who are severely underwater on their loans. We interpret this as evidence that a neighboring
foreclosure has the greatest impact on borrowers who are on the margin of defaulting, and
not those who are severely at risk. Finally, we find that contagion is minimal when borrowers
have the same lender, perhaps because the neighboring foreclosure sends a signal about their
lender’s behavior, lowering the perceived probability of a successful renegotiation of the loan,
thus reducing strategic incentives to default.
We find evidence that completed foreclosures disrupt local housing markets. After a
completed foreclosure, the mean residential sale price dips by as much as 40%. However,
this drop is largely explained by selection into sale—in the wake of a completed foreclosure,
the composition of residential sales is skewed toward lower quality (and thus, lower price)
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homes. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out that foreclosures do influence the value of homes,
conditional on quality.
While our instrumental-variables method provides clean identification of the effect of fore-
closure, the resulting estimates are of a particular parameter that helps to inform foreclosure
policy. Our estimates represent the effect of a completed foreclosure on the neighborhoods
around properties that are most likely to be influenced by foreclosure judges. These are
the cases that are most likely to be influenced by policy. At the same time, our estimates
compare the neighborhood-level effect of a completed foreclosure relative to a delinquent
mortgage that does not end in foreclosure. This is the relevant parameter for assessing pol-
icy that addresses how easily and how often lenders should be able to foreclose on delinquent
borrowers. Finally, while there may be concerns about the external validity of our estimates,
which are derived from a housing crisis in one of the worse-hit cities, it is in exactly such cir-
cumstances that policymakers and economists must worry most about foreclosure contagion.
In sum, our estimates of foreclosure contagion suggest room for policy that seeks alternative
solutions for delinquent borrowers.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Filing Date
Filings per Month Foreclosure Rate
Notes: Monthly count of new foreclosure filings in Cook County over time (left axis) and share of cases filed
in a given month that end in a completed foreclosure (right axis). Dashed vertical lines indicate Cook County
suspension of all new foreclosure filings starting April 16, 2009, except for so-called “consent foreclosures:”
foreclosure filings in which lender and borrower had already agreed to foreclosure prior to filing. This
“moratorium” was scheduled to end on September 1, 2009, although appears to have ended earlier, given the
spike in filings prior to Sept. 1.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics: Pre-Treatment Characteristics
Mean P-Value
All D† F † (H0 : D = F )
Case Resolved 0.950 1.000 1.000 .
Ends in Foreclosure 0.612 0.000 1.000 .
Days to Decision 373.554 274.931 428.665 0.000
Prob Redefault 0.049 0.120 0.013 0.000
Single-Family Property 0.623 0.684 0.590 0.000
Conventional Mortgage 0.647 0.665 0.653 0.000
Loan Principal 237328.100 219520.200 237733.000 0.892
Complaint Amount 229621.000 211420.400 231905.600 0.449
Large Plaintiff 0.471 0.472 0.473 0.065
Large Attorney 0.685 0.682 0.687 0.032
Median Income (tract)†† 44859.720 46409.490 43748.260 0.000
Share White (tract)†† 0.449 0.468 0.433 0.000
Population (tract)†† 5434.558 5472.077 5411.712 0.000
N 148220 50140 90653
Notes: Data from matched court records and foreclosure filings (one obs per case) with baseline sample
restrictions as described in text.
†
D = dismissed cases, F = completed foreclosures.
††Data from 2000 Census (tract-level).
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics: Outcomes
Means P-Value
All D† F † (H0 : D = F ) N
Neighboring Filings 2.423 2.161 2.596 0.000 475127
Any Neighboring Filing 0.734 0.702 0.755 0.000 475127
Neighboring Foreclosures 0.748 0.603 0.844 0.000 475127
Any Neighboring Foreclosure 0.365 0.326 0.390 0.000 475127
Neighboring Sales 3.038 2.962 3.099 0.006 133176
Mean Neighboring Sale Price 169326 184213 157182 0.000 81371
Mean Repeat-sale Adjusted Price122896 123240 122621 0.205 56306
Notes: Outcome variables (0.1 mile radius) measured annually for five years (two years for sales outcomes)
after case is decided (observation = one case-year).
†
D = dismissed cases, F = completed foreclosures.
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Table 1.3: Balance of Covariates
Coefficient† p Value††
Adj. Rate Mortgage 0.0005100 0.3837(0.0006240)
Loan Principal††† -0.0000033 0.0343**(0.0000025)
Large Plaintiff -0.0005790 0.9438(0.0003840)
Large Attorney -0.0007020 0.1370(0.0007410)
Median Income (tract)††† -0.0002780 0.6566(0.0001730)
Share White (tract) -0.0000439 0.4025(0.0005620)
Population Density (tract) 0.0454000 0.1364(0.0355000)
Price (Zip code)††† 0.0000541 0.8564(0.0000410)
Total Foreclosure Filings†††† 0.0000266 0.3578(0.0000570)
Total Completed Foreclosures†††† 0.0001580 0.5866(0.0001230)
p Value 0.4280
N 143276
Notes: **Indicates significance at the 5% level. Standard errors are the max of the SE clustered on census
tract, clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. †Coefficient from regres-
sion of instrument (case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate) on given pre-treatment covariates, controlling
for filing month and property type fixed effects. P value in first column is from a joint significance test for the
given covariates. ††Given covariate (for that row) is regressed on full set of case calendar dummies (plus filing
month and property type fixed effects); p value for a joint significance test of the case calendar dummies.
†††In $10,000 of dollars. ††††Outcomes as defined in Section 1.4 measured the year before the case is filed.
Table 1.4: Complier Characteristics: Ratio of Subgroup First Stage Estimate to Overall
First Stage
Quartile of Income†
1 2 3 4
0.784 1.011 1.060 1.066
Loan Characteristics††
Large Lender Conventional Positive Zip Code UnderwaterMortgage Price Growth
1.002 0.896 0.795 0.907
Notes: †Income quartile is given by the tract-level quartile of median tract income from the 2000 Decennial
Census. ††Large lender is an indicator for the plaintiff being one of the six most prominent banks in the
sample, each representing ≥ 10% of filings. Zip-code-level annual price growth is taken from Zillow housing
price indices for Cook County. Underwater is a proxy for the outstanding balance of the mortgage being
greater than the estimated value of the home, as described in the text.
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Table 1.5: Baseline Contagion Estimates: 2SLS Coefficient of Effect of Completed Foreclo-
sure on Given Outcome in Given Year
Years After End of Case (t): 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline Estimates
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.052* 0.012 0.082*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140
(0.028) (0.027)(0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
0.691* 0.670* 0.536*** 0.657** 1.551 0.538
(0.393) (0.368)(0.183) (0.319) (0.983) (0.987)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Cumulative Count of Filings
Yid(i)+t = Cumulative Filings
0.691* 1.395* 2.090*** 4.522*** 6.446** 5.610
(0.393) (0.732)(0.794) (1.169) (3.105) (4.610)
1st-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Yid(i)+t = Cumulative Filings 0.622 1.266* 1.594** 3.820*** 4.076 2.693
No Recent Foreclosures (0.380) (0.667)(0.703) (1.429) (2.918) (4.611)
1st-stage F 172.500 159.700 138 20.910 12.790 7.515
N 71925 66995 55105 43186 27395 14948
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates of the effect of
complected foreclosure on given outcome (measured within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since
the case is decided), on an indicator for the case ending in foreclosure (instrumented by the leave-one-out
case-calendar-filing-month-specific foreclosure rate), filing month, property type, and year of observation
fixed effects, and case-level controls:share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial census, income
quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs each representing
≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing ≥10,000 cases),
whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population. Cumulative filings
represent the total number of new filings since decision through the given year.
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Table 1.6: Constant Sample Contagion Estimates
Years After End of Case (t): 0 1 2 3 45
Constant Sample Observed for 3 Years after Case Decision (Decided in 2004–2008)
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.094** 0.059 0.168*** 0.090*
(0.048) (0.046) (0.061) (0.053)
1st-stage F 24.620 24.620 24.620 24.620
N 67379 67379 67379 67379
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
1.243** 1.567*** 1.056*** 0.657**
(0.552) (0.395) (0.391) (0.319)
1st-stage F 24.620 24.620 24.620 24.620
N 67379 67379 67379 67379
Cases Observed for 2 Years or Fewer after Decision (Decided in 2009–2011)
Yid(i)+t = Any Filing per Year
0.027 -0.018 0.026
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
1st-stage F 72.890 69.410 66.700
N 62820 51187 25764
Yid(i)+t = Total Filings per Year
0.239 0.099 0.202
(0.447) (0.515) (0.263)
1st-stage F 72.890 69.410 66.700
N 62820 51187 25764
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates of the effect of
complected foreclosure on given outcome (measured within 0.1 miles of the property in the given year since
the case is decided), on an indicator for the case ending in foreclosure (instrumented by the leave-one-out
case-calendar-filing-month-specific foreclosure rate), filing month, property type, and year of observation
fixed effects, and case-level controls:share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial census, income
quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs each representing
≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing ≥10,000 cases),
whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population. Constant sample
includes only cases for which we observe three years post decision.
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Table 1.7: Estimates in Years Before Filing
Years Before Case is Filed 3 2 1
Any Filing 0.003 0.009 0.018(0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
1st-stage F 400.000 400.000 400.100
N 140672 140672 140672
Total Filings per Year 0.020 0.084 0.214(0.087) (0.122) (0.139)
1st-stage F 400.000 400.000 400.100
N 140672 140672 140672
Any Completed Foreclosure -0.027 0.045* -0.004(0.023) (0.025) (0.030)
1st-stage F 159.400 182.100 164.300
N 140672 140672 140672
Total Completed -0.057* 0.075 0.110
Foreclosures per Year (0.033) (0.065) (0.071)
1st-stage F 159.400 182.100 164.300
N 140672 140672 140672
log(price) 0.007 0.037 0.007(0.038) (0.042) (0.049)
1st-stage F 164.900 166.500 136.400
N 109123 102220 84126
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
1.5, with outcomes measured in the given year prior to the case being filed.
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Table 1.8: Contagion in Completed Foreclosures
Years After End of Case 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline Estimates
Any Completed Foreclosure -0.048 0.002 0.045 0.138*** 0.033 0.174(0.031) (0.030) (0.038) (0.051) (0.106)(0.144)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures 0.280* 0.435*** 0.312*** 0.558*** 0.243 0.063(0.164) (0.160) (0.117) (0.185) (0.316)(0.334)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Contagion in Completed Foreclosures Filed Prior To Decision
Any Completed Foreclosure -0.043 0.135*** 0.073*** 0.025 -0.010 0.003(0.031) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)(0.015)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures 0.303* 0.609*** 0.111*** 0.031 -0.010 0.003(0.164) (0.118) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017)(0.015)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.9: Baseline Housing Market Estimates
Years Since End of Case 0 1 2
log(price)
2SLS -0.127 -0.411** -0.358(0.105)(0.203) (0.395)
1st-stage F22.500 18.840 14.390
N 43079 26047 12241
2SLS 0.059 0.003 -0.251log(price) (0.066)(0.146) (0.201)
(repeat-sales) 1st-stage F11.130 6.314 7.355
p-value 0.107 0.030 0.763
N 30482 17916 7904
2SLS 0.220 6.562 9.964Total Sales (0.914)(4.574) (9.255)
(Cumulative Over Years) 1st-stage F24.620 19.060 12.970
N 67379 41958 23831
2SLS -0.031 -0.373 -0.186log(price at last sale)† (0.116)(0.230) (0.323)
(repeat sample) 1st-stage F21.000 12.400 13.910
N 29620 17597 7852
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table 1.5. Sales outcomes represent residential transactions within
the given radius and time period only (total sales represents the total count of sales since the decision year),
while price represents the mean sale price of these transactions. Repeat-sales adjusted prices are estimated
as outlined in the text; associated p-value is for the cross-equation test of equality between the repeat-sales
adjusted and unadjusted (first panel) price effects. †Price at previous sale (for repeat sales) adjusted for
annual price growth. Fewer observations here since sample is restricted to the latter of all repeat sales (need
to observe a previous sale).
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Table 1.10: Contagion Among Loans with Lenders Implicated in Independent Foreclosure
Review Settlement
Outcome Variable Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Baseline
†
Effect of Completed Foreclosure 0.062*** 0.735** 0.094*(0.022) (0.320) (0.050)
First-stage F 131.900 131.900 147.100
N 311116 311116 235325
Effect of Completed Foreclosure 0.039* 0.115 0.084*Automating (0.022) (0.073) (0.049)
Lenders† First-stage F 131.900 131.900 138.000
N 311116 311116 86054
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS specification as in Table
1.5, although all five years post-decision are pooled and the effect of completed foreclosure is fixed.
†Outcomes are measured based on new foreclosure filings by lenders implicated in the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Independent Fore-
closure Review Settlement, while “Baseline” includes new foreclosure filings among all lenders. Both samples
are restricted to cases decided between 2007 and 2010 (during which automation of foreclosure filings is
thought to be most common).
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Table 1.11: Contagion Estimates By Proxy for Borrower Equity
Outcome Variable Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Neighboring Filings from Underwater versus Non-Underwater Borrowers
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings of 0.066*** 0.696*** 0.096**
Non-Underwater Borrowers† (0.020) (0.230) (0.043)
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings of 0.023 -0.066 -0.003
Underwater Borrowers† (0.019) (0.062) (0.035)
First-stage F 84.220 84.220 86.940
p val for difference between groups 0.053 0.000 0.006
N 902490 902490 441734
Neighboring Filings from -10% – 10% Equity versus < -10% or > 10%
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings with 0.008 -0.159*** -0.035
Equity < -10% or > 10%†† (0.017) (0.054) (0.035)
Effect of Foreclosure on Filings with 0.063*** 0.789*** 0.107**
Equity between -10% and 10%†† (0.020) (0.245) (0.045)
First-stage F 84.220 84.220 89.350
p val for difference between groups 0.017 0.000 0.001
N 902490 902490 416141
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
1.5, pooling observations for five years after the case is decided (fixing the effect of completed foreclosure to
be constant).
†Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either borrowers in negative equity or
borrowers in positive equity (as defined in the text). P-value tests the significance between the two responses
(positive vs. negative equity)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing
for differing filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
††Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either borrowers where the difference
between outstanding debt and loan principal is within 10% of initial loan principal and all other borrowers
(see definition in the text). P-value tests the significance between the two responses—estimates are performed
simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing filing month and year of observation fixed
effects).
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Table 1.12: Contagion Estimates By Lender Identity
Years Since Decision Any Filing Total Filings Log Filings
Filings from Different Lender† 0.061*** 0.770*** 0.085**(0.022) (0.245) (0.041)
Filings from Same Lender† 0.006 -0.184*** 0.008(0.015) (0.056) (0.045)
First-stage F 87.490 87.490 93.560
p val for difference between groups 0.052* 0.000*** 0.109
N 796112 796112 330880
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
1.5, pooling observations for five years after the case is decided (fixing the effect of completed foreclosure to
be constant).
†Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in the
observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender vs.
other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing




Cleaning Court Records We collected all chancery court case records filed between
January 2004 and June 2010 (inclusive). We extract from each record the associated case
number and the case calendar to which the case is assigned. The records also contain a list
of case actions, the lawyer who initiated this action, the associated judge, and the date. We
extract this list of actions (simple text descriptions, e.g., “Amend complaint or petition -
allowed” or “Dismiss by stipulation or agreement”) and the corresponding dates.
We identify a case as ending in a dismissal if an action occurs containing one of the follow-
ing descriptions: "mortgage foreclosure motion plaintiff dismissed", "mortgage foreclosure
voluntary dismissal, non-suit or dismiss by agreement", "mortgage foreclosure motion de-
fendant dismissed", "mortgage foreclosure dismissed for want of prosecution", "dismissed
for want of prosecution", "general chancery - dismissed for want of prosecution", "general
chancery - voluntary dismissal, non suit, dismiss by agreement", "mortgage foreclosure vol-
untary dismissal, non-suit or dismiss by agreement", or "mortgage foreclosure judgment
for defendant"; or an action containing any of the following: "case dismissed", "voluntary
dismissal", "declaratory judgment voluntary dismissal", "dismiss entire cause" and not "de-
nied", or "dismiss by stipulation or agreement" and not "denied". For dismissed cases, we
consider the end of the case to be the date of this “dismissal” action (in the case of multiple
such actions, we take the final).
Cleaning RIS Data Record Information Services, Inc. provided us with details of fore-
closure filings and foreclosure auctions for Cook County from 2002 through 2011. RIS is a
private data provision company that collects publicly available records on all foreclosure fil-
ings in the five counties of Chicago. RIS employees manually input data on each foreclosure
filing. From the foreclosure filings, we extract the associated chancery court case number,
unique loan ID, the filing date, details of the associated loan (origination date, principal at
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origination, outstanding claim at time of foreclosure filing, a general indication of mortgage
type—conventional, adjustable rate, etc.), details of the associated property (latitude and
longitude, census tract, zip code, property type—condo, single family, etc.), and the parties
involved (defendant name, plaintiff—the lender or servicer—identity, plaintiff law firm).
We identify a case as ending in a completed foreclosure if there is an associated foreclosure
auction record in the RIS data. For completed foreclosures, we use the date of the foreclosure
auction as the end-date of the case. If there is both a dismissal action in the court records
and an associated foreclosure auction, we consider the case to have ended in a completed
foreclosure, although, our results are not sensitive to this decision. Relatedly, there is a
field in the RIS data that indicates the outcome of the auction, including if the auction is
canceled. Since this information is missing for half of the years and since it is not indicated
why a cancellation occurs, we do not code canceled auctions as dismissals in our analysis
sample. Again, however, our baseline results are not sensitive to coding canceled auctions
as dismissals. We consider a borrower to have redefaulted if a foreclosure filing is brought
against the same loan ID. Note that this will not count new filings at the same property
for different loans (e.g., if the home owner has filings against mortgage and a home equity
loan, we count these as distinct filings). However, if a second filing against the same loan
ID occurs within 180 days, we consider this to be the same case, taking the first date as the
true filing date (and merging info from the two filings). The descriptive statistics in Table
1.1 show a non-zero number of redefaults (1.3%) among loans that end in foreclosure. This
is likely due to miscoding in the RIS data—for example, a foreclosure auction is scheduled
and recorded by RIS, the case is dismissed before the auction takes place (and RIS misses
this) and the borrower subsequently redefaults on the loan. Our results are not sensitive to
discarding these observations.
We construct a unique ID for each plaintiff and attorney as follows. For plaintiffs and
attorneys who are on more than ∼100 cases, we manually checked the names for consistency
and constructed a unique ID number. We then identified “large plaintiffs” as those plaintiff-
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IDs associated with greater than 7000 cases, and “large attorneys” as those attorney-IDs
associated with greater than 10000 cases. We identify by name all plaintiffs implicated in
the Independent Foreclosure Review Settlement conducted by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
We match the RIS and chancery court records by case number. We discard non-matches,
which arise due to several factors: non-foreclosure chancery court cases (e.g., name changes,
mechanic’s liens) will not appear in the RIS foreclosure filings; differing date ranges be-
tween the two data sources (2004–2010 for court records, 2002–2011 for RIS); and differing
geographies (RIS data includes some cases in neighboring counties).
Cleaning Census Data We merge in the following census-tract-level data from the 2000
Decennial Census: median tract income, population, land area, and share of population
that identifies as each census-designated race. We construct tract-level income quartiles
(i.e., what quartile of median income does a given tract fall into), an indicator for being a
predominantly white tract (share white is greater than the median share), population density
(and associated quartiles), and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each race (i.e., the sum of
the squared share of each race in the tract). We merge the census tract data to the RIS data
using census tract FIPS codes.
Cleaning Deeds Records These data are collected from the county recorder for Cook
County, IL. The records were collected by an anonymous private firm and made available to
us by the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at the Columbia Graduate School of Business.
These data include the date of each sale property transaction, the type of property, the
address, the price of the sale, and an indicator for the property being residential. We drop
all transactions with sale price or address missing. We drop duplicate records—multiple sales
with identical sale prices that occur at the same property within 30 days of one another. We
keep only residential sales. We geocode these deeds records based on the property address
using Yahoo! Placefinder.
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Defining Outcomes Using the cleaned and matched RIS and court records, for each
foreclosure case we calculate the distance between the associated property and the properties
associated with all other foreclosure filings. We then count the number of new filings around
each property (i.e., within the given radius; 0.1 miles in the baseline) in each calendar year,
omitting from the count new filings at the same property or filings associated with the same
case—e.g., a given loan may be tied to multiple properties, which we do not want to include
in the count. If there are multiple foreclosure filings at a neighboring property, we include
each of these in the count (although we have found that our results are not sensitive to
treating these as a single new filing). For each calendar year, we then construct an indicator
for there being any new foreclosure filing. We then identify the year that the case is decided
and define our contagion outcomes relative to that year: number of filings and indicator
for any filing in the year the case ends, number and indicator one year after the case ends,
two years after, and so on. We follow the same procedure to get a count of new completed
foreclosures in each calendar year: calculate the distance between the property associated
with each case and each completed foreclosure (from the RIS auction data), and count the
auctions that occur within the given radius in the given calendar year (where this date is
based on the auction date).
We also construct several sub-counts of new foreclosure filings. Foreclosure filing records
in the RIS data have a field reporting additional lien holders that are listed on the foreclosure
claim (reporting additional lien holders is optional for plaintiffs). For each filing we create
an indicator for additional lien holders. We then construct the same contagion outcomes,
but only counting filings with multiple lien holders. Similarly, we construct our contagion
outcomes using the annual count of new filings from plaintiffs implicated in the Independent
Foreclosure Review Settlement and, as described in the text, use this to investigate contagion
among lenders known for the bulk processing of delinquent loans into foreclosure filings.
Thirdly, we construct an indicator for the borrower being underwater on their loan: we
take the principal of the mortgage at origination, conservatively assume an 80% loan-to-
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value ratio to back out the value of the property, adjust the value of the property using
Zillow monthly zip code housing price indices for the year of origination and the year of the
foreclosure filing, and compare the adjusted value of the property to the claim made against
the borrower by the plaintiff. If the claim is larger than the value of the property, then we
consider the borrower to be “underwater”. For each property associated with a foreclosure
filing, we then find the annual count of filings against underwater borrowers within the given
radius. We have experimented with other ways to construct this underwater indicator—claim
larger than loan principal at origination, claim larger than 110% of estimated value, and so
on—and find little difference in our results. Finally, we construct contagion outcomes for
filings from the same lender. We restrict our sample to the set of cases for which we cleaned
the plaintiff name (i.e., filings with plaintiffs who appear on approximately more than 100
filings). For each case within this subsample, we identify all filings within the given radius
and create an indicator for the neighboring filing having the same plaintiff. We then find
the annual count of new filings from the same plaintiff and new filings from other plaintiffs.
We construct our housing market outcomes in a very similar way. For each foreclosure
filing, we calculate the distance between the associated property and all residential sales in
the deeds records. As with the filings, we want to exclude sales at the property associated
with the completed foreclosure. However, in this case (and unlike the filings) we do not have
a perfect match of address—we cannot precisely identify a sale associated with the property
going through foreclosure. Instead, we drop sales within 0.01 miles. For each calendar year,
we take the mean sale price of all sales occurring within that year within the given radius
(0.1 miles in the baseline) of the property associated with the foreclosure filing. We then
use as an outcome the log of this sale price. In the following section, we discuss how we
use repeat sales do adjust this average sale price for fixed property quality. We also use as
an outcome the count of residential sales that occur within the given radius in the given
calendar year and an indicator for any sale occurring.
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1.8.2 Adjusting Price Data for Property Quality Using Repeat Sales
In our deeds records, we first identify all repeat sales: of the 1,330,949 residential sales we
observe between 1995 and 2008, there are 585,756 (44.01%) properties that transact more
than once, which leaves us with 216,068 transactions during the relevant period of 2004 –
2008 (43.56% of the 496,055 residential transactions in this period). For each property, k,
we assume that the sale price in year t, Pkt, is a function of the property’s time-invariant
characteristics, δk, the year of sale, and whether or not there is a recent foreclosure nearby,
Fi(k)t:
log (Pkt) = α0 + αδk +Ψt + αFFi(k)t + ￿kt = α0 + αδk +Ψt + ekt (9)
where Ψt is a year-specific fixed effect and we denote for convenience ekt ≡ αFFk(i)t + ￿kt =
log (Pkt) − α0 − αXk − Ψt. We want a measure of the sale price, P ∗kt, that removes the
influence of property characteristics, but allows price to vary with foreclosure:
log (P ∗
kt
) = β0 + φt + ekt
To achieve this, we estimate a simple price regression that controls for property and year of
sale for all repeat sales in our sample: log (Pkt) = β0 + θk +Ψt + ekt , where θk is a vector of
property fixed effects and Ψt is a vector of year-of-sale fixed effects. Property fixed effects ab-
sorb the influence of the (time-invariant) property characteristics. Using the OLS parameter




β̂0 + Ψ̂t + êkt
￿
. Using
these quality-adjusted sales prices, we then construct a quality-adjusted measure of sale price
for each property i going through the foreclosure courts by taking the log of the average of
all P ∗
kt
that transact within x miles of property i in the relevant year of observation.
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1.8.3 Monotonicity of Instrument
A failure of monotonicity occurs if a higher value of the instrument means a higher probability
of foreclosure for some cases, but a lower probability for others. As discussed in the main
text, a failure of monotonicity may arise if judges treat different types of borrowers and
lenders differently.
We examine this possibility by relating foreclosure rates for each case calendar for dif-
ferent subgroups to the overall value of the instrument for that case calendar. We want to
check that a higher value of the instrument for the case calendar is associated with a higher
foreclosure rate for the sub-groups. We first calculate the overall foreclosure rate by case
calendar and filing year, and de-mean these estimates by filing year.51 We then take a given
covariate (e.g., the borrower is from a predominantly white neighborhood) and calculate the
foreclosure rate by case calendar, filing year, and the value of the covariate (e.g., foreclosure
rate by case calendar, filing year, and whether predominantly white neighborhood), and
again de-mean by filing year. We plot the de-meaned group-specific foreclosure rates against
the de-meaned general case-calendar-filing-year foreclosure rate and display these plots in
Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. A failure of monotonicity as we described above suggests that for
certain subgroups a higher general case-calendar foreclosure rate is associated with a higher
group-specific foreclosure rate, while for other subgroups a higher general case-calendar fore-
closure rate is associated with a lower group-specific foreclosure rate. We construct six such
plots: i) comparing foreclosure rates between properties in census tracts where the share of
white residents is greater than the median to those below the median, ii) comparing prop-
erties in each quartile of median tract-level income, iii) comparing foreclosure rates among
conventional (fixed-rate) mortgages vs. unconventional mortgages (adjustable rate, interest
only, etc.), iv) comparing foreclosure rates by property type, v) comparing cases where the
51Recall that our estimates all include filing date fixed effects, so the relevant comparison is within filing
date, although the figures are similar if we do not de-mean. We use filing year for this exercise to decrease
noise in the foreclosure rate estimates; the story does not change if we use filing month, although the
associated figures are noisier.
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plaintiff is a large lender to those with smaller lenders, and vi) comparing foreclosure rates
among cases where the lender’s attorney is a large vs. smaller attorney (as previously de-
fined). Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 shows that there is no evidence of a failure of monotonicity.
In all cases, there is a clear positive relationship between the overall case-calendar-filing-year
foreclosure rate and the group-specific case-calendar-filing-year foreclosure rate—a higher
value of the instrument is associated with a higher foreclosure rate in each subgroup. Thus,
in terms of observables—property type, loan type, whether the plaintiff is a large bank
or employs a large attorney, and census tract demographics—the monotonicity assumption
appears valid.
1.8.4 Nonlinearities in Foreclosure Contagion
Our regressions are all at the foreclosure-case level, which raises two issues. Firstly, the treat-
ment is imperfectly assigned since neighborhoods around two (or more) delinquent properties
may overlap. Secondly, and relatedly, it is difficult to investigate non-linearities in the effect
of a completed foreclosure. To explore nonlinearities and work with a cleaner (albeit limited)
treatment, we look at the effect of the lagged foreclosures in a small neighborhood on the
new filings.
We define small neighborhoods by partitioning Cook County into squares and examining
foreclosure behavior within. We assign each property associated with our foreclosure cases
to a 0.0625-square-mile square (0.25x0.25). Within each square, i, denote by Nit the count
of new filings that occur in each year, t. Similarly, we count the total number of completed
foreclosures in each year, Fit. We discard squares that have no foreclosure activity (i.e., no
filings) over the period 2004–2010.
Our goal is to relate the lagged number of completed foreclosures in square i to the
number of new filings in a given year. We include fixed effects for the number of ongoing
foreclosure cases for properties in square i as of year t (ηit)52 and for the year of observation
52Since our data only covers filings from 2004 through 2010, we only consider cases filed in this period.
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(ψt):
Nit = β0 + β1Fit−1 + β2Fit−2 + ηit−1 + ηit−2 + ψt + βXi + eit (10)
where Xi is a vector of square-specific controls (census-tract demographics).53 We instru-
ment the lagged number of completed foreclosures using the expected number of completed
foreclosures in square i in year t − 1 or t − 2 (conditional on the number of ongoing cases,
ηi,t−j), where we take the probability of a filing ending in completed foreclosure to be the
leave-one-out case-calendar/filing-month probability of foreclosure as described in Section
1.4.2.54 In this way, we are comparing neighborhoods with the same initial foreclosure filing
activity, but with different completed foreclosure outcomes owing to random assignment of
these filings to different case calendars.
Aggregating in this way helps address the two issues listed above. Firstly, neighborhoods
here are well defined entities that do not overlap, and so there is no mis-assignment of
the treatment as defined (while this is a contained definition of the treatment, completed
foreclosures on the edges of these neighborhoods may nonetheless have spillover effects to
neighboring squares that we are not accounting for). Secondly, by aggregating counts of
foreclosures we can more readily explore non-linearities in the effect of filings.
The results from the 2SLS estimation of Equation 10 are presented in Table 1.34 and
show evidence of contagion consistent with our baseline estimates from Section 1.5.1. We
split the sample by pre-crash (2006–2008) and post-crash (2009–2010) observations to reflect
the differences seen for these samples in Section 1.5.1. Column 1 shows a strong positive
relationship between lagged completed foreclosures and new foreclosure filings—a completed
foreclosure one year prior causes 0.281 new filings, while a foreclosure two-years prior causes
53We have also experimented with additional lags, although these are rarely significant and require a
further reduction in sample size.
54We treat each case filed within square i as of the given period as an independent random draw that
may or may not foreclose in the given year. We construct the probability of foreclosure in the given year for
each case as the leave-one-out share of cases filed in the same month and assigned to the same calendar that
foreclose in the given year. Then the expected number of foreclosures in square i in a given year is the sum
over these probabilities.
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0.913 new filings. Off of a mean of 2.54 filings per year for this sample, this represents an
increase of 11.1% to 35.9%, which is on par with the baseline estimates in Section 1.5.1. At
the same time, the linear estimates for 2009–2010, in Column 4, are substantially smaller:
0.115 and 0.481 (5.2% and 21.8% relative to the mean of 2.21 filings for this sample). Columns
2 and 5 show estimates allowing for a quadratic relationship between lagged foreclosures and
new filings. Interestingly, the quadratic relationship is significant—as the lagged number
of foreclosures grows, the marginal effect of a completed foreclosure in the neighborhood
diminishes. Again, this is consistent with the findings in Sections 1.5.1 that split the sample
by pre-crisis and crisis—exposure to more foreclosure activity diminishes the contagion effect,
perhaps because the marginal foreclosure conveys less information (about house prices or the
foreclosure process itself).
Finally, in Columns 3 and 6 we allow for a more flexible relationship between lagged
foreclosures and new filings by regressing new filings on a set of indicators for the lagged
number of foreclosures. We instrument the lagged foreclosure indicators by the probability
of observing that number of foreclosures in that year, conditional on the number of ongoing
foreclosure cases.55 These estimates seem to suggest that the contagion effect is strongest
for the first two completed foreclosures. However, we do not put too much stock in these
results as the first-stage F statistic for these regressions suggests that the instrument here is
weak.
1.8.5 Lender Response to a Completed Foreclosure
For any given mortgage, divide the remaining life of the loan into three periods (t ∈ 0, 1, 2).
Consider a mortgage in which the borrower owes a payment of mt in each period, t and the
mortgage is fully paid back as of t = 2. Suppose the borrower misses their payment in the
55For example, if there are four ongoing foreclosure cases in a given year, then the instrument for the
indicator of one completed foreclosure is the sum of the probabilities that each of the four cases ends in
foreclosure, where these probabilities are given by the case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate in that
year. We restrict the sample to observations with no more than five ongoing cases in the lagged years, since
the calculation of these probabilities grows drastically with the number of outstanding cases.
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current period (t = 0). With probability α1 the borrower will still be delinquent the following
period and the lender can foreclose on the property, in which case the lender recovers the value
of the home, P , less the costs of foreclosure, λ (e.g., legal fees). However, with probability
1 − α1, the borrower will recover in period 1 and will resume making payments. Then the
value of the unmodified loan to the lender is:







where R is the discount rate. The lender may instead choose to modify the loan, which
reduces subsequent loan payments to m￿1 < m1 and m￿2 < m2.
Lenders will be willing to modify a mortgage when modification is very effective in re-
ducing the probability of non-payment or when the necessary reduction in the value of the
loan is small. By lowering payments, modification reduces the probability of default to
α
￿
1 < α1.56Then the value of the modified loan is:
VM = α
￿










Thus, the lender will choose modification when the value of the modified loan is larger than
the unmodified loan, or the difference between the two is positive:









2 − (P − λ)
￿























> 0, even if the probability
of re-default under modification is zero (i.e., even if α￿1 = 0), modification is still not optimal
if the modified payments are too low. For example, lenders will never modify if the net-
56Adelino et al. (2009) allow home prices to change across periods, however, for the purpose of this paper
little generality is lost by assuming no price growth. Similarly, Adelino et al. (2009) operate under the
assumption that modification guarantees payment in period 1 with a non-zero probability of default in
period 2. Again, this does not fundamentally change the implications of the framework.
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of-foreclosure-cost value of the property is greater than the present value of the modified
mortgage payments (i.e., m￿1 + 1Rm
￿
2 < (P − λ)). When the value of the modified payments
are high enough, lenders are more inclined to modify when it is very effective in reducing
the probability of redefault (i.e., the smaller is α￿1).
Assuming that the default probabilities are constant (which shuts down the borrower
contagion channel), a neighboring completed home foreclosure—which lowers the value of
the property under consideration—discourages new foreclosure filings by lenders. Taking the
derivative of VM−Vu with respect to the value of the home, we see that ∂VM−Vu∂P = α
￿
1−α1 < 0,
relying on the assumption that modification lowers the probability of future default. A drop
in the value of the home encourages mortgage modification—selling the property at auction
is relatively less appealing to the lender than the modified mortgage.
We derive similar conditions for modification by mortgage servicers. Mortgage servicers
are typically employed by lenders to collect mortgage payments and to manage mortgage
defaults. When a mortgage is current, servicers receive a share of the interest payments
that they collect. However, when a borrower is delinquent, servicers are required to forward
payments to the holder of the debt while they manage the default (either by modifying the
loan or seeking foreclosure). While managing a default, the servicer must incur all associated
costs (e.g. legal fees). If the default ends in foreclosure, the servicer is reimbursed for all
foreclosure-related expenses and fees. Thus, the value to the servicer of foreclosing on the




= α1 · Π+ (1− α1) ·
￿





where Π is the total value of all foreclosure-related fees charged by the servicer and where
ρ is the share of the mortgage payment that is returned to the servicer. When the loan is
modified, the servicer is generally not reimbursed for any related expenses, and so the value





= α￿1 · Π+ (1− α￿1)
￿







where CM is the cost of modification (e.g., time/labor spent in negotiations). Notice that
if the modification is successful, the servicer receives a lower monthly payment for servicing


































The servicer’s incentives are similar to the lender’s incentives, although as pointed out by
Levitin and Twomey (2011), since servicers’ fees have seniority over all other claims against
a property, servicers are “indifferent to the amount of the [foreclosure] sale proceeds.” In
other words, since the payoff to a servicer of a completed foreclosure is the foreclosure fees,
the servicer does not care about the value of the property (as long as it is high enough to
cover their fees). Moreover, high costs of modification (which are not reimbursed) will push
the servicer in favor of foreclosure. Notice, then, that if the probabilities of foreclosure (α1
and α￿1) are invariant to a neighboring completed foreclosure, the servicer will not experience




) /∂P = 0).
In summary, under the assumptions that a neighboring completed home foreclosure lowers
the housing value P and that borrowers are unresponsive to the neighboring foreclosure so
that α1 and α￿1 are unchanged, we should observe “anti-contagion” in home foreclosures: if
only lenders and servicers are responding, a completed home foreclosure should discourage
neighboring foreclosure filings. Of course, if a neighboring completed foreclosure has no
influence on housing values and borrowers are unresponsive, then lenders and servicers should
not respond (we should see no contagion at all).
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1.8.6 Estimates by Proxies for Social Connectedness
We find little systematic relationship between the extent of foreclosure contagion and several
proxies for social connection. Our first attempt to proxy social connectedness is to stratify
by neighborhood diversity, operating under the assumption that neighbors with similar back-
ground maintain stronger social ties. For each census tract, we calculate a Herfindahl index
of neighborhood diversity using race-population shares from the 2000 Decennial Census. We
then estimate the baseline treatment effect for each diversity quartile to examine whether
contagion is stronger in less diverse (high-index) census tracts. We also estimate the baseline
specification and interact the treatment effect with an indicator for the foreclosure taking
place in a census tract where a single race makes up more than 75% of the population. Our
second set of proxies draw on the notion of social capital outlined by Glaeser and Sacerdote
(2000), who argue that social connections are higher when residents live in close proxim-
ity to one another. For example, studying survey data, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) find
that there are higher levels of civic participation among residents of large condo buildings
than single-family housing. We proxy neighbor proximity in two ways. First, we interact
the foreclosure treatment effect with an indicator that the home undergoing foreclosure (the
unit of observation) is a condominium unit. Second, we stratify census tracts by population
density (again using data from the 2000 Decennial Census). In both of these cases, while we
continue to find evidence of contagion, there is no systematic relationship between foreclo-
sure contagion and our proxies for social connection. Our social-contagion estimates can be
found in Table 1.31 and 1.32, and Figures 1.5 and 1.6 of the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates




































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
Share White > Median Share White < Median













































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned
by filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again,
demeaned by filing year). A predominantly white census tract has an above-median share of white residents
as of the 2000 Decennial Census, and income quartiles are calculated at the census tract level using median
income from the 2000 Decennial Census.
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Figure 1.3: Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates





















































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
Conventional Mortgage Unconventional Mortgage





































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
condo not condo
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned by
filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again, demeaned
by filing year). Conventional mortgage includes all standard fixed-rate mortgages (while unconventional
mortgages includes adjustable-rate mortgages, balloon-payment mortgages, reverse mortgages, and interest-
only mortgages; we exclude VA mortgages). Condo status is as reported in the court documents.
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Figure 1.4: Calendar-Group-Specific Foreclosure Rates vs. Calendar-Specific Rates





































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
Large Plaintiff Not Large Plaintiff





































Propensity to Foreclose by Calendar and Filing Year
Large Attorney Not Large Attorney
Notes: Filing-year foreclosure rates are calculated for each indicated sub-group by case calendar, demeaned
by filing-year, and plotted against overall foreclosure rates for the given calendar and filing year (again,
demeaned by filing year). A large lender is a plaintiff who appears on more than 7000 of the foreclosure
cases filed in cook county, while a large attorney appears on greater than 10,000 cases.
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Figure 1.5: Contagion Estimates by Income Quartile
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0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Income Q1 Income Q2
Income Q3 Income Q4
Notes: 2SLS estimates (as described in Tables 1.9 and 1.5) performed separately for each value of the given
neighborhood quartile of income: income quartiles are calculated at the census tract level using median
income from the 2000 Decennial Census.
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Figure 1.6: Contagion Estimates by Social Connection Proxy
(a) Effect of Foreclosure on Any New Foreclosure Filings
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(b) Effect of Foreclosure on Log New Foreclosure Filings
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(c) Effect of Foreclosure on Any New Foreclosure Filings
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(d) Effect of Foreclosure on Log New Foreclosure Filings




























0 1 2 3
Years Since Decision
Pop Density Q1 Pop Density Q2
Pop Density Q3 Pop Density Q4
Notes: 2SLS estimates (as described in Tables 1.9 and 1.5) performed separately for each value of the given
quartile. Population density is calculated as census-tract population (as of 2000) over census-tract area.
Diversity is measured with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index over the shares of each 2000 Decennial Census-
designated race in the tract.
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Table 1.13: First Stage Regression of Foreclosure on Propensity to Foreclose




1st-Stage F 150.000 147.400
N 140667 140667
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level. Reported standard errors (and corresponding F statistics)
are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract, clustered on filing
month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. First-stage regression of indicator for case ending
in foreclosure on leave-one-out case-calendar-filing-month foreclosure rate, and filing month and property
type fixed effects. †Unreported controls include share of tract that report race as white in 2000 decennial
census, income quartile from decennial census, whether plaintiff is a “large plaintiff” (six largest plaintiffs
each representing ≥ 7000 filings) or attorney is a “large attorney” (three largest attorneys each representing
≥10,000 cases), whether mortgage is adjustable rate, size of initial loan, and census tract population.
Table 1.14: Contagion Estimates Measured Since Case Filing
Years Since Filing 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing
2SLS 0.057*** 0.032 0.026 0.025 0.076 0.024(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.076)(0.087)
1st-stage F 388.100 388.100 399 255.500 30.450 22.310
N 140683 140683 121171 98032 59967 36685
Total Filings
2SLS 0.631* 0.867** 0.334 0.276* 0.023 0.456(0.354) (0.343) (0.260) (0.152) (0.440)(0.728)
1st-stage F 388.100 388.100 399 255.500 30.450 22.310
N 140683 140683 121171 98032 59967 36685
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table 1.5. Outcomes (and year-of-observation fixed effects) are
measured as of the year that the case is filed (rather than the year that the case is decided).
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Table 1.15: Controlling for Length of Case
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.049 -0.006 0.107** 0.125 0.357** 0.167
Filing (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.086) (0.177) (0.163)
First-stage F 149.500 133.900 114.600 24.810 10.740 8.804
N 129834 118201 92804 67076 41733 23666
Control for Total Filings 0.728 0.782 0.669** 0.928* 2.308 0.627Log Length (0.553) (0.562) (0.299) (0.511) (1.522) (1.196)
of Case First-stage F 149.500 133.900 114.600 24.810 10.740 8.804
N 129834 118201 92804 67076 41733 23666
log(Price) -0.102 -0.516 -0.390(0.176) (0.341) (0.442)
First-stage F 19.320 7.391 12.570
N 42880 25890 12155
Any 0.058 0.008 0.105*** 0.124 0.401** 0.245
Filing (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.076) (0.196) (0.264)
First-stage F 175.100 163.900 163.200 27.100 14.840 4.805
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Control for Total Filings 0.783 0.791 0.677*** 0.890** 2.497 0.883Quadratic in (0.496) (0.501) (0.255) (0.451) (1.599) (1.895)
Length of Case First-stage F 175.100 163.900 163.200 27.100 14.840 4.805
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
log(Price) -0.113 -0.638 -0.511(0.158) (0.427) (0.685)
First-stage F 21.270 6.922 7.338
N 43079 26047 12241
Any 0.053 0.001 0.106** 0.141 0.463** 0.214
Filing (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.096) (0.226) (0.225)
First-stage F 127 123.400 104.800 24.880 14.800 8.341
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Control for log(# of Filings) 0.808 0.842 0.672** 0.990* 2.819 0.803Quarterly Length (0.567) (0.556) (0.288) (0.576) (1.956) (1.660)
Dummies First-stage F 127 123.400 104.800 24.880 14.800 8.341
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
log(Price) -0.105 -0.619 -0.462(0.197) (0.404) (0.562)
First-stage F 19.450 9.194 12.400
N 43079 26047 12241
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure outcome are as in Table 1.5, including the indicated controls for length of the case—
log of the total months, a quadratic in total months, or number-of-quarter fixed effects.
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Table 1.16: Robustness of Contagion Estimates By Specification
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.066** 0.029 0.096*** 0.113** 0.253** 0.160
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.052) (0.107) (0.130)
First-stage F242.600 225 212.400 25.470 20.900 14.130
No Covariates N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Filings 0.739* 0.741** 0.603*** 0.796** 1.616* 0.621(0.388) (0.375) (0.196) (0.320) (0.954) (0.972)
First-stage F242.600 225 212.400 25.470 20.900 14.130
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Any 0.071** 0.029 0.095*** 0.096* 0.244** 0.150
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F232.700 220.200 201 24.080 18.910 13.190
No Property- N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Type FEs Total Filings 1.190*** 1.065*** 0.876*** 0.868** 1.488 0.805(0.453) (0.398) (0.197) (0.338) (0.939) (0.941)
First-stage F232.700 220.200 201 24.080 18.910 13.190
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Any 0.068** 0.018 0.104*** 0.089 0.171 0.085
Filing (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.058) (0.117) (0.137)
Drop Cases First-stage F179.200 168.800 162.300 25.500 19.180 14.600
Decided in N 105638 95487 75004 55342 34719 19464
Summer Total Filings 0.914** 0.851** 0.633*** 0.563 1.126 0.100(0.430) (0.406) (0.230) (0.354) (0.932) (1.078)
First-stage F179.200 168.800 162.300 25.500 19.180 14.600
N 105638 95487 75004 55342 34719 19464
Any 0.083 0.118** 0.026 -0.088 -0.130 -0.417
Filing (0.062) (0.057) (0.062) (0.109) (0.296) (0.662)
First-stage F 45.180 43.800 37.200 14.260 4.733 1.432
Monotonicity- N 127521 115977 90795 65515 40534 22821
Robust IV Total Filings 3.471*** 2.067*** 1.041 -0.263 -1.259 -7.345(1.113) (0.675) (0.674) (1.149) (3.539) (9.501)
First-stage F 45.180 43.800 37.200 14.260 4.733 1.432
N 127521 115977 90795 65515 40534 22821
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding F
statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract, clustered
on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given outcome are
as in Table 1.5, with the following adjustments: “No covariates” omits the case-level controls as outlined in
Table 1.5; “No Property-Type FEs” omits the property-type (condo/single-family/multi-family/apartment)
fixed effects; “Drop Summer Decisions” drops cases that are decided in June, July, or August (during which
the courts dismiss inactive cases); “Monotonicity-Robust IV” indicates that the instrument is constructed by
calendar/filing month/income quartile/large plaintiff/“white” census tract cells.
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Table 1.17: Robustness of Estimates by Sample
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any 0.056** 0.009 0.083*** 0.093* 0.280** 0.160
Filing (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.054) (0.115) (0.137)
First-stage F188.700 179.600 202.400 24.060 18.630 12.440
N 140912 127802 94495 67749 42249 24048
Total Filings 0.649 0.649* 0.553*** 0.700** 1.757* 0.693Include (0.399) (0.375) (0.184) (0.318) (1.019) (1.013)
Moratorium First-stage F188.700 179.600 202.400 24.060 18.630 12.440
N 140912 127802 94495 67749 42249 24048
log(Price) -0.122 -0.418** -0.378(0.106) (0.210) (0.409)
First-stage F 21.490 18.220 14.660
N 43343 26236 12343
Any 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.035 0.017
Filing (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
First-stage F202.200 201.500 225.100 144.800 125 127.600
N 152559 139324 105628 77785 50704 31508
Total Filings 0.402** 0.363** 0.410*** 0.376** 0.360** 0.241Full Sample (0.204) (0.177) (0.124) (0.163) (0.157) (0.204)
First-stage F202.200 201.500 225.100 144.800 125 127.600
N 152559 139324 105628 77785 50704 31508
log(Price) -0.159*** -0.199*** -0.222***(0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
First-stage F131.300 121.900 132.700
N 50879 32750 17952
Any 0.048* 0.008 0.081*** 0.089 0.251** 0.140
Filing (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.055) (0.115) (0.135)
First-stage F247.600 229.100 207.200 24.470 18.120 12.920
Filings < 99th N 127046 116434 91674 66454 41416 23533
Percentile Total Filings 0.144 0.234 0.395*** 0.318 0.887 0.231(0.194) (0.174) (0.128) (0.225) (0.561) (0.568)
First-stage F247.600 229.100 207.200 24.470 18.120 12.920
N 127046 116434 91674 66454 41416 23533
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
outcome are as in Table 1.5, with the following sample adjustments (recall that the baseline sample omits
cases filed during the foreclosure moratorium of 2009, omits filings against VA loans, and omits cases filed
during the first year of a case-calendar’s existence): “Include Moratorium” maintains the baseline sample,
but includes cases filed during the 2009 foreclosure moratorium; “Full Sample” relies on the set of all matched
foreclosure cases in Cook County for 2004–2010; “Filings < 99th Percentile” drops observations where the
number of new foreclosure filings near a case in a given year is greater than the 99th percentile.
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Table 1.18: Contagion in Any New Filing, Omitting Each Filing Year
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
No 2004 0.044 0.014 0.078*** 0.076 0.233* 0.167(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.130) (0.174)
First-stage F 221.700 208.300 190.800 21.330 15.180 10.010
N 124342 112717 87309 61592 36265 18391
No 2005 0.046* 0.009 0.072** 0.109* 0.349** -0.735(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.063) (0.171) (1.183)
First-stage F 258.600 248 247.400 22.270 8.089 0.937
N 116682 105064 79676 54020 28854 11860
No 2006 0.053* 0.006 0.078*** 0.060 0.189* 0.233*(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.047) (0.103) (0.132)
First-stage F 267.700 255 249 28.580 26.780 13.700
N 112963 101380 76056 50592 26403 17411
No 2007 0.061** 0.015 0.073*** 0.072 0.316* 0.140(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.052) (0.185) (0.133)
First-stage F 176.900 167.300 172.700 21.770 8.266 12.970
N 107066 95565 70614 46462 34353 23831
No 2008 0.079 0.003 0.224*** 0.242* 0.247** 0.140(0.073) (0.072) (0.081) (0.126) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 62.950 55.030 34.530 16.530 19.060 12.970
N 93508 83050 62869 56850 41957 23831
No 2009 0.055* 0.018 0.078*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 232.200 218 173.100 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 110228 101633 89191 67379 41958 23831
No 2010 0.043 0.012 0.082*** 0.090* 0.247** 0.140(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.112) (0.133)
First-stage F 245.500 224.400 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 116405 111987 93143 67379 41958 23831
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table 1.5, although omitting cases filed in the given year.
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Table 1.19: Contagion in Total New Filings, Omitting Each Filing Year
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
No 2004 0.658 0.642* 0.462** 0.531* 1.464 -0.253(0.403) (0.376) (0.182) (0.318) (1.181)(0.253)
First-stage F 221.700 208.300 190.800 21.330 15.180 20.300
N 124342 112717 87309 61592 36265 13557
No 2005 0.667 0.653* 0.531*** 0.840** 1.609 0.571(0.407) (0.386) (0.189) (0.341) (1.157)(1.206)
First-stage F 258.600 248 247.400 22.270 8.089 1.423
N 116682 105064 79676 54020 28854 8716
No 2006 0.695* 0.650* 0.501*** 0.597** 1.524 -0.003(0.396) (0.373) (0.175) (0.286) (0.946)(0.231)
First-stage F 267.700 255 249 28.580 26.780 24.660
N 112963 101380 76056 50592 26403 12983
No 2007 0.659 0.686* 0.528*** 0.529* 1.882 -0.062(0.427) (0.405) (0.187) (0.314) (1.594)(0.217)
First-stage F 176.900 167.300 172.700 21.770 8.266 24.500
N 107066 95565 70614 46462 34353 17628
No 2008 1.118* 0.635 1.192** 1.178 1.551 -0.062(0.654) (0.517) (0.573) (1.012) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 62.950 55.030 34.530 16.530 19.060 24.500
N 93508 83050 62869 56850 41957 17628
No 2009 0.749* 0.768** 0.524*** 0.657** 1.551 -0.062(0.394) (0.378) (0.199) (0.319) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 232.200 218 173.100 24.620 19.060 24.500
N 110228 101633 89191 67379 41958 17628
No 2010 0.627* 0.667* 0.536*** 0.657** 1.551 -0.062(0.375) (0.367) (0.183) (0.319) (0.983)(0.217)
First-stage F 245.500 224.400 205 24.620 19.060 24.500
N 116405 111987 93143 67379 41958 17628
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for count of
filings per year are as in Table 1.5, although omitting cases filed in the given year.
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Table 1.20: Baseline Estimates for 0.25 Mile Radius
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing per Year
2SLS 0.017 -0.003 0.016 0.026 0.032 -0.064(0.012) (0.011 ) (0.011) (0.016)(0.041)(0.052)
1st-stage F238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Filings per Year
2SLS 2.187***2.358 ***1.693 ***1.219 2.665 0.762(0.777) (0.785 ) (0.520) (0.764)(1.792)(2.217)
1st-stage F238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
log(price)
2SLS -0.161** -0.269 * -0.410 *(0.067) (0.144 ) (0.220)
1st-stage F 24.760 17.870 16.860
N 63639 39508 21860
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table 1.5, although defining outcomes using a 0.25 mile radius around delinquent
property.
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Table 1.21: Estimates for Loans with Multiple Claimants
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing 0.076* 0.007 0.087** 0.071 0.112 0.058(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.075)(0.143)(0.164)
First-stage F 210.100 213.600 175.800 23.360 16.810 12.410
N 65366 59917 48271 34865 21252 11377
95% CI Lower Bound 0.154 0.081 0.163 0.217 0.392 0.379
Total Filings per Year 0.820 0.669 0.454 0.470 2.026 0.707(0.575) (0.511) (0.286) (0.495)(1.634)(1.267)
First-stage F 210.100 213.600 175.800 23.360 16.810 12.410
N 65366 59917 48271 34865 21252 11377
95% CI Upper Bound 1.947 1.671 1.015 1.440 5.229 3.190
log(price) 0.035 -0.172 -0.198(0.147) (0.231) (0.346)
First-stage F 19.580 24.230 18.530
N 22348 13423 6071
95% CI Upper Bound -0.254 -0.625 -0.876
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for any new
neighboring filing are as in Table 1.5. Sample is restricted to cases where multiple lien holders are listed in
the foreclosure filing.
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Table 1.22: Contagion in Completed Foreclosures/Dismissals Filed After Decision
Years After End of Case 0 1 2 3 4 5
Contagion in Completed Foreclosures Filed After Decision
Any Completed Foreclosure -0.015 -0.150*** 0.054 0.186*** -0.023 0.119(0.011) (0.032) (0.035) (0.055) (0.115)(0.154)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Completed Foreclosures -0.028* -0.285** 0.323** 0.705*** -0.044 0.180(0.014) (0.129) (0.160) (0.211) (0.389)(0.539)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Contagion in Dismissals Filed After Decision
Any Dismissal -0.018** -0.029 -0.011 0.034 0.047 0.077(0.008) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.072)(0.095)
First-stage F 238.300 224.200 205 24.620 19.060 12.970
N 130199 118566 93143 67379 41958 23831
Total Dismissals -0.026** -0.050 -0.026 0.049 0.003 0.216(0.011) (0.036) (0.028) (0.059) (0.127)(0.176)
First-stage F 232.700 234.500 172.700 25.030 15.020 8.676
N 94866 84906 66291 46383 28310 15230
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure or dismissal outcome are as in Table 1.5. Dismissal outcomes are counted in the same
way as foreclosure outcomes: number of dismissals or indicator for any dismissal (among cases filed after
observation case is decided).
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Table 1.23: Robustness of Price Estimates By Specification
Years Since Decision 0 1 2
No Covariates
log(Price) -0.153 -0.439** -0.374(0.113)(0.214) (0.394)
First-stage F23.290 20.600 15.210
N 43079 26047 12241
No Property-Type FEs
log(Price) -0.113 -0.416** -0.361(0.106)(0.204) (0.397)
First-stage F22.140 19.140 14.580
N 43079 26047 12241
Drop Summer Decisions
log(Price) -0.127 -0.482** -0.549(0.122)(0.240) (0.361)
First-stage F22.860 18.330 9.793
N 31977 19176 8837
Monotonicity-Robust IV
log(Price) -0.200 -0.929* -0.337(0.256)(0.502) (0.678)
First-stage F12.080 5.523 3.730
N 41593 24902 11517
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and
corresponding F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat)
clustered on the census tract, clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract
and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given outcome are as in Table 1.5, with the following
adjustments: “No covariates” omits the case-level controls as outlined in Table 1.5; “No
Property-Type FEs” omits the property-type (condo/single-family/multi-family/apartment)
fixed effects; “Drop Summer Decisions” drops cases that are decided in June, July, or August
(during which the courts dismiss inactive cases); “Monotonicity-Robust IV” indicates that the
instrument is constructed by calendar/filing month/income quartile/large plaintiff/“white”
census tract cells.
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Table 1.24: Price Effects, Omitting Each Filing Year
Years Since Decision 0 1 2
No 2004 -0.068 -0.418* -0.207(0.111)(0.252) (0.464)
First-stage F 17.390 12.490 12.150
N 38223 21575 8701
No 2005 -0.140 -0.282 -2.818(0.127)(0.405) (2.370)
First-stage F 15.530 5.944 1.824
N 32114 16558 6011
No 2006 -0.143 -0.393** -0.156(0.101)(0.182) (0.341)
First-stage F 28.770 29.790 13.780
N 30601 17345 9770
No 2007 -0.113 -0.531* -0.358(0.112)(0.292) (0.395)
First-stage F 17.230 9.746 14.390
N 32369 22664 12241
No 2008 -0.206 -0.411** -0.358(0.206)(0.203) (0.395)
First-stage F 13.530 18.830 14.390
N 39009 26046 12241
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for log of
neighboring residential real estate sale prices are as in Table 1.5, although omitting cases filed in the given
year.
Table 1.25: Sub-Sample Price Effects
Years Since Decision 0 1 2
Repeat Sample, Unadjusted -0.073 -0.395 -0.322
log(price) (0.115)(0.247)(0.440)1st-stage F 22.070 11.470 13.980
N 30482 17916 7904
Non-Repeat Sample -0.235 -0.291 -0.705
log(price) (0.146)(0.274)(0.518)1st-stage F 24.040 16.870 9.938
N 30522 17925 8143
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates for given
completed foreclosure or dismissal outcome are as in Table 1.5, although using the given sample. “Repeat










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.33: Contagion Among Borrowers with the Same Lender
Years Since Decision 0 1 2 3 4 5
Any Filing (Different Lender) 0.062** 0.037 0.073*** 0.092* 0.287** 0.070(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.054) (0.119) (0.163)
Any Filing (Same Lender) 0.001 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.048 0.029(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.074) (0.094)
First-stage F 124.700 112.400 112.700 13.060 8.506 4.524
p val for diff. = same 0.104 0.488 0.126 0.146 0.040 0.794
N 231920 211018 164628 117636 70910 38210
Total Filings (Different) 0.816** 0.887*** 0.683*** 0.742** 1.112 -0.081(0.362) (0.343) (0.182) (0.347) (0.700) (1.108)
Total Filings (Same) -0.194*** -0.185*** -0.160*** -0.116 0.024 0.063(0.061) (0.062) (0.050) (0.083) (0.190) (0.254)
First-stage F 124.700 112.400 112.700 13.060 8.506 4.524
p val for diff. = same 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.018 0.860
N 231920 211018 164628 117636 70910 38210
log(# of Filings) (Different) 0.023 0.127** 0.121** 0.182** 0.145 -0.053(0.067) (0.054) (0.053) (0.090) (0.226) (0.246)
log(# of Filings) (Same) 0.046 0.001 0.033 -0.154 -0.425 0.952(0.087) (0.080) (0.072) (0.103) (0.394) (3.326)
First-stage F 55.050 107.600 41.270 15.800 5.857 0.056
p val for diff. = same 0.838 0.162 0.157 0.000 0.121 0.750
N 98694 88191 67543 47654 28798 15282
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
1.5. Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in
the observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender
vs. other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing
filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
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Table 1.34: Neighborhood-Level Aggregate Contagion Regressions
2006–2008 2009–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fit−1
0.281** -0.051 0.115 0.725***







0.913*** 1.177*** 0.481*** 0.742***






























N 30291 30291 25317 19807 19807 12967
First-Stage F Stat351.578 205.429 0.060 244.386 145.119 0.071
Notes: ***Indicates significance at the 1% level, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors (and corresponding
F statistics) are the maximum of the standard error (minimum of F-stat) clustered on the census tract,
clustered on filing month, and multi-way clustered on tract and filing month. 2SLS estimates as in Table
1.5. Outcomes are for two separate counts of new foreclosure filings by either different lenders than that in
the observed case or the same lender. P-value tests the significance between the two responses (same lender
vs. other lender)—estimates are performed simultaneously (pooling both outcomes and allowing for differing
filing month and year of observation fixed effects).
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2 Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Resi-
dential Real Estate Market (with Wojciech Kopczuk
57
)




Houses and apartments sold in New York and New Jersey at prices above $1 million are
subject to the so-called 1% “mansion tax" imposed on the full value of the transaction. This
policy generates a discontinuity (a “notch") in the overall tax liability. We rely on this and
other discontinuities to analyze implications of transfer taxes in the real estate market. Using
administrative records of property sales, we find robust evidence of substantial bunching and
show that the incidence of this tax for transactions local to the discontinuity falls on sellers,
may exceed the value of the tax, and is not explained by tax evasion (although supply-side
quality adjustments may play a role). Above the notch, the volume of missing transactions
exceeds those bunching below the notch. Interpreting our results in the context of an equi-
librium bargaining model, we conclude that the market unravels in the neighborhood of the
notch: its presence provides strong incentive for buyers and sellers in the proximity of the
threshold not to transact. This effect is on top of the standard extensive margin response.
Finally, we show that the presence of the tax affects how the market operates away from the
threshold—taxation increases price reductions during the search process and in the bargain-
ing stage and weakens the relationship between listing and sale prices. We interpret these
results as demonstrating that taxation affects the ultimate allocation in this search market.
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2.1 Introduction
Purchasing real estate is a time-consuming and complicated process with large financial
stakes and potentially important frictions. Beyond the price, a typical transaction involves
many associated costs, including broker’s fees, inspection costs, legal fees, title insurance,
mortgage application and insurance fees, and moving costs. In this paper, we rely on a partic-
ular type of cost—transfer taxes that are imposed on the value of real estate transactions—to
understand how frictions affect the functioning of this market.
Our objective is fourfold. Real estate transfer taxation is common and given the impor-
tance of this market it is of interest to understand the empirical implications of such taxes.
Second, we take advantage of variation in tax incentives and data on both transactions and
listings in order to gain better understanding of the importance of search and matching fric-
tions in this market. Third, we use this context to develop a framework for understanding
tax incidence and efficiency costs of transaction taxes in search and matching markets more
generally. Other contexts where similar issues arise are labor markets and financial transac-
tion taxes. Fourth, our theory and empirics allows for studying the impact of discontinuous
incentives on the existence of the market itself.
Our empirical approach relies on variation generated by the discontinuous nature of
the taxes imposed in New York and New Jersey, which are levied as a function of the
appropriately defined purchase price. A prominent example is the so-called “mansion tax”
in New York state (since 1989) and New Jersey (since 2004) that applies to residential
transactions of $1 million or more. The tax rate is 1% and is imposed on the full value
of the transaction so that a $1 million sale is subject to a $10,000 tax liability, while a
$999,999 transaction is not subject to the tax at all. In New York City, all real estate
transactions are also subject to the real property transfer tax (RPTT) and in New Jersey
they are subject to the Realty Transfer Fee (RTF)—both of these schedules happen to have
(smaller) discontinuities as well, as we discuss in Section 2.2. Hence, all of these taxes create
tax notches (see Slemrod, 2010), while the introduction of the tax in New Jersey also creates
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a time discontinuity.58 Furthermore, the statutory incidence is different for the mansion tax
(which is the responsibility of the buyer) than for the New Jersey RTF and New York City
RPTT (which are the responsibility of sellers, with the exception of sales of new constructions
in NYC). Interestingly, such discontinuities are not uncommon—for example, they are also
present in the UK (Besley et al., 2013; Best and Kleven, 2013) and D.C. (Slemrod et al.,
2012).
Our results allow us to reach three sets of conclusions. First, and perhaps least surpris-
ingly, we find that the tax distorts the price distribution resulting in significant bunching
just below $1 million. This bunching is evident in the distribution of sales in New York
displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.59 A similar pattern appears in New Jersey after the intro-
duction of the tax. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate that the onset of this effect is immediate.
The bunching we observe is substantial: our estimates robustly indicate that about $20,000
worth of transactions shift to the threshold in response to the $10,000 tax. The strength of
this effect does not significantly vary with our proxies for tax evasion and we show, using
listings data, that a distortion of similar magnitude is already present when properties are
first advertised by sellers, which we interpret as inconsistent with tax evasion. We find some
evidence that the effect is weaker (but still very strong) for newly built properties that sell
when already finished, suggesting that real adjustments to the characteristics of a property
may be part of the effect. Still, we conclude that real responses do not fully account for the
extent of bunching and the tax near the threshold imposes a substantial burden on sellers.
Results from smaller discontinuities that shift statutory incidence are consistent with this
conclusion.
Second, we build a theoretical framework to illustrate and test for unraveling of the
market above the threshold—the possibility that the tax locally destroys trades of matches
58There are also geographic discontinuities that we do not exploit: the RPTT changes at the New York
City border, and both RTF and the pre-2004 mansion tax change at the New Jersey-New York border.
59Figure 2.1 corresponds to the whole state, while Figure 2.2 is for New York city itself. We chose to
present the two figures with different binning and overlaying the fit on just one of them in order to present
both the visual evidence of the effects and illustrate salient features of the data (round number bunching)
that we control for in the empirical analysis.
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with remaining positive surplus. Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show that the distribution of prices
features a large gap above the threshold. If all transactions with positive surplus when taxed
continue to transact in the presence of the discontinuous tax, the gap is expected to reflect
observations shifting from just above the notch (in absence of the tax) to bunch below the
threshold. In particular, the gap above the notch is expected not to be bigger than the
extent of bunching below. This is a testable prediction. If it fails, it implies that some of the
observations are not occurring over and beyond the standard extensive margin response—the
phenomenon that we refer to as “unraveling”: transactions with positive surplus that could
otherwise occur not far from the notch are not taking place at all. Moreover, we show that
the difference between the size of the gap and the extent of bunching is a lower bound for
the number of missing transactions. One explanation for such unraveling is that sellers, who
face a large burden from these sales, may instead opt out or continue waiting, or buyers may
prefer to continue searching in order to benefit from locally depressed prices.
The implementation of our test for unraveling is straightforward and illustrated in Figure
2.5 (that we explain in more detail later in the paper). Conceptually, we estimate bunching
at the threshold by constructing the counterfactual distribution based on the data to the left
of the threshold and comparing this to the observed bunching at the notch. We estimate the
gap by constructing the counterfactual distribution based on the data well to the right of the
threshold (i.e., affected by the tax and, thus, accounting for the standard extensive-margin
response) and comparing this to the observed gap in sales above the notch.60 Intuitively,
the after-tax counterfactual used to estimate the size of the gap is, by construction, already
net of the standard extensive margin response (matches that have surplus lower than the
tax) and thus the gap only reflects sales that have shifted to the threshold or matches with
continued positive surplus in the presence of the tax that do not sell. We argue that these
missing transactions would have sold if they were far from the threshold, but are discouraged
60In practice, we usually simply allow for a shift in the distribution at the threshold to parsimoniously
capture the two different counterfactual distributions. We also report results that rely on separate estimation
on both side.
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by the incentives presented by the notch to continue searching.
We indeed find that more transactions are missing from the gap than we can observe
bunching at the threshold, indicating that the market unravels locally. This effect is large:
our baseline estimates indicate that over $40,000 worth of transactions (i.e., equivalent to
the mass of transactions that would sell between $1,000,000 to $1,040,000 in absence of
the tax) that would still yield positive surplus even with the tax do not take place. This
corresponds to 2,800 missing transactions in New York City, out of 380,000 that occurred
over the whole period. Hence, by our estimates, this one percent tax, applying at a relatively
large threshold, managed to eliminate 0.7% of transactions due to the unraveling effect. To
reiterate, our interpretation of this response is conceptually different from the standard
demand response that is due to higher taxes discouraging transactions with low surplus:
unraveling corresponds to eliminating transactions with positive surplus in the presence of
the tax. This additional extensive-margin response indicates that the substantial friction
introduced by the transaction tax hampers functioning of the market in some region above
the threshold. Given our sources of variation, estimating the standard response would require
making strong assumptions about comparability of distributions with and without taxes, and
we do not pursue it in this paper.
Recognition and empirical identification of the type of extensive margin response that we
focus on is a novel contribution. There are, of course, known examples of frictions eliminating
particular markets—most prominently, asymmetric information affecting the existence of
insurance markets. We find that the notched design of the tax can destroy a market for
housing with values close to the notch, which has not been previously recognized. We argue
that such a response is present because of the search frictions in the housing market and may
apply in any situation where search is present and the population affected by distortionary
incentives is not fixed.61
Unraveling has important implications for empirical work that relies on notches. Much
61More speculatively, we briefly comment in Section 2.6 on figures from our online appendix that indicate
possible changes in patterns of behavior during the search process.
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of this literature focuses on contexts where only the intensive margin is of interest, such as
income taxation, and hence this point has not been recognized before. In particular, our
results indicate that in situations where the volume of taxable units is endogenous (as in
housing, but perhaps not under the income tax far from the filing threshold where non-
filing may be negligible), exits around kinks/notches cannot be assumed to be the standard
extensive margin and hence such responses cannot be generalized as reflecting the effect on
behavior elsewhere. One must be careful about separating unraveling from the standard
effect—response to the tax in general may differ substantially from behavior close to the
notch.62 Similarly, estimation of the extent of optimization frictions as in Kleven and Waseem
(2013) relies on measuring the size of the gap, which would partially reflect unraveling if
present. Moreover, the possibility of unraveling complicates estimation of a general (i.e., not
specific to the notch) intensive-margin response to a notched policy, such as the approach
described by Kleven and Waseem (2013). We demonstrate how a general response of price
to the transfer tax, as determined by the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers,
could be estimated by adjusting bunching by the size of the gap. This procedure eliminates
the part of the response that is driven by the discrete impact of the notch, leaving only the
effect of a continuous tax. However, such an estimate will be biased (perhaps substantially)
in the presence of unraveling.
Our third set of conclusions finds evidence indicating that the impact of the tax is not
limited to the proximity of the threshold, but extends much further. Both price reductions
while properties are listed and discounts (the difference between final advertised and sale
price) increase permanently above the threshold, indicating that the search and matching
process is affected everywhere by the tax. Furthermore, we find that in the presence of
the tax listing prices are a weaker signal of the final sale price of the property. Relying on
our theoretical arguments, we interpret this greater dispersion of sale price conditional on
asking price as corresponding to increased deviation from the efficiency-maximizing matching
62In particular, extensive margin responses in other papers exploiting discontinuities in transaction taxes
(Slemrod et al., 2012; Best and Kleven, 2013; Besley et al., 2013) are subject to this critique.
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equilibrium and conclude that a general transaction tax increases inefficiency in the search
process.
A small literature focuses on the effect of transfer taxes on the functioning of the real
estate market (Benjamin et al., 1993; Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn, 2005; Dachis
et al., 2012). Contemporaneously, three other papers (Slemrod et al., 2012; Best and Kleven,
2013; Besley et al., 2013) look at similar distortions to the distribution of final prices (but
not listings) in the United Kingdom and Washington, D.C. These studies focus on the
standard extensive margin response (the general effect on sales) to policy changes, rather than
incidence, listings and search frictions as we do. We are also unique in showing evidence of
unraveling—that the extensive margin effect of the tax goes beyond eliminating transactions
with negative net-of-tax surplus. Beyond offering the first, to our knowledge, evidence of
this type of an effect, these results also cast doubt on generalizing from responses around
notches and kinks (where market can unravel) to elsewhere (where only standard extensive
margin response should be present) in the presence of matching frictions.
Another strand of literature to which we contribute analyzes the search and matching
process in the real estate market. Several studies focus on the role of listing prices and
bargaining in determining the final sale outcome (c.f. Han and Strange, 2012, 2013; Merlo
and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Haurin et al., 2010), while a few apply more general search models
to real estate data (c.f. Carrillo (2012); Genesove and Han (2012)). However, these studies
do not explicitly identify the effect of transaction costs, such as transfer taxes, on outcomes.
A related line of study focuses on the role of real estate agents, attempting to unbundle the
effect of cost from information provision (Levitt and Syverson, 2008; Jia and Pathak, 2010;
Bernheim and Meer, 2013). Finally, a number of empirical papers incorporate information
available in real estate listings data to the study of seller behavior in the housing market
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Carrillo and Pope, 2012).
Our paper is also related to the broader body of work on behavioral responses to taxation.
As in the research on responses to income taxation, we are interested in separating real,
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timing, avoidance, and evasion responses (Slemrod, 1990; Saez et al., 2012). Contrary to that
strand of work, our context requires considering both sides of the market. There has been a
recent revival of interest in estimating the incidence of specific taxes/transfers (e.g., Doyle Jr.
and Samphantharak, 2008; Mishra et al., 2008; Hastings and Washington, 2010; Marion and
Muehlegger, 2011). Real estate tax is more complicated due to non-homogeneity of goods
traded, and the closest analogue in the literature is work on incidence of income/payroll
taxes or credits (Rothstein, 2010; Saez et al., 2011).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next two sections, we discuss the institu-
tional and policy context and our data. In Section 2.4 we present our theoretical framework.
We start by introducing a bargaining framework that illustrates the effect of the tax for a
particular match, followed by discussion of frictionless equilibrium and predictions regarding
the effect of the tax on the price distribution. We then derive simple testable implications of
the presence of frictions to matching. In Section 2.5, we present empirical results about the
distribution of prices, both graphical evidence and local incidence estimates for various types
of taxes, relying on price and listings data. We also show evidence for various subsamples
in order to shed a light on the role of evasion and real adjustments. In Section 2.6, we focus
on distortions to the matching process near the threshold and present our results about the
extent of unraveling. In Section 2.7 we demonstrate the global effect of the tax on discounts
and informational content of listings. Conclusions are in the final section.
2.2 Policy
Real estate transfer taxes are common across the U.S. These taxes are applied to the sale
price of real property, and range from as low as no tax in Texas to 2% in Delaware. In New
York and New Jersey, the tax rates change discontinuously with total consideration, creating
corresponding notches in total tax liability. Table 2.1 contains details of the relevant tax
schedules. One notch arising in both states is due to the mansion tax: a 1% tax on the
total consideration for homes costing $1,000,000 or more. Under the mansion taxes of both
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New York and New Jersey buyers’ total tax liability jumps by $10,000 when the sales price
moves from $999,999 (where the tax does not apply) to $1,000,000 (where the tax comes
into effect). In New Jersey, the mansion tax was introduced on August 1st, 2004, and covers
all residential real-estate transactions. In New York state, the mansion tax was introduced
in 1989 and applies to the sale of individual coop and condo units, and one-, two-, and
three-family homes, with few exceptions.63
Real estate sales in New York City and New Jersey are subject to additional taxes with
discontinuous average rates. In New York City, the Real Property Transfer Tax (RPTT)
applies to residential sales (as defined for the New York mansion tax) with a rate of 1% if
the total consideration is $500,000 or less, and 1.425% above $500,000. Commercial sales
are also subject to the RPTT at a rate of 1.425% below $500,000 and 2.625% above. Unlike
the mansion tax the statutory incidence of the RPTT falls on the seller by law, however
it is customary for the buyer to pay the tax when purchasing directly from a sponsor (i.e.,
purchasing a newly developed condo or a newly offered coop). Thus, the RPTT is a unique
tax in that there is variation in the statutory incidence.
Residential sales in New Jersey are subject to the Realty Transfer Fee. This transfer
fee (or tax) has a non-linear schedule (see Table 2.1) that shifts when total consideration is
greater than $350,000. The marginal tax rate for consideration above $200,000 is 0.78% if
the total price is less than or equal to $350,000, while this tax rate jumps to 0.96% when the
total price is greater than $350,000. Moving from a price of $350,000 to $350,001 increases
the buyer’s tax liability by $630.
63Exceptions are as follows. If a residential unit is partially used for commerce, only the residential share
of the total consideration is subject to the tax (although the entire consideration is still used to determine
if the tax applies). Similarly, multiple parcels sold in the same transaction are taxed as one unit unless the
parcels are evidently not used in conjunction with one another. Vacant lots are exempt from the mansion
tax, and, finally, any personal effects sold with the home are deducted from the total consideration for tax
purposes (but are subject to state sales taxes).
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2.3 Data
We study administrative records on real estate transactions in New York state and New
Jersey as well as historical real estate listings in New York City. Sales records, which cover
the universe of recorded real estate transactions in the given geography and time period, come
from three sources: the New York City Department of Finance’s (NYCDOF) Annualized
Rolling Sales files for 2003–2011 (covering all of NYC), real property transfer reports compiled
by the New York state Office of Real Property Services (NYSORPS) for 2002–2006 and 2008–
2010 (all of NY State, excluding the five counties of NYC), and SR1A property transfer forms
collected in the New Jersey Treasury’s SR1A file for 1996–2011 (all of NJ). These records
contain details of each transaction, including the date of sale, the total consideration paid
by the buyer, the address of the property, the property type (e.g., one-, two-, or three-family
home, residential coop or condo, etc.), the year of construction of the building (in NYC and
NJ) or whether the property is newly constructed (in New York state), and whether the
sale is arms-length (NYSORPS only).64 We also use deeds records for 1996–2008 for NYC
collected by an anonymous private data provider from the county records, which indicate
whether the buyer relied on a mortgage (see Appendix 2.9.3 for more information about data
sources).65
We identify sales that are subject to each of the transfer taxes. Misclassification in
taxable status, if any, will introduce a bias against finding effects, however it is unlikely
to be substantial: our information comes from administrative records that contain sufficient
information to classify, even though an explicit taxability flag is not provided. In New Jersey,
we consider all “residential” sales to be taxable (mansion tax and Transfer Fee). For New
York state, we define all single-parcel residential sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes,
condos, and seasonal properties as subject to the mansion tax. Finally, in New York City
64This definition excludes sales between current or former relatives, between related companies
or partners in business, sales where one of the buyers is also a seller, or sales with “other unusual
factors affecting sale price.” See Appendix 2.9.3 for more details.
65We are grateful to Chris Mayer and the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate for access to this data.
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we define all single-unit (non-commercial) sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes, coops,
and condos as taxable.66
We match the Rolling Sales data for Manhattan to a subset of historical real estate listings
in order to get a broader picture of the effect of the tax on the real-estate search process. Our
listing data comes from the Real Estate Board of New York’s (REBNY) electronic listing
service and covers all closed or off-market listings between 2003 and 2010. REBNY is a trade
association of about 300 realty firms operating in New York City and represents a substantial
share of listings in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Members are required to post all listings and
updates to the electronic listing service. We limit attention to the more complete Manhattan
listings, which accounts for approximately 45% of Manhattan sales in the Rolling Sales files.
From the REBNY listing service we observe details of all (REBNY-listed) closed or off
market listings since 2003. These data include initial asking price and date of each listing,
all subsequent price updates, and the date the property sells or is taken off the market. To
acquire the final sale price, we match these listings by precise address (including apartment
number) and/or tax lot to the NYCDOF data for Manhattan. We obtain approximately a
90% match rate for listings identified as “closed” in the REBNY data.67
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics from the three sources of sales data. Overall, we
have records for 3,256,597 taxable sales (with non-zero sale price) spanning 1996–2011. The
distribution is skewed: mean sale price is higher than the median. Unsurprisingly, prices
are highest in New York City. Although median (and mean) sale price is well below the
$1,000,000 threshold of the mansion tax, there are still several thousand sales per geography
within $50,000 of the mansion-tax cutoff. Table 2.3 presents the count of taxable residential
sales and median prices over time for the three regions. The growth of housing sales and
prices throughout the early 2000s is evident here, as is the subsequent drop in total sales
66While multi-parcel sales in New York state are typically subject to the mansion tax, such a sale may be
split for tax purposes if structures on adjacent parcels are not used in conjunction with or clearly related to
one-another. Since we cannot identify such cases in the New York City and New York state data, we err on
the side of caution and exclude all multi-parcel and partially-commercial sales sales from taxable status.
67The match-rate is continuous across the tax thresholds. See Appendix 2.9.3 for details on the matching
process.
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and median price at the onset of the recession in 2007/2008.
Table 2.4 presents statistics for the matched REBNY listings data. The sales covered by
REBNY have much higher prices, on average, than the general NYC rolling sales data ($1.24
million versus $658,000). This is due to the REBNY data only covering sales in Manhattan,
which is considerably more expensive than the outer boroughs. About 64% of the homes
in our sample end up closing (rather than being taken off the market). At the same time,
8% of listings do not close but have a corresponding sale in the rolling sales data, which
we interpret as corresponding to either direct sales by owner or sales with a non-REBNY
agent. Homes that do not close spend more time on the market (200.5 days vs. 146 for sold
properties). These statistics suggest that search frictions are non-negligible in the housing
market—the process of finding a buyer for a home is lengthy and sellers are often unable to
find a match. There also appears to be bargaining between buyers and sellers: for properties
that close and are matched to the rolling sales data, the average discount between the initial
asking price and the sale price ( initial− sale
initial
) is 5.9%: 3.2% discount from initial asking to final
asking price and a 2.8% discount from final asking price to sale price. However, the median
listing in our sample has no price updates between the initial and final asking prices.
2.4 Theoretical Framework
To interpret our empirical findings, we present a simple model of real-estate transactions.
We first discuss implications of taxation in a bargaining framework given a match between a
buyer and a seller. We then characterize the equilibrium and its responsiveness to taxation
absent search frictions. The equilibrium in this situation corresponds to assortative matching.
We follow with a discussion of how the price distribution might respond when individuals
search and need not transact conditional on matching. Finally, we elaborate on how the
equilibrium price dispersion (which is present when there are matching frictions) may respond
to taxation, and how these effects can be empirically characterized by relying on observable
information (including listings data).
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2.4.1 Bargaining
We start with a bargaining model that clarifies the nature of distortions to the price distri-
bution around the notch and relates tax incidence observed at the notch to the bargaining
power that determines incidence elsewhere. For now, we abstract from equilibrium consid-
erations and instead characterize pricing behavior given a match. This is a building block of
the equilibrium analysis that we come back to below. The Nash bargaining model itself is
formally presented in the Appendix 2.9.1. Here, we introduce the intuition underlying the
model and illustrate key results on Figure 2.6. The figure corresponds to a lump-sum tax,
but the main insights apply as well to the proportional tax that we discuss in more details
in the Appendix.
We assume that transaction prices are determined by Nash bargaining between the buyer
and seller. Consider a single match (b, s) between a buyer with a reservation value of b and a
seller with reservation value s. Given the price that a buyer and a seller negotiate, p, and a
lump-sum tax T imposed on the buyer (as in the case of the mansion tax), the parties end up
with surpluses of SB = b− T − p and SS = p− s, respectively. We assume Nash bargaining
with seller’s weight β so that the price maximizes β ln(p− s) + (1− β) ln(b− T − p) and is,
thus, set to p(b, s)−βT , where p(b, s) ≡ βb+(1−β)s is the price absent taxes. Consequently,
the surplus of each side is equal to SB = (1 − β)(b− T − s) and SS = β(b− T − s), which
implies that the parameter β determines how the total surplus b−T − s is split between the
two parties.
Necessarily, the incidence of the tax is determined by the seller’s relative bargaining
power, β, as well. Although it follows automatically from this framework, it is worth high-
lighting that the party with lower bargaining power bears a lower share of the tax. This
party has a lower claim to the surplus in the first place and, symmetrically, experiences a
lower reduction in surplus when the tax is imposed. At the extreme, when β = 0 or β = 1,
one of the parties has no bargaining power and no surplus, and thus is completely inelastic
so that it cannot bear any burden of the tax.
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Transaction taxes may also discourage sales. Transactions take place when the surplus is
non-negative (b−T −s ≥ 0). All matches (b, s) that satisfy βb+(1−β)s = p, for some p, sell
at exactly the same price (equal to p− βT ) or do not sell at all if total surplus is negative.
By reducing the surplus, the uniform lump-sum levy discourages some sales (note that this
is the “standard” extensive margin response; we discuss unraveling in Section 2.4.3).
However, the lump-sum tax does not lead to re-ranking of transactions. All prices simply
adjust by βT , so that transactions that were occurring at the same price absent the tax
continue to sell at equal (although different from the original) prices. This lack of re-ranking
is not general: it does not survive considering proportional rather than lump-sum taxation,
but it simplifies the following discussion and provides a natural benchmark (and, as discussed
in the appendix, the key qualitative results generalize to the proportional tax case).
We illustrate our formal results regarding the price and sales responses to the tax graph-
ically on Figure 2.6. The figure shows reservation values of buyers and sellers on the two
axes, and also allows for tracing prices. The contract line (the relationship between prices
of buyers and sellers) in absence of the tax requires that the prices of buyers and sellers
have to be the same: pB = pS; while in the presence of the tax above the notch it is given
by pB = pS + T · (pS ≥ H), where H is the notch (H = $1,000,000 for the mansion tax).
The solid black line represents this pricing/budget constraint below the notch, the dashed
black line represents the no-tax situation above the notch, and the solid blue line represents
the contract line in the presence of the tax (above the notch). The straight green line and
other lines parallel to it show the locus of matches with the same sale price in absence of the
tax—i.e., a constant value of p(b, s) (corresponding to the intersection of the given parallel
line with the black no-tax contract line). In the presence of the lump-sum tax all matches on
any of these lines sell at the same price, given by p(b, s)− βT , which corresponds to a point
where a given constant price line intersects with the contract line. Transactions in the gray
shaded area, marked “Z”, have positive surplus and would sell without the tax, but they do
not sell when the tax is present because the net-of-tax surplus turns negative. Matches in
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this region reflect the standard extensive margin response.
Price adjustments are affected by the presence of the notch, resulting in some transactions
moving from above to just below the notch, and can be broken-down into four cases that
depend on the initial (absent-tax) price. Case 1 are transactions that originally occur below
the price of H and are not affected by the tax (buyer-seller matches in region “D”). Case 2
are transactions that, in absence of the tax, sell at a price between H and H+βT and would
sell below H if the tax was uniform (i.e., not notched), but in the presence of the notch
occur there. These transactions are illustrated in Figure 2.6 by the yellow area marked “A”
that is bounded by the p(b, s) schedules corresponding to p(b, s) = H and p(b, s) = H + βT .
Given the assumption of maximizing the Nash-bargaining objective function, transactions
that originally sell at a higher price than H+βT may sell at the notch depending on whether
total surplus at the notch or with the tax is higher. We show that for some intermediate
range of original (absent-tax) prices above the threshold (Case 3), some transactions will
bunch at the notch (region “B”), while others will sell at a new price above the notch (region
“C”), depending on the relative size of the seller’s and buyer’s reservation values for the
property. However, when the original price is high enough (greater than some finite pre-tax
price corresponding to the solid green line) no transaction will bunch, constituting our final
case (region “E”). In the appendix we establish that the qualitative characterization of the
effect of taxation on prices described by Figure 2.6 is general.
The formal model delivers an additional result that is not a priori obvious: there exists a
pre-tax price above which the presence of the notch does not affect any transactions. Firstly,
for any β there exists a pre-tax price above which transactions are not affected by the notch—
this boundary is determined by considering matches involving a seller with reservation value
of zero. Furthermore, and less intuitively, there exists a single finite bound for such maximum
pre-tax prices above which transactions do not bunch that applies uniformly for any value
of β. In the lump-sum tax case, the tight bound (applying as β → 0) is the solution to
ln(H)− ln(p)− H−T
p
+ 1 = 0 and corresponds to p ≈ $1, 144, 717 when H = $1, 000, 00 and
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T = $10, 000. In the case of the proportional tax, the bound solves ln(H)−ln(p)−H−p ln(1+t)
p
+
1 = 0 (where t is the marginal tax rate, 1% in the case of mansion tax) corresponding to
p ≈ $1, 155, 422. While this precise characterization is the consequence of functional form
assumptions in the case of Nash bargaining, it does provide a theoretical justification for the
assumption that we make in our empirical analysis that only matches in some finite omitted
region around the notch might bunch. In our empirical analysis, we use this theoretical
bound for defining the omitted region in our baseline specification (but of course we explore
the sensitivity to this choice).
2.4.2 Equilibrium
The framework that we have introduced so far focuses on price determination given a match
between a buyer and seller. This is a component of the equilibrium description—given
matches that lead to sales, we assume Nash bargaining as the approach for determining the
price. The missing component of the model is a description of how matches form. Providing
a complete search framework is beyond the scope of this paper and, in fact, we are not aware
of a framework in the literature that would incorporate two-sided search in the real estate
context (Carrillo, 2012, makes a step in this direction by setting up, but not explicitly solving,
a model of this kind). We make two arguments that we then investigate empirically. First,
we consider what the distribution of prices reveals about the distribution of the underlying
matches and efficiency of the equilibrium. Second, we consider which of the matches are
likely to be “stable” in the presence of the tax.
The simplest way to introduce equilibrium consideration in this framework is to assume
random matching followed by very large frictions (search costs) preventing both parties from
further search so that, conditional on a match, the only decision to make is whether to
transact. Under this assumption, there is a matching technology M(b, s) that results in
some (smooth) distribution of matches over (b, s) and Figure 2.6 reflects which of those
matches correspond to transactions.
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An alternative is to consider a situation with no search frictions. Suppose that we have
an equal number of buyers and sellers. Absent taxation, the overall surplus from a match
in our Nash bargaining model is strictly supermodular (it is given by ln(b− s) + constant).
Hence, the equilibrium and, simultaneously, the efficient allocation that maximizes the over-
all surplus involves positive assortative matching. In the presence of taxation, the surplus
for transactions not subject to the tax and not at the threshold remains ln(b−s)+ constant,
while the surplus for transactions subject to the tax is ln(b − s − T ) + constant (which
is, naturally, also supermodular). Hence, within each of these groups maximization of the
overall surplus involves assortative matching.
The efficient allocation absent taxation corresponds to an increasing profile of matches
(b, s). This profile is illustrated on Figure 2.6 using a wiggly solid gray line. If these matches
were to remain when the tax is introduced, a match corresponding to point X on the figure
would be the highest priced one that is not subject to taxation, the match marked by Y
would be the lowest priced one that does not shift to the notch, and matches between X
and Y would move to the notch.
Introduction of the tax may affect which matches take place in the equilibrium. The
efficient allocation will retain the main features visible on Figure 2.6, although the actual
equilibrium profile and points X and Y need not coincide with the allocation absent tax
distortions. As argued above, the equilibrium matches subject to the tax will continue to
be assortatively matched—that is, matches above point Y will lie on an increasing profile.
Similarly, matches below point X will form an upward-sloping profile. For matches that are
priced at the threshold, the price is fixed at H so that any permutation of residences between
buyers would deliver exactly the same surplus (a feature that is arguably peculiar to this
model), so that the precise identity of matches between X and Y is indeterminate.68
The equilibrium allocation in the presence of frictions will not be efficient, although
68The location of X and Y may change because fewer transactions may take place in the presence of a
tax. Figure 2.6 appears to preclude this possibility by using the efficient matching schedule that does not
involve matches that are crowded out by the tax, but it need not be so in general.
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efficiency serves as a natural reference point. Trivially, our theoretical framework implies that
under the efficient allocation variance of the price (or, equivalently, buyer’s type) conditional
on seller’s type (and vice versa) is zero, because the efficient allocation corresponds to an
upward sloping line.69 In the presence of frictions, matches would occur not just on the
efficient allocation line as in Figure 2.6, but rather could be spread over the rest of the
region corresponding to surplus from transacting. Intuitively, one might expect that an
increase in dispersion of prices for a given type of home corresponds to an allocation that
is further from the efficient one. While we do not prove this result, it has to be so at least
when the frictions are small. To examine whether transaction taxes affect the efficiency of
the housing market allocation, we test whether there is an increased dispersion of prices in
the presence of the tax. Because matches are indeterminate in the bunching region, this
exercise is of interest for transactions that are not local to the threshold—i.e., those far
enough from the threshold in either direction. We discuss this further in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.3 Measuring the Impact on the Price Distribution
We expect that the tax affects the distribution of home sales by inducing both bunching of
sales at the notch and by creating a “gap” in the distribution above the notch, and we estimate
both. Our objectives are twofold. First, descriptively, these estimates allow us to quantify
the magnitude of distortions to the price distribution. Second, we use these estimates to
back out values analogous to the mass in regions A and B of Figure 2.6. Intuitively, extra
transactions bunching at the threshold correspond to regions A and B, while transactions
that are missing from the distribution above the threshold (relative to the distribution further
to the right) reflect region B. In principle then, these values may be used to recover the
mass in region A that is tightly linked to the bargaining parameter, β.
However, in what follows, we argue that the tax notch provides a strong incentive for
neighboring “productive” matches—those close to the boundary between regions B and C,
69While the efficient allocation is not unique in the bunching region A and B on Figure 2.6, the price is
constant and equal to the threshold level in that region.
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which have positive surplus in the presence of the tax—to break. Consequently, there may
be more transactions missing from the distribution above the notch than locate at the notch
itself. We show that our estimates can be used to test for and bound this local extensive-
margin response: if such a response is not present, the excess number of transactions at the
notch must exceed the gap in the distribution. We view this test as one of the central con-
tributions of our paper, as it corresponds to testing for unraveling of the market due to the
presence of the notch. Equivalently, this is a test of whether the extensive margin response
is standard (the gray region in Figure 2.6)—a condition that is necessary to generalize from
estimates based on a notch to behavioral responses to a general tax (as done by Best and
Kleven (2013) and Slemrod et al. (2012)). Previewing our results, we find that overwhelm-
ingly the answer is that it is not. The rest of this section serves to define quantities that we
estimate and to formalize the test for the local unraveling of the market.
Observed and counterfactual distributions. We first consider how the distribution of
sales is distorted by the tax notch. The discussion is graphically illustrated on Figure 2.5,
which is a distribution analogue of Figure 2.6 (with corresponding region labels and coloring).
We denote by F (p) the “true” (population) price distribution in the presence of the actual
(notched) tax from which our observations are drawn. We denote by FT (·) the observed
cumulative population price distribution—a draw from F (p). In order to characterize and
interpret distortions to the distribution, we presume that there is a set of potential matches
(from some matching technology) that may result in transactions. We leave the origin of
the set of matches unspecified, and simply assume that there is some matching technology
that we take as given. Matches are indexed by i and have associated with them three prices
(pi, p̌i, p̃i): the actual price pi in the presence of a “notched” tax, the shadow price p̌i that
would prevail if the tax did not apply anywhere, and the shadow price p̃i that would prevail
for the same transaction if the tax was proportional everywhere (i.e., involved no threshold).
In the context of our model as illustrated on Figure 2.6, pi = p̌i for transactions taking place
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in region D, pi = p̃i in regions C and E, and p̌i ≥ H > pi in regions A and B. Analogously,
this respectively corresponds to the transactions far below the notch, transactions above the
notch, and the bunching region on Figure 2.5. We assume that p̌i > p̃i, which excludes
the polar case of incidence fully borne by buyers, but allows for simplifying notation. We
also allow for either of the prices to be infinite, corresponding to the transaction not taking
place in a given regime. We do not rule out in general that the notched tax affects the
equilibrium distribution everywhere (even below the threshold): F (p) corresponds to the
actual equilibrium outcome; however, p̌i and p̃i are prices specific to matches that form
in the observed equilibrium given a notched tax, so that their marginal distributions do
not reflect any changes regarding which matches would form if the the tax was removed or
replaced by one that is proportional everywhere.
We rely on two counterfactual distributions for our estimates: one that corresponds to
the non-taxable regime and another corresponding to the taxable one. F0(p) = P (p̌i < p) is
the counterfactual distribution corresponding to the non-taxable regime. Below the taxable
threshold, H, F0 is the true distribution net of transactions that are affected by the presence
of the tax (p̌i ≥ H > pi). We define a counterfactual distribution F1(p) = P (p̃i < p)
corresponding to the region subject to the tax: it is the distribution under a proportional
tax with no notch (in particular it is accounting for the “standard” extensive margin response
but, of course, without allowing for equilibrium adjustment to the set of matches).
In the presence of the tax, the actual distribution will display an excess mass bunching
below the threshold (relative to F0) and a gap above the threshold (relative to F1). At some
abuse of the notation, we use the region descriptors from Figure 2.6 (e.g., A) to denote
the set of matches and the mass (probability) of transactions in the corresponding region.
Transactions that are distorted by the threshold have p̌i ≥ H > pi and come from a number of
different sources: p̃i < H (region A except for A￿); p̃i = ∞ (region A￿); and p̃i ≥ H (region B).
We note that A+B = P (p̌i ≥ H > pi) and B = P (pi < H ≤ p̌i ∧ p̃i ≥ H) = P (pi < H ≤ p̃i).
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, these transactions move from above the threshold (in absence
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of the tax) to bunch just below the notch. This movement of sales from above the threshold
(and any additional extensive margin response beyond the standard one already embedded
in the adjustment to distribution F1) leaves a gap in the observed distribution just above
the notch.70
Crowd out of productive matches. One concern is that not every productive match
corresponds to a transaction: i.e., that there may be transactions for which p̃i < p̌i < ∞ =
pi—those with sufficient surplus to survive the tax, but that do not occur in the presence of
the notch. To see why, recall that our basic framework assumed that equilibrium matches
in the neighborhood of the notch form in a way similar to those away from it, with only the
outcome of the bargaining process affected. However, proximity to the threshold provides
strong incentive for some buyers and sellers in matches near the notch to continue or delay
searching (and perhaps not transact in the end at all). Firstly, consider buyer-seller pairs
who would move to the threshold if a sale occurs (region B of Figure 2.6). Sellers in this
region—who face a substantial reduction in sale price in moving to the notch—may prefer
searching for a buyer with slightly higher reservation value who is, thus, willing to buy above
the notch. Secondly, buyers in the buyer-seller pairs that would transact in the gap region
above the notch (region C) may have an incentive to return to the market to find a seller
with slightly lower reservation value.
Whether this type of local extensive-margin response is present is of interest in its own
right, corresponding to both an efficiency loss due to a notched tax in markets with search
frictions (productive matches that do not transact) and the importance of search in the
housing market. We assume that such exits do not occur for transactions below the threshold
(p̌i < H, region D) and for transactions that have sufficiently high prices (region E, p̃i > P̄
for some sufficiently large price P̄ ). We denote the mass of such exits that comes from
matches that could otherwise sell above the threshold in the presence of proportional taxation
70Transactions to the left of the threshold (region D) have pi = p̌i, and those with pi = p̃i correspond
to regions C and E. The gray region—transactions with surplus low enough that the tax crowds them
out—have p̌i < ∞ = pi = p̃i.
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(regions B and C) by M ≡ P (H ≤ p̃i ≤ P̄ < ∞ = pi).
Local incidence. Using an estimate of the excess mass bunching at the threshold (I), we
can estimate a measure of the incidence of the tax. We define
I = F (H)− F0(H) = P (p̌i ≥ H > pi) = A+B
as the number of observations that shift below the threshold due to the tax. Given the
observed distribution FT and an empirical estimate of the counterfactual distribution F̂0,
we can construct an empirical estimate of the volume of responsive sales making up I as
Î = FT (H)− F̂0(H). In practice, we construct the counterfactual price distribution of sales
F̂0 by relying on the actual distribution FT to the left of the notch, but omitting sales near
it—the specifics are in Section 2.4.5. The estimate of bunching, Î, is represented by the
red/yellow area in the first panel of Figure 2.5.
Given an estimate of the counterfactual distribution F0 to the right of the threshold, we
can also define a dollar measure ĥ as
F0(H + ĥ)− F0(H) = Î (14)
to represent the magnitude of the shift to the threshold. In other words, ĥ is obtained
by finding the dollar value such that the integral under the counterfactual to the right of
the notch is equal to the excess mass (represented as the green area of the first panel of
Figure 2.5). We refer to ĥ as “local” or “reduced-form” incidence of the tax. Our preferred
interpretation is that, as with the “kinked” budget-set methodology outlined by Saez (2010),
ĥ represents the average amount of money that is lost (relative to their corresponding non-
taxed sale price, p̌i) by sellers participating in the marginal transactions affected by the
presence of the threshold. However, the value of ĥ does not, on its own, inform us about
the underlying bargaining power of the two sides of the market and hence does not reflect
incidence of the tax away from the threshold.
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We construct and estimate ĥ throughout, but our interpretation of ĥ as local incidence
depends on assumptions about the nature of the counterfactual distribution. With the
exception of our data for New Jersey prior to implementation of the tax, we do not observe
p̌i for values greater than H at all. When we use data below the notch to project F0 above
the notch, the interpretation of ĥ requires additional assumptions. If Fτ (p) below the notch
coincides with the distribution absent taxation F0(p) (i.e., pi = p̌i for p̌i < H), then the
projected counterfactual above the notch corresponds to the distribution absent taxation
as well, so that ĥ can be thought of as a reduced form dollar estimate of local incidence
(this interpretation also applies when we build our counterfactual using the non-distorted
distribution in New Jersey before the tax was introduced). However, if the untaxed part of
the distribution (below the notch) is affected by the tax via general equilibrium effects (and
so Fτ (p) ￿= F0(p)), the projection of the counterfactual above the notch, and the dollar value
ĥ that relies upon this projection, do not have clear interpretations (although ĥ remains
a convenient way of standardizing mass of sales bunching below the notch). On the other
hand, even if Fτ (p) ￿= F0(p), our estimate of the excess mass Î (and unraveling estimates
that depend on it) remains valid.
Gap. We also construct a measure of the gap to the right of the notch by comparing an
estimated counterfactual above the threshold to the observed distribution. We presume that
there is a known value of P̄ such that F1 and F coincide for prices greater than H + P̄ (by
Theorems 3 and 4, this has to be so in our framework; also recall that we assumed away exit
of productive matches for high enough prices) and define the gap in the distribution as:
G = [F1(P̄ )− F1(H)]− [F (P̄ )− F (H)]
i.e., the difference between the number of transactions taking place in the presence of taxation
with and without the notched implementation of the tax. For the estimation, we replace
F by FT , and F1 by its empirical estimate F̂1. The estimate of F̂1(P̄ ) − F̂1(H) reflects the
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expected number of observations in regions B and C, while FT (P̄ ) − FT (H) is the actual
number of observations in region C. Using our definitions, we can show that
G = P (P̄ ≥ p̃i ≥ H ∧ (pi < H ∨ pi = ∞)) = P (pi < H ≤ p̃i)+P (H ≤ p̃i ≤ P̄ < ∞ = pi) = B+M
Recall that M represents the mass of transactions that would have taken place under a
proportional tax at prices exceeding the threshold, but do not take place in the presence of
the notch. Thus, the gap reflects two effects: exit from the market of productive matches
and shift to the threshold.
To reiterate, the gap reflects transactions that are missing from the distribution to the
right of the threshold relative to the counterfactual with taxes. In particular, it does not
include the standard extensive margin response—matches with surplus small enough that
they are no longer economically viable in the presence of the tax (the gray region Z in Figures
2.5 and 2.6).
Testing for market unraveling. The gap, G, and behavioral response, I, are related and
can be used to test for the presence of market unraveling and, in the absence of unraveling,
to estimate β. Both G and I partially reflect transactions in region B—those that would
sell at prices higher than the threshold in the presence of a continuous tax, but sell at the
threshold when it is discontinuous. Clearly,
G− I = M − A







market does not unravel in the neighborhood of the notch (M = 0), then G− I = −A ≤ 0.
Intuitively, if all buyer-seller matches continue to transact in the presence of the notched
71Alternative definitions would be to define F1(H + Ẑ)− F1(H) = Ĝ− Î or F0(H + Ẑ)− F0(H) = Ĝ− Î .
The choice we implement has two advantages. First, it is in terms of the distribution F0 so that it is directly
comparable to ĥ. Second, knowing ĥ (which we report as well) allows for directly recovering an alternative




tax, then the mass bunching at the threshold should always be at least as large as the gap.
Hence, given estimates of I and G, we can then test whether the tax destroys productive
matches.
Remark 1. Rejecting a testable hypothesis Ẑ ≤ 0 implies market unraveling (M > 0).
If the hypothesis of M = 0 cannot be rejected, one could construct a straightforward
estimate of β. With no missing sales, I−G = A, so that β̂ would solve F0(H+β̂ ·T )−F0(H) =
Î − Ĝ.72
Previewing our results, however, we find that Ẑ ≤ 0 is rejected or, put differently, we find
that the size of the gap is larger than the number of transactions that bunch. We conclude
that there are transactions that do not take place because of the proximity to the threshold
so that the market (partially) unravels in its neighborhood.73
One can bound local exit from the market (M) by considering how much missing mass
is required to explain our estimates assuming different values of β. In particular, consider
the two extreme cases of β = 0 (buyer captures all surplus) and β = 1 (seller captures all
surplus). In the first case, A = 0, while in the second case A corresponds to the mass in the
interval of prices (H,H + T ). Noting that Ẑ is expressed in dollar terms, the dollar-valued
mass in the second case is, thus, T. Hence, the implied missing mass when Ẑ > 0 is between
Ẑ (when β = 0) and Ẑ + T (when β = 1). In our discussion of the results, we will refer to
the lower bound Ẑ.
Finally, note that this discussion provides three qualifications of general interest when re-
lying on notches and kinks in tax schedules for identification. First, for a clean interpretation
of our incidence parameter ĥ (and, analogously, for estimating elasticities or other measures
of behavioral response based on bunching), the counterfactual distribution F0 needs to cor-
respond to the situation absent the tax—this is a strong assumption that is violated if there
72We treat T as a lump-sum tax here for simplicity of exposition; the effect of adjusting for the marginal
tax of 1% is negligible for the purpose of this exercise.
73Naturally, unraveling occurs here because the tax reduces incentives to transact, but in other contexts
the incentives may go the other way. Studying a time-notch affecting marriages in Sweden, Persson (2013)
compares bunching at the notch and the gap above the notch and finds that in that context discontinuous
incentives may encourage transactions at the (time) notch.
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are spillover effects from the notch/kink to the non-taxable region. However, our estimates
of the number of observations bunching Î and missing mass Ẑ do not require such an as-
sumption. Second, the presence of a notch may provide incentives to exit, corresponding
to local unraveling of the market. In this case, gap estimates partially reflect such an exit
and can be used to test for its presence when combined with the magnitude of the shift to
the notch. Third, as a consequence, when there is such market unraveling, extensive-margin
responses estimated by studying local effects of notches/kinks do not generalize to extensive
response elsewhere.
2.4.4 Implications for Efficiency of the Equilibrium Allocation
In order to shed a light on how taxation interacts with search frictions away from the thresh-
old in this market, we proceed as follows. Recall that the equilibrium price for a given match
(b, s) is equal to βb + (1− β)s− βT . Conditional on the seller’s type, var[p|s] = β2var[b|s].
If we could directly observe s, the comparison of the variance of prices conditional on s
with and without the tax would constitute a test of the hypothesis that taxation affects
price dispersion. Evidence of this kind would suggest that the tax increases deviation from
efficiency.
In practice, we are unable to observe the seller’s type and instead rely on a set of indica-
tors, X, that proxy for it. In that case,
var[p|X] = β2var[b|X] + (1− β)2var[s|X] + 2β(1− β)cov[b, s|X]
When X contains s, the second and third term are zero. In order to understand how β2var[b|s]
varies with and without taxation, we consider expanding the set of indicators X—as they
become more informative about s, the influence of the last two terms declines and the first
term should tend towards var[b|s]. We test whether there is a difference between var[p|X]
with and without taxes for a large set of indicators X correlated with seller’s type.
One of the primary indicators of seller’s type that we consider is the seller’s asking price.
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It is natural to think that this price is correlated with the seller’s type, but it may also be
endogenous to taxation. In that case, the alternative interpretation of the effect of taxation
on var[p|X] is as a test of whether taxation changes informativeness of this important signal
available to buyers.
2.4.5 Econometric Implementation
We estimate the price distribution of sales by maximum likelihood as follows. We specify a
parametric distribution of prices absent the tax:
ln f0(p) = g(p) + αD(p) (15)
and the distribution in the presence of the tax:
ln f(p) = ln f0(p) + γ · I(p > H) (16)
where the left-hand side is the log of the probability distribution function at price p, g() is
a parametric function (a polynomial—third degree in our baseline specification) and D is a
set of controls for round numbers. We allow for discontinuity of the density at the threshold
(γ) to account for the shift in sale price and global extensive-margin response (gray region
Z of Figures 2.5 and 2.6) among transactions subject to the tax. We estimate this model
using data that excludes some region around the threshold (H−P, H+ P̄ ) to ensure that our
estimates are not biased by the distortions to the distribution near the notch.74 Given the
observed distribution of prices outside of the omitted region, we estimate the distribution
given by equation (16) by maximum likelihood.75 This procedure yields f̂0(p), our estimate
of the counterfactual distribution function of prices absent the tax and f̂1 = eγ̂ f̂0, the
74Our theoretical framework establishes that there is a value of P̄ above which the notch (although not
the tax) is irrelevant for the distribution.
75Formula 16 is already the log-likelihood and implementation only requires imposing conditions guar-
anteeing that f(p) is a probability distribution function, i.e., that it integrates to one over the considered
interval.
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counterfactual in the presence of the tax.76 Using these counterfactual distributions, we
estimate bunching and gap, local incidence, and bounds on attrition near the threshold
as outlined above. Specifically, we estimate the excess mass as the difference between the
observed mass in the region (H−P, H) and the predicted mass (
´
H
H−P̄ f̂0(p)dp), and estimate
the gap as the difference between the predicted mass in the region (H,H + P ) allowing for




f̂1(p)dp) and the observed mass in (H,H + P̄ ).
While it is common in existing literature exploiting kinks and notches for identification to
include round-number dummies to control for bunching at these points, our implementation
of the round-number effects, D(p), is more involved. Our baseline approach is to rely on
the maximum likelihood estimation and hence specify the density at any point. In order to
parsimoniously capture various forms of bunching (in particular, there is bunching in listings
data just under round numbers — e.g., at $899,000), we introduce “bunching” regions for each
round number R that extend from R−b to R. Within the bunching regions, the distribution
is specified as g(p) +DR +DR · p where DR are the relevant round-number dummies, while
it is g(p) otherwise. Interacting the round-number dummies with price allows the extent
of rounding to vary with price (perhaps $1.2 million is not equally as salient as $600,000).
In practice, we allow for rounding at multiples of $25,000, but allow for separate effects
for multiples of $25,000 and $50,000. We set b = $1000, which makes the bunching region
extend from, for example, $899,000 to $900,000 allowing both for bunching at the $900K
level and just below it (e.g., $899,999). Since our objective is to estimate the counterfactual
in the omitted region (in particular, at $1 million), this approach amounts to assuming that
bunching at other round prices is a valid counterfactual for the magnitude of bunching at
the tax notch—this is not a directly testable assumption but, as discussed before, data in
New Jersey before the introduction of the mansion tax (Figure 2.3) provides support for this
assumption. Except for a gain in information by allowing for continuous prices, this approach
76We show as a robustness check an estimate of ĥ resulting from estimating f0 using only the data to the
left of the threshold. Moreover, we combine this with an estimate of f1 using only data on the right of the
omitted region to attain an estimate of Ẑ.
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is very close to binning the data in $1000 bins (and we show the more restrictive “binned”
specifications as one of our robustness checks). Beyond that, using maximum likelihood
instead of fitting a polynomial to binned data replaces the arbitrary zero-mean restriction
for the error terms by a natural restriction that the estimated specification represents a
distribution function—arguably, a much more natural assumption than OLS.
All reported standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the whole procedure 999
times. Note that the estimates of incidence and gap may fall into one of the round-number
bunching regions. When this is the case, the estimates are not very sensitive—small changes
in parameters correspond to staying in the bunching region. In such cases reported stan-
dard errors for estimates of gap and incidence are small, even though standard errors for
parameters of the parametric density are not.
2.5 Distortion to the Price Distribution
We begin by demonstrating graphically that the tax has a causal effect on the distribution
of prices and timing of transactions. Response to the tax notch is evident in Figure 2.1,
which shows the empirical distribution of taxable sales in New York with sales grouped into
$5,000 bins. There is clear bunching in the sale price just below $1 million and a drop in the
volume of sales just above $1 million. These features, especially the gap above the notch,
are obvious when looking at the distribution in logarithmic scale (and $25,000 bins), as in
Figure 2.2. Figure 2.11 in the Appendix shows analogous patterns at the smaller (0.425%)
RPTT notch at $500,000, which also demonstrates some evidence of a response.77
We can also verify explicitly that the tax induces bunching by comparing sales in New
Jersey before and after the introduction of the tax. Figure 2.3 presents plots of the (log-
77There is also significant bunching at other round price levels (at every $50,000 and, to a lesser extent,
remaining $25,000 multiples), which may confound our bunching analysis. Unlike the bunching at $1 million,
this round-number bunching occurs in the bin above rather than the one below the round number. A priori it
is possible that, although this observed bunching below $1 million is consistent with theoretical predictions,
it may simply reflect adjustments to the tax by very small amounts. However, aggregating the data to larger
bins in Figure 2.12 mostly eliminates such round-number bunching, while continuing to indicate that the
response covers more than just the immediate neighborhood of the threshold.
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scaled) histogram of sales in NJ before and after the tax is introduced in $25,000 bins, with
the pre-tax distribution adjusted to account for sales growth and inflation, as discussed in
the Figure note (and corresponding to our later empirical implementation that compares
NJ before and after the tax).78 We see pronounced bunching after the tax is introduced in
2004 and minimal bunching prior to 2004. Data prior to 2004 also shows that $1 million
is no more salient than other multiples of $50,000 before the tax arrives. Moreover, this
figure displays clear visual evidence of the gap above the notch in the post-tax distribution,
a feature that is not shared with the pre-tax distribution.
As Figure 2.4 illustrates, the number of sales in NJ just below the threshold clearly
increases precisely at the time of the introduction of the tax and the number of sales above
the threshold falls. Focusing on the region within $10,000 of the threshold it is evident
that the increase in the mass below the threshold is larger than the shift from just above
$1 million. This difference provides the first clear indication that the local effect of the tax
may extend beyond 100% of its value ($10,000). Figure 2.4 in the Appendix demonstrates
that retiming is strong for sales well above the threshold, but that it is unlikely to have
lasted for an extended period of time—the excess sales just before the introduction of the
tax do not correspond to more than a couple months worth of sales. On the other hand,
the pattern of sales in the combined $900,000–1,100,000 range suggests that, despite pricing
effects post-introduction of the tax, overall retiming of transactions in the neighborhood of
the threshold is not particularly strong.79
78We choose this larger bin size to smooth out the bunching at other multiples of $50,000. The conclusions
are the same using $5,000 bins—in the presence of the tax there is excess bunching just below $1,000,000
and a gap just above that is not present when there is no tax. However, the bunching at multiples of $50,000
makes the figure difficult to read when both distributions (pre and post tax) are overlaid.
79Appendix Figure 2.14, which shows the monthly distribution of sales in New Jersey between $900,000 to
$1,100,000, further demonstrates that responses extend well beyond the $10,000 value of the tax. There is no
evidence of the distribution being distorted below $975,000, and clear evidence of a shift of the mass of sales
to just under $1 million from as far above as the $1,025,000 to $1,050,000 range. Additionally, Figures 2.4
and 2.14 show patterns that may be consistent with anticipation effects—there is a spike in sales with prices
over $1 million just before the introduction of the tax. This is not surprising: the tax had been announced
prior to coming into effect, and the lengthy process of closing a real estate transaction may allow for the
possibility to speed up the timing of final sale. This effect is not long lasting and of no relevance for New
York where the tax was introduced long before our data starts.
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Our baseline estimates, presented in Table 2.5, demonstrate that the observed bunching
translates to a local incidence on sellers that exceeds the magnitude of the tax. The first row
reports estimates for New York City and corresponds to the specification shown on Figure
2.2. For our baseline, we use a 3rd order polynomial, while omitting data in the $990,000-
$1,155,422 region (the upper bound is the theoretical limit discussed in Section 2.4.1), and
allowing for an additional constant shift above the tax threshold. Our estimate of the local
incidence parameter in the baseline specification is $21,542.098: bunching at the threshold
is equivalent to all transactions over the following $21,000 shifting to the threshold. These
estimates are consistent with impressions from the graphical evidence presented above. Taken
literally as an incidence estimate this corresponds to over 200% incidence of the tax on sellers
for the marginal transaction. The fourth column presents the corresponding estimates of Ẑ:
the positive value indicates that there has to be substantial unraveling due to the presence
of the threshold or, in other words, there is no β that can rationalize behavior if no such
extensive-margin response is present.
In Appendix 2.9.4 we discuss robustness of these results to reasonable modifications of our
specification, including choice of polynomials, changes in the omitted region and estimating
incidence by OLS relying on binned data. We find that our baseline local incidence results
are very robust. We also consider “placebo” treatments at other round numbers that, as
expected, show no effect.
Our estimate of about 200% reduced-form incidence local to the threshold is consistent
across geographies and data sets. In the top panel of Table 2.5, we report results for New
York State (excluding New York City) and New Jersey. Estimates for these regions are
remarkably similar—within $2,000—to those for New York City. In contrast, estimates for
New Jersey before the introduction of the tax show no evidence of bunching.
As an alternative to our maximum likelihood approach, we estimate incidence in New
Jersey using the pre-tax period as a counterfactual for the post-tax period and find similar
results. We implement this pre/post comparison as follows. We omit transactions within 90
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days of the policy change (to avoid the retiming response) and focus on the following year
(Oct. 30, 2004–Oct. 29, 2005). We rescale the period before the tax (May 3, 2003 to May
2, 2004) to account for sales growth over time. Specifically, we construct a counterfactual
growth factor by taking the ratio of the count of sales within $2500 of each price from May 3,
2002 to May 2, 2003 to the count of sales from Nov. 5, 2000 through Nov. 4, 2001 (omitting
sales between Nov. 2001 and May 2002 to mimic the 180 day gap around the introduction
of the tax in August, 2004). Figure 2.3 shows the corresponding distributions. We find
excess sales at the mansion tax threshold as the difference between total post-period sales
and adjusted pre-period sales in the region $990,000–$999,999, and estimate the incidence
as the price, p∗, at which the number of sales in the pre-period between the threshold and
p
∗ is equal to the excess. We estimate the missing mass in the gap in the same way by
taking the difference between total sales in the range $1,000,000–$1,155,422 in the pre and
post periods. We find standard errors for these estimates by bootstrapping this procedure
(including the growth factor for the pre-period) 999 times. Our incidence estimate using the
pre/post comparison is slightly larger than the baseline estimate ($25,000 vs. $21,542).80
The similarity of our estimate of ĥ using cross-sectional data (our baseline specification)
and the pre/post comparison in New Jersey is reassuring, given that these sources of identi-
fication rely on different assumptions about the counterfactual. In the cross-sectional case,
the counterfactual distribution is potentially distorted due to general equilibrium effects. In
the pre/post comparison, the counterfactual is the distribution absent taxation. Similarity
of the estimates of ĥ suggests that general equilibrium spillover to the distribution outside
of the omitted region is not very important.
We find some heterogeneity by property vintage (years since construction) in estimates
80We find little change in local incidence over time. Figure 2.15 in the appendix displays monthly incidence
estimates for NJ. Prior to the introduction of the mansion tax in August 2004 estimates show no response
to the threshold. Once the tax is introduced, prices quickly respond—incidence estimates reach the $20,000
level within four months. We find no evidence that the response to the tax is changing with the housing
boom and bust. We also see no obvious relationship between incidence and the real estate market in New
York. Table 2.10 presents incidence estimates for all three geographies over time. While the estimates vary
somewhat from year to year and region to region, we see no clear pattern over time and they all hover around
our baseline estimates of $20,000.
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shown in Table 2.5, suggesting that some of the local response to the tax may be due to
supply-side quality adjustments. We expect that negotiating a purchase of property before
construction is finished allows for significant response in terms of the level of finish, appli-
ances and other amenities, allowing for price reductions driven by adjustments in property
characteristics. Similarly, older properties may require renovation and hence allow for qual-
ity to more readily respond to the tax. In contrast, original sales of apartments or houses
after they have been constructed and finished may have less flexibility. Our data for New
York City and New Jersey contain information about year of construction of the property.
In particular, in New York City, which is dominated by large apartment buildings, there
is a non-trivial number of sales that occur before construction is finished. For New York
(but not New Jersey), we find that bunching is very large for sales before construction is
complete and for sales that occur three or more years after construction. In contrast, sales
that occur soon after construction—presumably original sales of already fully constructed
and equipped properties—show smaller, but still significant (exceeding $10,000 incidence
estimate), bunching. Recall though that the introduction of the tax in New Jersey induced
bunching immediately (Figures 2.4 and 2.14), so that investment-related adjustments are
unlikely to explain the bulk of the response. We interpret these results as evidence that
supply-side response along the quality/finish dimension is important: quality adjustments
may perhaps explain around half of the price shift, still leaving local incidence of over 100%.
While we do not pursue full welfare analysis, note that such a tax-motivated response cor-
responds to welfare loss by the same logic that implies that taxable income response reflects
the efficiency cost of income tax (Saez et al., 2012).
Our estimates for the NYC RPTT and NJ RTF, reported in the first and second panels of
Table 2.6, are smaller, but still consistent, with the mansion tax results. We find no evidence
of response to the small ($600) New Jersey RTF threshold. For the $2125 RPTT notch that
applies only in New York City, we find a response for new sales, but not for old sales (and we
find no effect in the rest of New York State where the tax does not apply). The variability of
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these results coincides with shifts in statutory incidence. Like the mansion tax, the RPTT
on new sales is the responsibility of the buyer and we find evidence of a response that is
consistent with the mansion tax estimates, albeit somewhat smaller: $1758.225 represents
an 82.7% local incidence on sellers of the $2125 increase in tax liability. The RPTT on old
sales and the NJ RTF schedule are the responsibility of the seller, and in none of these cases
do we find any evidence of response. Both of these results are consistent with our reduced-
form incidence estimates based on the mansion tax: a 100% burden of the tax on sellers
should correspond to no price change for the sellers when they are the party with statutory
incidence. Alternatively, switching incidence can correspond to changes in the salience of the
tax—perhaps a tax imposed on sellers is less salient than the one imposed on the buyers.81
One concern is that the response to the tax may be driven by tax evasion, which we
investigate by examining proxies for the availability of evasion opportunities. In the third
panel of Table 2.6, we split the NYC sample by coop vs. condo status. Coop transactions
have to be approved by coop boards that have the power to veto sales. In particular, there is
anecdotal evidence that coop boards disapprove transactions that occur below the expected
(or, perhaps, desired) market price. One might expect that if underreporting of the price
is the important margin of response to the tax, the extent of bunching in coop apartments
should be smaller than otherwise. This is indeed what we find, although the margin is small:
$16,292.354 for coops vs. $23,292.602 for non-coops.
We also investigate a more direct proxy for evasion—the nature of the transaction—
presented at the bottom of Table 2.6. All-cash transactions involve fewer parties (in partic-
ular, no financing) and more liquidity, which may increase the likelihood of side payments.
We find the opposite: incidence of $16,018 for cash transactions versus $20,676.666 when
the sale has an associated mortgage. In the context of real estate transactions, tax evasion
81For both the RTF and the RPTT there is a small dominated region where sellers would be better off
accepting a lower sale price below the threshold, which is offset by a lower tax bill. Thus, there should be
a small amount of bunching and a small gap at the RTF and RPTT thresholds when sellers remit. That
we find no evidence of this is potential support of these taxes’ limited salience. The dollar value of these
discontinuities is small, however, so we refrain from drawing sharp conclusions on this point.
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is certainly possible, but one might expect that it is not completely straightforward: both
parties have to agree and money has to change hands at some point during the long closing
process. Evasion in this context likely requires an aspect of trust between the two parties.
Our New York State data contains a dummy for whether a transaction is “arms-length” (i.e.,
between related parties). We find no evidence that arms-length transactions involve more
bunching ($23,169 for arms-length sales, $23,786 for non-arms-length).
Finally, examining listings data for Manhattan, we find comparable bunching in seller
listing prices, suggesting that evasion is not a driving force of the observed sale-price response.
Figure 2.7 shows the smoothed distribution of listing prices around the mansion tax threshold
for properties sold and matched to the tax data.82 There are three prices shown for sold
listings: the initial asking price, the final price in the listing data, and the sale price. Among
properties that sell, bunching appears most prominent for the final asking price, followed
by the sale price, and the initial asking price. These visual perceptions are confirmed by
our estimates in Table 2.7 that find substantial bunching for both initial and final listing
prices that actually exceed the response at the sale stage.83 The response of the listing prices
indicates that sellers internalize the presence of the tax (which is the responsibility of the
buyer) even before meeting the buyer. Since these listings responses occur before the seller
identifies a buyer who would be willing to engage in tax evasion, we find it unlikely that the
ultimate sale price response is driven by such cheating.
The evidence so far shows clearly that notched transaction taxes distort the distribution
of sale prices. We find some evidence of supply-side response in quality adjustments, as
82Since bunching is more prominent in listings data, we adjust the distributions on the graphs to remove
the common round number bunching. Specifically, we regress the log of the per-$25,000-bin count on a cubic
in price and dummy variables for multiples of $50k and $100k interacted with the price. We then subtract
the predicted bunching effect from the actual counts. The remaining peaks in the data are the result of noise
and do not necessarily correspond with salient round numbers. Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 in the appendix
show the unadjusted distribution and the distribution of listing prices for all listed properties in Manhattan,
respectively.
83We do not find conclusive evidence of a similar response of listings prices to the NYC RPTT. This is
consistent with the results that we discussed before: we find a response to the RPTT only for new sales
where the tax applies to buyers. However, the number of new sales in the listing data is very small and we
run into power issues.
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well as differences in estimates based on the side of the market responsible for the tax. Our
tests of tax evasion are weak, but do not suggest that this is the main force. These results
reflect local reduced-form incidence estimates—the adjustment of prices in response to the
threshold. By themselves, they do not reveal the strength of bargaining power and are not
informative about the incidence of the tax away from the threshold. As discussed in our
theoretical section, understanding the bargaining power and, relatedly, the possibility of
unraveling in the market requires investigating the size of the gap in the distribution as well
(reflected by Ẑ).
2.6 Unraveling: Market Distortions Local to the Threshold
Our estimates of Ẑ imply that there is significant unraveling of the market local to the
tax threshold. In general, we find the number of sales bunching at the threshold to be
smaller than the number of sales missing from the gap, translating into a positive value
of Ẑ, as reported in Table 2.5. As discussed in Section 2.4.3, a positive sign on Ẑ cannot
be reconciled with positive values of β (seller’s bargaining power) and instead indicates
unraveling of the market in the proximity of the threshold. Hence, our results show that the
threshold design of the tax discourages transactions that would have taken place if the tax
rate was the same but discontinuity was not present—even after controlling for the usual
extensive margin response (sales with positive surplus in absence of the tax, but negative
surplus when taxed) we find that there are sales that do not occur. Moreover, the presence
of unraveling suggests that the matching process is an important part of real estate sales
and that this process may be disrupted by the tax.
To be specific, our baseline estimate of Ẑ = $43, 861.766 implies that the tax eliminates
transactions that correspond to a range of original prices with a width between $43, 861.766
and $43, 861.766 + tax ≈ $54, 000 above the threshold. For NYC, this corresponds to about
2,800 sales over the 2003-2011 period. Altogether, we find that the tax induces a $20,000
price-range worth of transactions from above the threshold to bunch at the threshold, and
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discourages another $50, 000 or so of sales from occurring at prices just above the threshold.
The finding that Ẑ is substantial and positive is robust. Firstly, as can be seen in Table 2.5,
Ẑ ranges from 37,409.87 to 43,861.766 across the three geographic regions that we consider
(NYC, NYS, and NJ). Secondly, Ẑ is small and economically insignificant in NJ before the
tax is introduced. Thirdly, as discussed in Appendix 2.9.4, the estimates of Ẑ are robust to
the specification choices. Moreover, using data for NJ and constructing our counterfactual
distribution using data from before the tax is introduced gives an estimate of Ẑ somewhat
smaller than the baseline maximum likelihood estimate and with large standard errors, but
with a point estimate that is still economically significant.
This extensive-margin response highlights an important margin of efficiency loss due to
the transaction tax notch. As discussed above, a positive estimate of Ẑ suggests a very
specific extensive-margin response, which we refer to as unraveling: some buyer-seller pairs
who have a positive joint surplus under the tax (regions B and C of Figure 2.6) are exiting
the market. This does not imply that these parties do not trade at all—buyers and sellers
can continue to search and some of them may ultimately transact at different prices away
from the bunching/gap region—but it provides evidence that the market in the region just
above the threshold is unraveling. Note that this is different from the usual extensive margin
response in which buyer-seller pairs who would transact in absence of the tax find that the
tax reduces their joint surplus below zero and so the sale does not occur. Our estimation
procedure explicitly controls for this traditional extensive-margin response by allowing for a
level shift (discontinuity) in the distribution above the notch.
Examining real-estate listings data for New York City, we find suggestive evidence that
the tax further disrupts the search process in a region above the notch. We interpret the
presence of substantial bunching in the listings price (discussed above) as evidence that the
tax influences seller search behavior. We also find that those who list just above the notch
(between $1M and $1.075M) are still very likely to sell below one million (see the relationship
between listing and sale price in Figure 2.18 in the Appendix), and are more likely to sell
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than those who list below the notch or much higher above the notch (Figure 2.19) despite
spending more time on the market (Figure 2.20). Interestingly, those who list just above the
notch are more likely to leave their original REBNY realtor and sell with another realtor or
on their own (Figure 2.21), suggesting an additional margin of adjustment to the tax—saving
on realtor fees to compensate for a lower price.
The evidence thus far points to extensive distortions to price, unraveling of the market,
and some disruption of the matching process local to the transfer tax notch. However, many
of these responses occur because of how the tax is implemented—prices can adjust below the
notch to avoid the tax and the notch creates specific local incentives for buyers and sellers to
break matches. In what follows, we examine how the tax affects home sales more generally,
away from the notch.
2.7 Global Market Distortions
In this section, we show evidence indicating that the transfer tax may distort the matching
process everywhere above the notch. Conditional on initial listing price, sellers are taking
larger discounts in the presence of the tax. While this higher discount could be explained by a
shift in bargaining power or by endogenous listing prices, we find evidence that the efficiency
of matches themselves is distorted by the tax. In particular, the variance of sale price
conditional on property characteristics increases with the tax. While these results are largely
descriptive—we must rely on observations below the threshold to form a counterfactual
above—they do show sharp effects and, as discussed in Section 2.4.4, we interpret this higher
variance in selling price as a decrease in the efficiency of the matching process.
Price discounts, which we define as the percent drop from listing to sale price, increase
under the transfer tax. Figure 2.8 shows that the discount from the initial price to the final
advertised price (i.e., before a buyer is identified) and to the final sale price increase as the
initial listing price moves above $1,000,000. We present the median and 75th percentiles of
the distribution of discounts (many listings are not revised) in the figures. The effect is not
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immediate at the $1,000,000 threshold, because the tax applies to the sale price and not
the initial price, and it is the latter that constitutes the running variable here: close to $1
million a small discount is sufficient to bring the sale price below the notch. Interestingly, the
increase is persistent well above the threshold—beyond $1.1M larger discounts persist, even
though these discounts are generally not large enough to move the transaction below the
notch. We find analogous evidence for the discount from final to sale price—see Appendix
Figure 2.22—suggesting that the price response is slowly revealed and reinforced throughout
the search process by distorting the initial prices, subsequent revisions and, finally, during
the bargaining stage.84
We investigate the relationship between transfer taxes and price discounts more formally
and find that the increase above the notch is significant and persistent. We regress the
discount from initial asking price to sale price on a linear spline in initial asking price,
with nodes at every multiple of $100,000 (restricting the sample to listings with initial prices
between $500,000 and $1,500,000). We follow the same procedure for the discount from initial
asking price to final asking price. We plot the difference between the predicted discount (first
price and final price) at each node and the predicted discount at $1,000,000 in Figure 2.9.
These estimates show a significant jump in the price discounts at the notch that shows no
signs of reversing before reaching $1.5 million.85
There are several explanations for the increase in discounts. Firstly, it could be that sale
prices above the notch are not changing, but the response is driven entirely by a change in
asking prices (and we know from Section 2.5 that asking prices respond to the tax). In this
case, since the final outcomes would be unchanged there could be little efficiency loss due to
the tax. Secondly, it could be that the tax increases buyers’ bargaining power. This may not
entail any welfare loss due to the tax, but rather a redistribution of surplus from sellers to
buyers. These two explanations still reveal that the tax affects behavior, although not the
84This can also be seen in Figure 2.23, in which we focus on the mean discounts from the initial price that
allow us to decompose the response (but blur the response that is predominantly present at high quantiles).
Roughly half of the response is due to price revisions and half due to discounts at the bargaining stage.
85 The corresponding point estimates (and related slope estimates) are in Appendix Table 2.11.
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final outcomes. Alternatively, as we argue next, it could be that the tax disrupts the search
process and reduces match quality with associated efficiency losses.
We find evidence consistent with transfer taxes disrupting the buyer-seller match process:
conditional on seller characteristics, the tax increases the variance of sale prices. We investi-
gate the relationship between asking prices and the variance of sale-prices with a two-stage
spline estimation procedure. We first regress sale price on a linear spline in asking price
(nodes at every $100,000 between $500,000 and $1,500,000). We then estimate by median
regression the relationship between the squared residuals from this first stage and a linear
spline in asking price. We estimate standard errors using a clustered bootstrap procedure.86
We find a significant increase in the variance of sale price as (initial or final) asking price
crosses the $1,000,000 notch. In Figure 2.10 we plot the predicted dispersion at the given
node (from the two-stage spline procedure) relative to that at the notch.87 This increased
dispersion is pronounced and persistent well above the notch. The estimates show that, in
general, the predicted variance below the notch is very close to the predicted variance at
$1,000,000, while the variance of sale price conditional on asking price is significantly higher
above the notch than below the notch. Even as asking price rises to $1,500,000, the variance
of sale price does not return to pre-notch levels. This is inconsistent with asking prices and
discounts simply scaling up without changes to other aspects of the matching process. As
with the price discount, these estimates suggest that the real estate market is affected by the
transfer tax even far above the notch—in the presence of the tax, asking price is a noisier
signal of final sale price.88
86We use median regression in the second stage, because squaring the residuals makes these specifications
sensitive to outliers. The bootstrap is as follows: for each observation, we resample first-stage residuals from
the 50 nearest observations (by listing price). We use these residuals and the first-stage predicted values to
construct a bootstrap sample and re-estimate the two-step process. We iterate this process 999 to acquire
the distribution of estimates.
87We present the numerical estimates of the difference between the predicted value at each node and the
predicted value at $1,000,000 in Table 2.12. The estimates are fairly consistent for both asking prices and
are insensitive to the choice of quantile or mean regression in the first stage—see also Figure 2.10.
88This increase in dispersion is also confirmed in the raw data. In Figures 2.24 and 2.25 we plot the
variance of sale price conditional on initial asking price and final asking price, respectively. In both cases,
the variance of sale price increases above the notch.
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In Section 2.4.4 we argued that an increase in the dispersion in sale price conditional
on seller characteristics implies a movement further away from the optimal allocation of
assortative matching. An increase in the variance of sale price conditional on asking price
is suggestive of such an efficiency loss, but it is not conclusive: the ideal measure is the
variance of price conditional on seller type. Asking price is an imperfect proxy for seller
type—if asking price is endogenous to the tax, the increase in variance may be driven by a
change in the composition of sellers who list at each price.
We repeat the two-step estimates of sale-price variance versus asking price including
controls for property characteristics, in order to better approximate the variance of sale
price conditional on seller type. In both stages we control for year-of-sale fixed effects,
zip code fixed effects, building type (single-family home, multi-family home, apartment in
walkup, apartment in elevator building, etc.), whether the sale is of a new unit, and the log
of years since construction (plus an indicator for missing years since construction). We plot
the results from this procedure in Figure 2.10. Including these controls somewhat reduces
the effect of the tax on the variance of sale price, suggesting that endogeneity of listing prices
may have influenced the previous estimates, but the difference is not large and generally not
statistically significant. In particular, there is still a significant increase in the dispersion
of sale price above the notch. We interpret this increase as evidence that the transfer tax
reduces efficiency of the housing market by disrupting the matching process.
2.8 Conclusions
Our empirical analysis demonstrates how a notched transaction tax affects the distribution of
housing sales by creating bunching below the notch, a large gap in the distribution above the
notch, and distorts the relationship between asking price and sale price. The price responses
that we identify suggest that sellers local to the threshold take large price cuts—greater
than the cost of the tax—although this may partially be driven by quality adjustments. The
finding of a gap above the notch that is larger than the number of sales bunching at the
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threshold—even after controlling for the usual extensive-margin effect—suggests that there
are productive transactions that do not occur because of the notched tax. We show that
there is bunching in the distribution of residential listing prices and an effect of the tax on
discounts, both of which indicate that not just the final price, but also some aspects of the
search process, are affected by the tax. Finally, we find that in the presence of transaction
taxes the relationship between seller asking price and final sale price weakens, and that
this persists when we control for property characteristics. This effect extends far above
the threshold. We interpret this increase in price dispersion as a movement away from the
efficient allocation of positive assortative matching in the housing market and as revealing
the distortion due to taxation globally. Hence, we conclude that our analysis of real-estate
transaction tax notches reveals substantial price response local to tax thresholds, that a
notched tax crowds out productive transactions, and that transaction taxes may increase
search-related inefficiencies.
That we find substantial distortions due to the design of the transaction taxes in NY
and NJ (0.7% of all transactions are eliminated due to the threshold) raises the question
of why notched taxes are present in the first place. One of the few general results of the
optimal income tax literature is that the marginal tax rate should be lower than 100% (no
notches). Indeed, our bunching estimates show that the transfer tax threshold leads to a
substantial response and loss of revenue. Moreover, unraveling adds efficiency and revenue
costs. Phasing in the mansion tax, which is likely administratively feasible, would eliminate
these inefficiencies. Still, phasing in would not eliminate all distortions: an extensive margin
response may be present and one of our findings is that search is affected even far from the
threshold. One might ask, then, why have a progressive transfer tax is in the first place.
Public finance theory, going back to the Atkinson-Stiglitz result, suggests that such an
instrument is useful if it can push redistribution beyond what can be achieved via an income
tax (a tool which New York State, New York City, and New Jersey all have in place). The
real estate market raises an additional issue though: some investors may be non-residents,
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so that resources invested in real estate need not be reachable by income taxes. Still, while a
transfer tax might indeed hit non-residents, the same would be true about general property
taxes, which avoid many of the inefficiencies we identify herein. One redeeming quality of
the transaction tax is that it will disproportionately affect more frequently traded properties.
This feature is appealing if frequency of trading varies for different groups of purchasers.
Our evidence of exit from markets near the tax threshold raises important issues for
implementation and interpretation of studies relying on bunching at notches for identifica-
tion. To date, most of this literature has assumed one-sided markets and abstracted from
extensive-margin responses. Our framework highlights that there are two different types of
exit from markets. One is standard—transactions with low surplus do not take place. In
the income tax context, this is akin to the labor force participation decision.89 The second
type of exit, which has not been previously recognized in this literature, is unraveling of the
market near the notch that corresponds to destroying productive matches. Both of these re-
sponses imply that bunching does not fully characterize the consequences of a notch. While
in some contexts (e.g., an income tax notch at a high value) it is reasonable to ignore the
first type of extensive-margin response, the second type of response is likely to be intrin-
sic to any matching context in which parties have an option to continue search (e.g., firms
may continue searching for a worker willing to accept a wage below the notch; employees
may make different occupational choices). The possibility of this second type of response
undermines the assumption that the excess mass bunching at the threshold is identical to
the missing mass in the gap (as in Kleven and Waseem, 2013). Our empirical framework
relaxes this assumption and allows us to explicitly test for exit local to the notch.
More generally, our results suggest that taxes may introduce inefficiencies into other
search markets. Labor markets are, perhaps, the most obvious example of a market with non-
trivial search costs where matches are subject to taxation. Many labor-market regulations
follow notched designs, such as notched income and wage taxation or requirements to provide
89See Marx, 2013 for explicit modeling of this decision to exit the market.
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health insurance or comply with Value Added Tax if the number of employees crosses a
given threshold. That firms might face such discrete costs to increasing scale may lead not
simply to supply- or demand-side adjustments, but perhaps to the destruction of equilibrium
opportunities that require costly search—in the same way that productive real-estate matches
are discouraged near the transaction tax notch. Moreover, our finding that transaction
taxes increase search-related inefficiencies well above the threshold suggests that even non-
notched policies may lead to less efficient worker-firm matches. Of course, the housing market
differs from the labor market in ways that may make the mechanisms we study particularly
pronounced. Firstly, the availability of alternative margins of adjustment affects the ease
of moving below the tax threshold. Secondly, the housing market is a “spot” market where
the current price determines tax treatment; this is not necessarily the case in labor markets,
where contracts may be long lasting and as earnings adjust over time they move further
away from the notch. Nonetheless, our results underscore the importance of considering how












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Median Price of Taxable Sales Over Time
NYC NYS NJ
Year n Price n Price n Price
1996 . . .111759127000
1997 . . . .115470130000
1998 . . . .131485137500
1999 . . . .139167143000
2000 . . . .136891151000










201131919456000 . . 28766250000
Notes: NYC data is from the Department of Finance Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011 (taxable sales defined
as single-unit non-commercial sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes, coops, and condos). Data for NYS
from the Office of Real Property Services deeds records for 2002–2006 and 2008–2010 (taxable defined as
all single-parcel residential sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes). NYS observations in 2007 are from
sales made in 2007, but recorded in 2008–2011 and omits sales recorded in 2007. Data for NJ from the State



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Response to Mansion Tax, by Region and Years Since Construction
Sample IncidenceStd. Error Ẑ Std. Error n
NYC 21542.098 1150.878 43861.766 4142.953102493
NYS (excl. NYC) 23227.515 1084.482 41610.588 4334.170108462
NJ Post Tax 21477.388 1474.300 37409.873 4310.896111936
NJ Pre Tax -784.065 38.892 2958.261 285.872 57836
NJ Pre/Post Comparison†25000.000 8515.132 14223.330 11628.94 2020
<0 37329.701 16009.929-13709.572 42837.004 559
0 13759.258 7671.441 -2451.076 27109.852 1048
NYC 1 11309.339 3457.124 45053.550 15619.853 3422
(Yrs. Since Contr.) 2 14118.294 3145.743 47311.896 15259.170 4388
3 24467.069 5927.603 36654.826 26001.895 2253
4–6 25586.634 6045.138 82880.894 29444.354 2433
7+ 22780.508 1275.592 48877.574 5193.370 72128
NYS (excl. NYC) Old 22677.619 1283.443 40945.774 4264.702104576
New 34254.287 8350.604 62173.984 25965.831 3886
0 24949.365 10542.512 19598.806 33121.546 988
1 24684.039 7485.882 55501.171 26732.423 1896
NJ Post Tax 2 23730.361 7183.484 54344.928 25413.421 1773
(Yrs. Since Constr.) 3 24950.530 8043.393 25353.913 25917.361 1882
4–6 19718.802 4392.694 41103.750 17066.774 6148
7+ 19967.636 1633.977 40047.784 4989.520 85551
0 -351.083 4149.632 1619.879 26316.982 723
1 -142.337 6362.861 4103.325 71219.647 852
NJ Pre Tax 2 -798.644 1743.317 3214.845 13783.929 1082
(Yrs. Since Constr.) 3 -2121.267 2519.545 8725.490 10998.073 1249
4–6 -661.898 537.723 9250.812 18873.573 3335
7+ -778.278 46.481 3226.236 380.842 36530
Notes: Estimates from baseline procedure for given data source/sample (3rd-order polynomial, omit $990k–
$1,155,422).
†Estimates for NJ Pre/Post comparison using NJ taxable sales omitting 90 days around the implementation
of the policy: from Oct. 30, 2004 to Oct. 29, 2005 (post-period) and May 3, 2003 to May 2, 2004 (pre-
period). Incidence estimate is the price at which the number of sales in the pre-period to the right of the
threshold equal the difference between the number of sales in the bunching region ($990,000–$999,999) in
the post- and adjusted pre-periods—pre-period distribution is adjusted as described in text. Ẑ calculated
as in the text, where the excess number of sales bunching at the gap is the difference between the post-
and adjusted pre-period distributions in the bunching region, while the gap is calculated as the difference
between the distributions above the notch ($1M–$1,155,422). Number of observations listed for the pre/post
comparison is the total count of taxable sales between $990,000 and $1,155,422 for these dates.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity in Response by Notch and Sub-Sample
Geog. Sample IncidenceStd. Error Ẑ Std. Error n
RPTT
NYC New 1758.225 751.923 3071.659 1975.290 21683
Old -390.461 28.339 488.460 69.802259840
NYS New -679.032 510.129 7.829 332.599 19147
Old -889.542 18.945 1105.190 56.531687807
RTF
NJ Post Aug. 2004 -699.552 15.333 -268.101 44.131546882
Pre Aug. 2004 -591.400 20.099 -300.348 68.344836832
Mansion Tax
NYC
All Coops 16292.354 2184.555 58245.269 8590.430 26950
All Non-Coops 23292.602 1027.253 38817.535 4612.629 75543
Old Non-Coops 24196.113 535.699 37340.124 5067.660 63971
NYC Cash Only 16018.361 2356.852 74976.653 8814.378 28339
(Deeds) Mortgage 20676.666 2223.237119838.215 11273.628 49421
NYS Arms-Length 23168.557 1163.640 43274.495 4606.535 97936
Non-Arms-Length23786.484 3149.902 24496.898 12693.600 10526
Notes: RPTT and RTF estimates based on 5th-order polynomial, omitting sales between $490,000 and
$550,000 (for NYC and NYS) and between $340,000 and $400,000 (for NJ), Mansion tax estimates as in the
baseline specification. NYC data is from the Department of Finance Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011. Data
for NYS from the Office of Real Property Services deeds records for 2002–2006 and 2008–2010 (excluding
NYC) restricted to all single-parcel residential sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes. Sales in NYC are
defined as single-unit non-commercial sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes, coops, and condos. New
sales are defined as any sale occurring within three years of unit’s construction (in NYC) or any sale flagged
as new construction (in NYS, excluding NYC). Data for NJ from the State Treasury SR1A file for 1996–
2011 (taxable defined as any residential sale). Coops are identified in the rolling sales data as sales with
associated building codes equal to “Coops - Walkup Apartments” or “Coops - Elevator Apartments.”NYC
Deeds Records data from deeds records collected by private data provider (taxable defined as any residential
sale). Non-arms-length sales in NYS defined by the Office of Real Property Services as a sale of real property
between relatives or former relatives, related companies or partners in business, where one of the buyers is
also a seller, or “other unusual factors affecting sale price” (ex. divorce or bankruptcy).
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Table 2.7: Mansion Tax: Listings
SamplePrice IncidenceStd. Error Ẑ Std. Error n
All First24443.666 166.150101702.509 10589.03336232
Final34992.894 3380.599 76606.311 9122.15735714
Sold
First24363.369 353.901 95113.750 12794.90325112
Final38445.445 4289.510 68828.242 10640.68124755
Sale 19148.096 2089.630 53521.404 8077.06524474
UnsoldFirst24700.339 2638.516113962.040 21381.710 7612
Final32926.816 6670.229 94839.590 19962.747 7539
Notes: Data from the Real Estate Board of New York’s listing service; represents all REBNY listings
between 2003 and 2010 that are closed or off market. Unsold sample defined as all listings with final status
not equal to “closed.” Sold sample defined as all listings that match to a NYC Department of Finance sale
record with final status equal to “closed.” First price is the initial price posted on the listing. Final price
is the last price posted while the listing is active (prior to status being changed to “in contract” or “off
market”). Sale price is the recorded price from the NYC Department of Finance.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Sale Price
Notes: Plot of the number of mansion-tax eligible sales in each $5,000 price bin between $510,000 and
$1,500,000. Data from the NYC Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011 (taxable sales defined as single-unit non-
commercial sales of one-, two-, or three-family properties) and from the N.Y. State Office of Real Property
Service deeds records for 2002–2006 and 2008–2010 (taxable defined as single-parcel residential sales of one-,
two-, or three-family homes).
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Excess Below Threshold =1194.1
Missing Above Threshold =3923.8
ĥ = 23323.7
Ẑ = 53320.2
● ●Log of sales in $25K bins Omitted from estimation Counterfactual
Notes: Plot of the number of mansion-tax eligible sales in each $25,000 price bin between $510,000 and
$1,500,000. Data from the NYC Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011. Fit corresponds to the baseline specification
in Table 2.5.
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600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000
Sale Price
($25,000 Bins)
NJ Post Tax NJ Pre Tax
Notes: Plot of the number of mansion-tax eligible sales in each $25,000 price bin between $510,000 and
$1,500,000 before and after the introduction of the tax. Data from NJ Treasury SR1A file for 1996–20011
(taxable defined as any residential sale). We implement this pre/post comparison as follows. We omit
transactions within 90 days of the policy change (to avoid the retiming response) and focus on the following
year (Oct. 30, 2004–Oct. 29, 2005). We rescale the period before the tax (May 3, 2003 to May 2, 2004) to
account for sales growth over time. Specifically, we construct a counterfactual growth factor by taking the
ratio of the count of sales within $2500 of each price from May 3, 2002 to May 2, 2003 to the count of sales
from Nov. 5, 2000 through Nov. 4, 2001 (omitting sales between Nov. 2001 and May 2002 to mimic the 180
day gap around the introduction of the tax in August, 2004).
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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Month
$990,000 to $999,999 $1,000,000 to $1,009,999
Notes: Total taxable NJ sales in given price range by month. Data from NJ Treasury SR1A file for 1998–2011
(taxable defined as any residential sale). Mansion tax introduced in August, 2004 (denoted by gray dashed
line).
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Price
$25,000 Bins
Initial Asking Price Final Asking Price Sale Price
Notes: Data from REBNY listings matched to NYC Department of Finance sales records. Sample restricted
to “sold” listings: last listing status is “closed” and property can be matched to NYC sales data. Smoothed
plot of the distribution that accounts for round-number bunching. The log of the per-$25,000-bin counts are
regressed on a cubic in price and dummy variables for multiples of $50,000 and $100,000 interacted with the
price. Predicted bunching for round-number bins are then subtracted from the corresponding counts.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Initial Asking Price
($25000 bins)
First Asking vs. Final Asking Price (P75) First Asking vs. Sale Price (P75)
First Asking vs. Sale Price (Median) First Asking vs. Final Asking Price (Median)
Note: Plot of the median and 75th percentile discount from initial asking to sale price ( = 1 - final/initial)
and initial asking to final asking price ( = 1 - sale/initial) per $25,000 initial-asking-price bin. Data from
REBNY listings—sample includes all closed REBNY-listed properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000 that
match to NYC DOF data.
160




























500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Initial Asking Price
Initial Asking vs. Final Asking Initial Asking vs. Sale Price
Note: Plot of difference between predicted discounts by initial asking price and prediction at $1,000,000 from
regressions of discount (first to final price or first to sale price) on a linear spline in initial asking price with
$100K knots between $500,000 and $1,500,000. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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No Controls With Controls
Notes: Plots of the difference between predicted values at given initial asking price and predicted value at
$1,000,000 from the following procedure. The log of sale price is regressed on a linear spline in the log of
initial asking price with $100,000 knots between $500,000 and $1,500,000. Squared residuals from this first
stage are then regressed on a linear spline in log of initial asking price (using median regression; results are
sensitive to outliers). Controls in the indicated results include year of sale, zip code, building type, whether
the sale is of a new unit, and the log of years since construction. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence
intervals from 999 wild bootstrap replications of the two-stage procedure, resampling residuals in the first




To identify buyer-seller pairs that move to the notch, we compare maximized surplus above
the notch to surplus when price is at the notch. Surplus at the notch is given by β ln(H −
s)+(1−β) ln(b−H), while maximized surplus when the tax is due is given by β ln(β(b−s−
T )) + (1− β) ln((1− β)(b− s− T )). Transactions in this category that sell at the threshold
satisfy:
f(b, s; β) ≡ β ln(H − s) + (1− β) ln(b−H)− β ln(β)− (1− β) ln(1− β)− ln(b− s− T ) ≥ 0
(1− β)s+ βb ≥ H + βT and b− T − s ≥ 0, b ≥ H + T, s ≤ H
at the notch. That is, the surplus at the threshold has to be higher than under the alternative
of selling with the tax, and the non-trivial case corresponds to transactions with positive
surplus that could otherwise sell at a price higher than the threshold. We show the following
results:
Lemma 1. Fix 0 < β < 1 and consider matches (b, s) that satisfy p(b, s) ≥ H + βT,
b− T − s ≥ 0, b ≥ H + T, and 0 ≤ s ≤ H




such that f(b(s), s; β) = 0








locate at the notch and those with
b > b(s) sell with the tax at p(b, s)− βT
(c) Matches (b￿, s￿) that would otherwise sell at the same price as (b(s), s) (i.e., p(b￿, s￿) =
p(b(s), s)) sell at the notch when s￿ ≤ s and sell with the tax otherwise
(d) b(0) is finite, and matches (b, s) that absent the tax would sell at prices higher than the
corresponding price p(b(0), 0) = βb(0) will never bunch.
Proof. For part (a) and (b) note that for a transaction that would otherwise sell exactly at H+βT the notch















(b−H)(b−s−T ) < 0
because (1 − β)s + βb ≥ H + βT ; and finally that lim
b→∞
f(b, s;β) = β ln(H − s) − β ln(β) − (1 − β) ln(1 −
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− β ln(b − s − T ) = −∞ because all but last term converge to finite values as b
increases. Hence, for each 0 ≤ s ≤ H, there is b(s) that solves f(b(s), s;β) = 0, and b(s) separates positive
from negative values of f(b, s;β).

























. Note that convexity of 1
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Part (d): finiteness of b(0) follows from part (a). When p(b, s) > βb(0), then there is b￿ < b such that
p(b￿, s) = βb(0) = p(b(0), 0). Part (c) implies that (b￿, s) sells with the tax because s ≥ 0. Because b > b￿,
∂f
∂b
< 0 then implies that (b, s) also does not locate at the notch.
The lemma establishes the existence and shape of the schedule b(s), which is marked by
a solid red line in Figure 2.6. Given the seller reservation value, matches with buyers to the
left of this schedule bunch at the notch, while those above it sell with the tax. Parts (a) and
(b) of the lemma establish that b(s) exists and is unique for any s lower than the threshold.
Part (c) shows that the slope of b(s) is flatter than that of the constant-price schedules, and
Part (d) shows that the schedule b(s) intersects the horizontal axis at some finite value so
that for sufficiently high original prices transactions will never bunch. We re-state this last
observation in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Transactions at the notch satisfy H ≤ p(b, s) ≤ βb∗(β) < ∞ where b∗(β) is defined as
f(b∗(β), 0;β) = 0 or, explicitly, it solves β ln(H)+(1−β) ln(b−H)−β ln(β)−(1−β) ln(1−β)−ln(b−T ) = 0.
The corollary follows from part (d) of the lemma. As the original price increases, the
attractiveness of the notch declines so that only transactions with sufficiently high overall
surplus (sufficiently low reservation price of the seller) continue to bunch. For some price,
even the seller with zero reservation value will no longer agree to bunch at the notch and hence
no matches corresponding to higher p(b, s) will bunch either. The bound in the Corollary
depends on β. Interestingly, one can show that there is a uniform and finite bound for all
β, so that transactions above some finite price are never induced to bunch, regardless of the
value of β.
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Theorem 3. For any β > 0, transactions at the notch satisfy H ≤ p(b, s) ≤ βb∗(β) < x(0) <
∞, where f(b∗(β), 0; β) = 0 and x(β) ≡ β(b∗(β) − T ) for any β ∈ (0, 1) , x(0) = lim
β→0
x(β)
and the value of x(0) is the solution to ln(H)− ln(x)− H−T
x
+ 1 = 0.
Proof. In what follows we change variables as x = β(b−T ) (because it turns out that lim
β→0
b
∗(β) = ∞). Note
also that part (a) of the Lemma applied to (b∗(β), 0) implies that x(β) = β(b∗(β)−T ) > H so that we don’t




g(x,β) ≡ β ln(H) + (1− β) ln
￿








− β ln(β)− (1− β) ln(1− β)
= β ln(H)− ln(x) + (1− β) [ln(x− β(H − T ))− ln(1− β)]
We are interested in properties of x(β) that solves g(x(β),β) = 0.
Denote by x∗ the solution of ln(H)− ln(x)− H−T
x
+ 1 = 0. x∗is independent of β and finite. Note that
























0 (using ln(x) < x − 1 and the definition of x∗). Hence, for every β, g(x,β) = 0 has a solution on (H,x∗)
and, in particular, lim
β→0
x(β) has to be finite.





x(x−β(H−T )) . Clearly, for any x > H − T we have lim
β→0
gx = 0. Because lim
β→0
x(β) > H − T and is finite, we
also have lim
β→0
gx(x(β),β) = 0 and lim
β→0









ln(H)− ln(x(β)− β(H − T )) + ln(1− β)− (1−β)(H−T )
x(β)−β(H−T ) + 1
￿
= ln(H)− ln(x(0))− H−T
x(0) +1 as in the
statement of the proposition.
Example. When H = 1, 000, 000, T = 10, 000, and x(0) ≈ $1, 144, 717, transactions that
absent the tax would sell above this value will not bunch regardless of the value of β.
The gray dashed line on Figure 2.6 illustrates the bound, which corresponds to the price
x(0). As β changes, the slope of the corresponding line will change but it will always
correspond to the price of x(0). The sharp bound for a given β (the solid green line) always
lies to the left of this uniform bound and converges to it as β tends to zero. While this
bound is irrelevant given β, it is of natural interest when β is unknown.
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2.9.2 Proportional tax
While considering a lump-sum tax simplifies the analysis, transaction taxes, including the
mansion tax, are typically proportional. However, the results are only slightly affected when
the tax is proportional. Intuitively, incentives for bunching at the notch are always deter-
mined by the level of the loss due to taxation (both due to the tax itself and any distortionary
impact it might cause), rather than the rate of the tax (this is standard intensive/extensive
margin distinction). The proportional tax induces re-ranking, but retains qualitative features
of the solution described above. In the presence of the proportional tax the Nash bargaining
outcome is given by ps = q(b, s; t) ≡ β b1+t +(1−β)s, where q(b, s, t) denotes the seller’s given
types and the marginal tax rate, and pb = (1+ t)ps = βb+(1−β)s(1+ t) so that the overall
surplus from the transaction is equal to
β ln(β) + (1− β) ln(1− β) + ln(b− s(1 + t))− β ln(1 + t)
As in the case of the lump-sum tax, the price q(b, s; t) is linear in types so that the locus
of matches with constant price remains linear (although the slope is affected by the tax rate),
as in Figure 2.6.
It is also straightforward to show an analogous result to Lemma 1 for the proportional
case. Holding s constant, the net benefit to locate at the notch declines with b and becomes
negative for sufficiently high b (because (1 − β) ln(b − H) − ln(b − s(1 + t)) declines in b).
Thus, a schedule analogous to b(s) also exists in the proportional case. Similarly to part (c)
of the Lemma, the net surplus from switching to the notch declines in s holding q(b, s; t)
constant, so that the price corresponding to b(0) has to constitute the upper bound of the
region affected by the presence of the tax.
Finally, there is a straightforward relationship between the bounds corresponding to the
lump-sum and proportional tax. To see it, note that for a given match (b, s) the value of
locating at the notch is the same regardless of whether the tax is proportional or lump-
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sum because that allocation does not involve any tax. Consider s = 0, and the value of b,
b
∗(β;T ), that as before represents a match that is indifferent between locating at the notch
given the value of T . Simple inspection of the surplus for the lump-sum and proportional
tax cases shows that the indifference will hold for the proportional tax as well (because the
surplus will be the same as under the lump-sum tax) when the marginal tax rate is such
that ln(b∗(β;T ))− β ln(1 + t) = ln(b∗(β;T )− T ) so that (1 + t)β = b
∗(β;T )
b∗(β;T )−T . Thus, given β,
the bounds for T map into the bounds for t by this relationship.
Theorem 3 describes a uniform bound for prices corresponding to transactions that might
be affected by the lump-sum tax of T . Because bounds for proportional and lump-sum taxes
are related for any β, that Theorem can be adapted to identify the corresponding bound in
the proportional tax case.
Theorem 4. Given marginal tax rate t, define x∗ as the solution to ln(H)−ln(x)−H−x ln(1+t)
x
+
1 = 0. For any β > 0, transactions at the notch need to satisfy H ≤ q(b, s; t) ≤ x∗/(1 + t) <
∞, and x∗ is the lowest such bound.
Proof. To obtain the analogue of Theorem 3, recall that given T the Theorem established the existence of
the upper bound of undistorted prices below which transactions (might) relocate to the notch. Denote by
x(T ) the uniform bound for βb identified in Theorem 3 for a given value of T . For any β and tax rate t that
satisfy ln(x(T )/β)−β ln(1+t) ≥ ln(x(T )/β−T ), x(T ) would equal or exceed the undistorted price bound for
transactions relocating to the notch under proportional tax. We will find the value of t for which x(T ) is the
smallest such a bound for any positive β. Rewrite this inequality as ln(x(T ))− β ln(1 + t) ≥ ln(x(T )− βT ).
Note that it holds with equality when β = 0. Taking derivatives of both sides with respect to β,we obtain
− ln(1 + t) and − T
x(T )−βT respectively. In order for the inequality to hold in the neighborhood of β = 0, we
need to have ln(1 + t) ≤ T
x(T )−βT for small β and when that’s the case the inequality will hold for any value
of β because the left-hand side is constant while the right-hand side is increasing in β. The bound will be
tight when we do in fact have equality at β = 0 so that ln(1+ t) = T
x(T ) . Accordingly, when this relationship
holds, substituting x ln(1 + t) for T in the equation defining x(0) in Theorem 3 (which leads to the formula
in the statement of the proposition) and solving for x will yield exactly the same solution x∗(t). Finally,
this procedure shows that when s = 0, only matches with b ≤ x∗(t)/β may bunch. Correspondingly, only
transactions that satisfy q(b, s; t) ≤ q(x∗(t)/β, 0; t) = x∗(t)/(1 + t) might bunch.
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Clearly, the value x∗ that solves this formula is also the solution to the equation in The-
orem 3 when T = x∗ ln(1+ t), and the proof makes it clear that this is the right “conversion”
between the proportional and lump-sum tax cases. The theorem provides a bound in terms
of prices distorted by the tax q(b, s, t). However, because q(b, s, t)(1 + t) ≥ q(b, s, 0) it also
provides a (weaker) bound in terms of prices that are not distorted (t = 0): transactions
that bunch need to satisfy H ≤ q(b, s; 0) ≤ x∗ < ∞.
Example. For the New York and New Jersey mansion tax, H = 1, 000, 000, t = 0.01,
x
∗ ≈ $1, 155, 422. Hence, regardless of the value of β, transactions that absent the tax would
occur at prices above $1,155,422 will never bunch, while those that would occur below might
bunch. Transactions that do bunch, would otherwise sell (in the presence of the tax) at no
more than x∗/(1+ t) = $1, 143, 982. This is the same bound as the one corresponding to the
lump-sum tax of 1, 155, 422 · ln(1 + .01) ≡ 11496.83
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2.9.3 Data Appendix
New York City Department of Finance Annualized Rolling Sales. The New York
City Department of Finance (NYCDOF) Annualized Rolling Sales files contain details on
real-property transactions for the five boroughs from 2003 to the present (we use the data
through 2011). The data are realized by the NYCDOF on a quarterly basis and are derived
from the universe of transfer-tax filings (which are mandatory for all residential and com-
mercial sales). Geographic detail for each sale includes the street address (and zip code), the
tax lot (borough-block-lot number), and the neighborhood (Chelsea, Tribeca, Upper West
Side, etc.). The Rolling Sales files contain limited details about the properties themselves,
including square footage, number of units (residential and commercial), tax class (residen-
tial, owned by utility co., or all other property), and building class category (a more detailed
property code—for example, one-family homes, two-family homes, residential vacant land,
walk-up condo, etc.). Transaction details in the data include the sale price and date. A sale
price of $0 indicates a transfer of ownership without cash consideration (ex. from parents to
children).
New York City properties are subject to the mansion tax if they are single-, double-
, or triple-family homes, or individual condo or co-op units. We define taxable sales as
those transactions of a single residential unit (and no commercial units) with a building
classification of “one family homes,” “two family homes,” “three family homes,” “tax class 1
condos,” “coops - walkup apartments,” “coops - elevator apartments,” “special condo billing
lots/condo-rental,” “condos - walkup apartments,” “condos - elevator apartments,” “condos -
2–10 unit residential,” “condos - 2–10 unit with commercial use,” or “condo coops/condops.”
We define co-ops as a building code of “coops - walkup apartments,” or “coops - elevator
apartments.” We define a commercial sale to be a transaction with at least one commercial
unit (and no residential units) or a tax class of 3 or 4.
New York State Office of Real Property Service SalesWeb. The New York State
Office of Real Property Service (NYSORPS) publishes sales records for all real-property
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transactions (excluding New York City) recorded between 2002–2006 and 2008–2010 available
through the “SalesWeb” database. Since deeds are recorded after the sale, this data includes
a small number of sales from 2007. The database is compiled by ORPS from filings of the
State of New York Property Transfer Report (form RP-5217).
The NYS deeds records indicate several details about each transaction and property.
Transaction-specifc details include the sale price and date, the date the deed was recorded
(and recording details such as book and page number), the buyer’s, seller’s, and attorney’s
name and address (often missing), the number of parcels included in the transaction, and
details about the relationship between the buyer and the seller (whether the sale is between
relatives, whether the buyer is also a seller, whether one party is a business or the government,
etc.). Of particular interest to us is whether the sale is defined by the state as arms-length.
The data dictionary defines an arms-length sale as “a sale of real property in the open market,
between an informed and willing buyer and seller where neither is under any compulsion to
participate in the transaction, unaffected by any unusual conditions indicating a reasonable
possibility that the full sales price is not equal to the fair market value of the property
assuming fee ownership”, which excludes sales between current or former relatives, related
companies or partners in business, sales where one of the buyers is also a seller, or sales
with “other unusual factors affecting sale price.”Property details include the square footage,
assessed value (for property-tax purposes), address (including street address, county, zip
code, school district), and the property class (one-family home, condo, etc.). We consider
as subject to the mansion tax all single-unit sales with property class equal to one-, two-, or
three-family residence, residential condo, or a seasonal residence.
New Jersey Treasury SR1A File. We make use of sales records from the New Jersey
Treasury’s SR1A file for 1996–2011, which contains records of all SR1A forms filed at the
time of sale (the form is mandatory in the state for all residential sales). Each record
includes the sale price and date the deed was drawn, buyer and seller name and address
(often missing), deed recording details (date submitted, date recorded, document number),
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and whether there are additional lots associated with the sale. Property details include land
value, tax lot, square footage, and property class. We define taxable sales as those with a
residential property class.
New York City County Register Deeds Records. These data are collected from the
county registers for the five counties in New York City: Bronx County, Kings County, New
York County, Queen’s County, and Richmond County. The records were collected by an
anonymous private firm and made available to us by the Paul Milstein Center for Real
Estate at the Columbia Graduate School of Business.
These data include additional detail as compared to the Rolling Sales files, although at
the expense of precision. Prices in this data set are rounded to the nearest $100, which leads
to misallocation of sales to one side of a tax notch. Transaction details include the sale price
and date, an indicator for whether the unit is newly constructed, the number of parcels being
sold, whether the purchase was made in cash (i.e. whether a mortgage is associated with the
sale), and indicators for private lenders and within-family sales. Property details are limited
to address, zip code, and county.
Data Cleaning. We begin by dropping all transactions with a price below $100 (1,658,639
in NY State, 954,241 in NJ, and 274,118). The bulk of these transactions have a zero price,
representing transfers of property between parties not associated with a proper sale (e.g., a
gift or inheritance). This restriction is relatively innocuous, as our analysis focuses on sales
around each tax notch (although this choice does affect the descriptive statistics). More
importantly, we attempt to identify and discard all duplicate records. In New York State,
we identify duplicates as sales that occur within 90 days of one another at the same street
number in the same grid number (a unique tax lot id). Of these 48,073 duplicates, we always
keep the later sale (in case duplicates are representative of updates to the records). For New
Jersey, since we do not observe tax lots, we identify all duplicate sales that occur at the
same standardized address within 90 days of one another and drop all but the final duplicate
(343,221). Finally, for NYC we identify duplicates as properties in the same borough at
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the same standardized address that sell within 90 days of one another (20,420). While
these duplicates represent a large number of sales, and there are several ways one could
define duplicates, our estimates are insensitive to whether and how we clean duplicates (e.g.,
cleaning NY state based on address or NYC based on tax lot).
Real Estate Board of New York Listings Service. We have collected residential
real-estate listings from the Real Estate Board of New York’s (REBNY) electronic listing
service. REBNY is a trade association of about 300 realty firms operating in Manhattan
and Brooklyn. REBNY accounts for about 50% of all residential real-estate listings in these
boroughs. A condition of REBNY membership is that realtors are required to post all listings
and updates to the listing service within 24 hours.
Using the REBNY listing service, we have collected all “closed” (i.e. sold) or “perma-
nently off market” residential listings posted between 2003 (when the electronic listings are
first available) and 2010. REBNY listings include the typical details available on a real-
estate listing: asking price, address, date on the market and a description of the property.
Additionally, we observe all updates to each listing (and the dates of each update), which
lets us see how asking prices evolve and determine the length of time a property is on the
market. Finally, we observe the final outcome of the listing: whether the property is sold or
taken off the market.
We create several variables for each REBNY listing. We define the initial asking price as
the first posted price on the listing, and the final asking price as the last posted price while
the listing is “active.” We identify the length of time that a listing spends on the market as
the number of days between the initial posting and the date that the listing is updated as
“in contract.” We define the discount between two prices as the percent drop in price— p0−p1
p0
,
where p0 and p1 are prices and p0 is posted before p1.
One caveat to the REBNY listings is that the price is often not updated at the time of
sale. To overcome this, we match REBNY listings to the NYCDOF data by address and
date. Of the 48,220 closed REBNY listings for Manhattan, we achieve a match rate of 92%.
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Non-matches fall in a number of categories. Sales in some condop buildings are missing from
the DOF data due to a clerical error at the NYC DOF. Some transactions contain only street
address or a non-standard way of specifying the apartment number (in particular, commercial
units and unusual properties such as storage units fall in this category). Occasionally, the
same building may have two different street addresses and a unit may be listed differently in
the two databases.At the same time, of the 23,655 Manhattan listings that are not reported
as closed in the REBNY listings database, we find 7,425 corresponding sales in the NYCDOF
data. We treat such matches as an indication that the property was sold without the REBNY
realtor (either sold by the owner or using another realtor).
2.9.4 Robustness of incidence estimates
Table 2.8 demonstrates that our estimates are quite robust to variety of estimation ap-
proaches. Incidence estimates are very consistent, and gap estimates vary somewhat but
remain positive and large in most specification checks that we consider. Intuitively, there
are good reasons for why results may vary as one adjusts the order of polynomials and the
omitted region. Both incidence and gap estimated using cross-sectional data (the only ex-
ception to it our estimates for NJ that rely on pre/post comparison) involve prediction out
of sample (into the omitted region). As the size of the omitted region increases, one has to
predict far out of sample so that the “forecast” error is bound to increase. Furthermore, very
flexible polynomials that can fit data in sample well are not restricted in their behavior in
the omitted region and in some cases may generate non-monotonicity or explosive behavior
within the omitted region — overfitting is not the right approach for predicting out of sam-
ple. On the other hand, the omitted region that is too small generates bias in the estimates
of the counterfactual. Nevertheless, our results are robust to reasonable modifications of our
baseline specification as discussed below.
While our preferred specification uses a third-order polynomial, our incidence estimates
are not too sensitive to this choice. The second through fifth rows of Table 2.8 present
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estimates that we obtain using different orders—the results are similar, although inspection
of the fit of the data suggests that very low-order polynomials cannot capture properly the
shape of the distribution, while very high-order polynomials (not reported) introduce very
unrealistic behavior in the omitted region. As the result, there is a bit of sensitivity to
the order of polynomials in the gap estimates, which are positive and significant for all
specifications up to the fifth order polynomial, but shrink somewhat for higher orders.
The results are only somewhat sensitive to selecting a narrow omitted region. The esti-
mates in the sixth through eighth rows of Table 2.8 illustrate that a smaller omitted region
leads to smaller incidence estimate ($3000 to $5000 less than the baseline). We do not es-
timate Ẑ for the narrowest specifications since it does not make sense to restrict the gap
to be so small, especially given the visual evidence of the width of the gap. Relatedly, the
estimate of Ẑ using the omitted regions through $1.1M are smaller than the baseline —
understandable, given the visual evidence in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 indicating that the gap
extends further than that (consistently with the theoretical argument as well), and the fact
that the counterfactual is bound to be biased downward when part of the “true” gap is relied
on in estimation.
On the other hand, our results are robust to extending the omitted region beyond the
baseline, as is seen in Rows 10 through 12. The estimates of Ẑ are consistently large, positive,
and significant, although less precise as we use less and less data (and need to predict the
counterfactual over a larger range). Reassuringly, the incidence estimates change little as we
vary the upper bound of the omitted region. Similarly, none of the estimates are too sensitive
to expanding the omitted region below the threshold. The results in rows twelve through
fourteen of Table 2.8 show that both the incidence and gap estimates grow as the bunching
region is expanded below the threshold, however differences in estimates are economically
small and not statistically distinguishable from the baseline. Naturally, the standard errors
also grow as the omitted region is expanded.
We also estimate our counterfactuals for bunching and gap separately using only data
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below and above the omitted region (respectively). We present in Row 16 our estimate
using a 3rd order polynomial and data below the omitted region for the bunching/incidence
counterfactual and a 1st order polynomial using data above the omitted region for the
missing mass, and a 2nd order above the omitted region in Row 17. Again, incidence and
Ẑ are comparable with our baseline. Furthermore, bootstrapped standard errors increase
significantly as the order of polynomial increases, underscoring our earlier point that allowing
for overfitting by estimating high order polynomials that are then used to project into the
omitted region is a questionable approach. This observation (and visual inspection of the
fit) justified our choice of the baseline specification that relies on the 3rd order polynomial
and only a level shift at the threshold.
Our baseline estimate is also not sensitive to allowing for a discontinuity at the threshold.
The baseline specification relies on the data both below and above the omitted region. Since
the latter is distorted by the tax we rudimentarily control for it by allowing for a level shift
in the distribution. The estimate in row 18 of Table 2.8 demonstrates that incidence and
gap increase slightly when we do not allow for this discontinuity.
For completeness, we also estimate analogous specification by OLS—this is the standard
approach in the recent public finance work on notches and kinks—but we note that any
of these methods involves specifying the parametric density function and the maximum
likelihood estimation is a natural choice that guarantees that the estimates satisfy the law
of probability rather than the hard-to-interpret mean zero residual restriction. Additionally,
by requiring the data to be binned, OLS will throw out information. We report the OLS
results obtained by binning into $5000 and $10,000 bins in rows 17 and 18 and conclude that
they are quantitatively similar to the baseline.
The placebo estimates in Table 2.9 show that our estimates for NYC are not spurious.
Using the same procedure, we estimate the incidence and gap for all commercial sales (which
are not subject to the mansion tax) and for residential sales at other multiples of $100,000.
In all cases, we find small negative incidence estimates and relatively small gap estimates.
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350000 400000 450000 500000 550000 600000 650000
Sales Price
Notes: Plot of the number of sales in each $5,000 price bin between $350,000 and $650,000. Data from the
NYC Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011. Both commercial and non-commercial sales are subject to the NYC
RPTT.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Sale Price
Notes: Plot of the number of mansion-tax eligible sales in each $25,000 price bin between $510,000 and
$1,500,000. Data from the NYC Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011 (taxable sales defined as single-unit non-
commercial sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes, coops, and condos) and from N.Y. State Office of Real
Property Service deeds records for 2002–2006 and 2008–2010 (taxable defined as all single-parcel residential
sales of one-, two-, or three-family homes).
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1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Date
# Sales >= $1100k # Sales $900k--$1100k
Notes: Total taxable NJ sales in given price range by month. Data from NJ Treasury SR1A file for 1996–2011
(taxable defined as any residential sale). Mansion tax introduced in August, 2004 (indicated by dashed gray
line).
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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Date
< 925k < 950k < 975k < 1M
< 1.025M < 1.05M < 1.075M < 1.1M
Notes: Number of taxable sales in given range as a share of total sales between $900,000 and $1,100,000 by
month. Data from NJ Treasury SR1A file for 1998–2011 (taxable defined as any residential sale). Mansion
tax introduced in August, 2004 (denoted by gray dashed line).
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1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Date
Incidence 95% CI
Notes: Monthly baseline local incidence estimates and 95% confidence intervals for NJ. Data from NJ
Treasury SR1A file.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Price
$25,000 Bins
Initial Asking Price Final Asking Price Sale Price
Notes: Data from REBNY listings matched to NYC Department of Finance sales records. Sample restricted
to “sold” listings: last listing status is “closed” and property can be matched to NYC sales data. Plot of the
number of listings per $25,000 bin as a share of all sales between $500,000 and $1,500,000 (bins centered so
that the threshold bin spans $975,001–$1,000,000).
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Price
$25,000 Bins















500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Price
$25,000 Bins
Initial Asking Price Final Asking Price
Notes: Data from REBNY listings. Sample includes all REBNY-listed sales in the given range. Panel
(a) presents a plot of the number of listings per $25,000 bin as a share of all listings between $500,000
and $1,500,000 (bins centered so that the threshold bin spans $975,001–$1,000,000). Panel (b) presents a
smoothed plot of the distribution that accounts for round-number bunching: the log of the per-bin counts
from panel (a) are regressed on a cubic in price and dummy variables for multiples of $50,000 and $100,000
interacted with the price. Predicted bunching for round-number bins are then subtracted from the corre-
sponding counts.
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800000 900000 1000000 1100000 1200000
Initial Asking Price
10th - 90th Percentile 25th - 75th Percentile Median
Notes: Plot of the median, 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of sale price per $25,000 initial-asking-price
bin. Data from REBNY listings—sample includes all sold REBNY-listed properties (matched to NYC DOF)
in the range $800,000–1,200,000. Lines represent quantile regressions for the given range ($800k–$990k and
$1M – $1.2M).
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Initial Asking Price
($25000 bins)
Notes: Plot of the share of REBNY-listed properties that close or are matched to a NYC DOF sale per $25,000
bin. Data from REBNY listings—sample includes all listed properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000. “Sold”
defined as any property with a final listing status of “closed” or any listing that matches to NYC DOF sales.
184






















Notes: Plot of the median and 25th percentile of days to sale per $25,000 initial-asking-price bin. Data from
REBNY listings—sample includes all REBNY-listed properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000. Days to
sale defined as the number of days between initial listing of the property and buyer and seller entering into
contract (defined as final status = “in contract”). Unsold properties are assigned a value of 999 days.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Initial Asking Price
($25000 bins)
Notes: Plot of the share of REBNY listed properties that are sold in NYC DOF data, but are not listed
as closed in the REBNY listing per $25,000 initial-asking-price bin. Data from REBNY listings—sample
includes all REBNY-listed properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Final Asking Price
($25000 bins)
75th Percentile Median Discount
Notes: Plot of the median and 25th percentile discount from final asking price to sale price ( = 1 - sale/final)
per $25,000 final-asking-price bin. Data from REBNY listings—sample includes all closed REBNY-listed
properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000 that match to NYC DOF data.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Initial Asking Price
($25000 bins)
First Asking vs. Sale Price First Asking vs. Final Asking Price Final Asking vs. Sale Price
Notes: Plot of the average discount from initial asking to sale price ( = 1 - sale/initial), initial asking to
final asking price ( = 1 - final/initial), and final asking price to sale price relative to initial asking price (
= (final - sale)/initial) per $25,000 initial-asking-price bin. Data from REBNY listings—sample includes all
closed REBNY-listed properties in the range $500,000–1,500,000 that match to NYC DOF data.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
First Asking Price
($25000 bins)
Notes: Plot of the variance of the log of sale price by $25,000 initial asking price bin. Data from REBNY
listings—sample includes all sold REBNY-listed properties (matched to NYC DOF) in the range $500,000–
1,500,000. Observations with price discounts (first asking price to sale price) in the 1st or 99th percentile
are omitted.
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500000 750000 1000000 1250000 1500000
Final Asking Price
($ bins)
Notes: Plot of the variance of the log of sale price by $25,000 final price bin. Data from REBNY listings—
sample includes all sold REBNY-listed properties (matched to NYC DOF) in the range $500,000–1,500,000.
Observations with price discounts (first asking price to sale price) in the 1st or 99th percentile are omitted.
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No Controls With Controls
Notes: Plots of the difference between predicted values at given initial asking price and predicted value at
$1,000,000 from the following procedure. The log of sale price is regressed (median regression) on a linear
spline in the log of initial asking price with $100,000 knots between $500,000 and $1,500,000. Squared
residuals from this first stage are then regressed on a linear spline in log of initial asking price (using
median regression; results are sensitive to outliers). Controls in the indicated results include year of sale,
zip code, building type, whether the sale is of a new unit, and the log of years since construction. Dashed
lines represent 95% confidence intervals from 999 wild bootstrap replications of the two-stage procedure,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: NYC Mansion Tax: Placebos
Cutoff IncidenceStd. Error Ẑ Std. Error n
Commercial -634.223 69.3692203.190 512.087 5616
600,000 -689.324 32.9582430.942 386.221 74477
700,000 -708.755 30.5481257.927 258.632 86026
800,000 -787.246 29.686 360.535 280.648 93148
900,000 -732.660 32.098 -985.343 197.414 98003
1,100,000 -937.686 141.5243457.587 559.861106344
1,200,000 -669.331 42.6621346.163 591.304103660
Notes: Data from NYC Department of Finance Rolling Sales file for 2003–2011. Commercial sales are defined
as any transaction of at least one commercial unit and no residential units or a NYC tax class of 3 (utility
properties) or 4 (commercial or industrial properties) and are not subject to the mansion tax. Placebo
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 Response of Home Equity Debt to Mortgage Policy:
Evidence from a Kink and a Notch
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Abstract
I estimate the market-level response of the size of home equity loans to two mortgage
policies—the home mortgage interest deduction and regulations in Title XI of the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act requiring independent appraisals of
borrowers’ homes at loan origination. Using administrative data on home equity loan origi-
nations for California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, I employ recent empirical methods
that study non-linearities in individuals’ budget sets (“kinks” and “notches”). I find robust
evidence of bunching of loan principal at the thresholds beyond which mortgage interest is
not deductible and licensed appraisals of homes are required. The extent of this bunching at
the two policy cutoffs translates to a 20% market-level reduction in loan size in response to
removal of the mortgage interest deduction, and a 23% reduction in loan size in response to
appraisal requirements. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that the




In the wake of the financial crisis of the late 2000s an emphasis has been placed on rethinking
home loan policy in the United States. Economists have identified several possible causes of
the crisis, including lax underwriting standards and a boom in credit demand and availability
(Mian and Sufi (2009); Frame et al. (2008); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012); Mayer et al. (2009)).
In response, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
lawmakers and regulators are requiring banks to conduct more thorough reviews of loan
applicants and greater independence of home appraisers from banks.90 Moreover, there is a
strong movement toward reconsidering current policies that lower the cost of mortgage debt,
especially the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID).91 However, although these policy
changes may increase the likelihood that home loans are repaid, they also change the relative
price of home equity debt and may reduce the availability of such loans.
In this paper, I estimate how the size (principal) of home-equity loans taken by home-
owners responds to two mortgage policies: the home mortgage interest deduction and home
appraisal requirements of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA). By allowing mortgage payments to be deducted from taxable income, the MID
lowers the cost of debt to home owners, which may induce borrowers to take larger loans than
they otherwise would.92 Similarly, independent appraisals of homes being used as collateral,
as required by Title XI of the FIRREA, not only increase the cost of underwriting loans,
perhaps reducing the size or availability of debt, but may also reveal information about bor-
90For example, Dodd-Frank requires that, prior to origination, lenders must verify loan applicants’ income,
employment, current debt obligations, and credit history in order to determine that borrowers can reasonably
repay mortgages.
91The primary argument for removal of the deduction is that the policy, which is a substantial tax expen-
diture, benefits relatively wealthy households who are not on the margin of homeownership (Bourassa and
Grigsby (2000); Glaeser and Shapiro (2003); Gyourko and Sinai (2004); Poterba and Sinai (2011)). Moreover,
there is mixed evidence of the efficacy of the MID in encouraging home ownership. Rosen (1979), Green
and Vandell (1999), Bourassa and Yin (2008), Hilber and Turner (2012), and Hanson (2012) find that the
MID does not increase home-ownership, and may even reduce it through general-equilibrium housing price
effects. To date, there are no studies of how the MID influences the quantity of home equity debt taken.
92The MID reduces the effective interest rate: for every dollar of interest paid, a portion of that dollar is
returned to the borrower in tax savings.
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rowers and their property that might increase or decrease lenders’ willingness to issue a loan.
I use administrative data on home loan originations and take advantage of discontinuities
in the application of both policies to estimate whether and by how much the size of home
loans falls when home owners cannot deduct their mortgage interest and when independent
licensed appraisals are required at origination. Understanding the market-level response
of loan principal to these mortgage policies helps inform how such regulations distort the
market for home loans.
The desirability of regulating loan markets depends on weighing the benefits from in-
creases in loan quality against the distortionary costs of the regulations themselves. On one
hand, mandating lenders to adopt more stringent underwriting standards and/or increasing
the cost of debt by eliminating deductibility may improve the quality of loans (e.g., Keys
et al. (2012)) and lower the probability of housing-debt-driven crises in the future.93 For
example, Mayer et al. (2009) and Frame et al. (2008) document an increase in low- and no-
documentation mortgages and smaller down payments leading up to the financial crisis. Jiang
et al. (2014) find that low-documentation loans perform much worse than full-documentation
loans.94
On the other hand, tighter regulation of appraisals may discourage lending, and higher
after-tax interest rates (associated with the removal of the MID) may discourage borrowing,
reducing the availability of an important source of household debt. Home equity debt is a
commonly used tool for consumption smoothing in the U.S. (e.g., Abdallah and Lastrapes
(2012); Lovenheim (2013); Johnson (2012)). However, there is relatively little empirical
work estimating how regulation of lending standards and the removal of tax deductions
for interest payments affect the market for housing debt. Pence (2006) examines state
boundaries and concludes that foreclosure laws that favor borrowers result in mortgages
that are three- to seven-percent smaller than in lender-friendly states. Maki (2001) and
93Since I rely on loan origination data for my study, I cannot comment on how the MID and FIRREA
appraisal requirements affect loan performance.
94Mian and Sufi (2009) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) use aggregate data and find similar evidence of low
quality loans contributing to the housing crisis.
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Dunsky and Follain (2000) study the removal of interest deductions for consumer credit in
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and find substantial portfolio shifting to home debt (which
maintained deductibility). Similarly, Hanson (2012) finds that mortgage debt drops by 10–
18% at boundaries between states that do and do not allow for deduction of mortgage interest
payments. To date, however, there have been no studies of the response of home-equity debt
to the home mortgage interest deduction.
A key empirical challenge to studying home loan regulation is an absence of identifying
variation—much of the policy is set at the national level, with relatively few changes over
time. Existing research has relied primarily on cross-sectional or time-series variation in
policy. For example, Keys et al. (2009) exploit cross-sectional variation in underwriting
regulations faced by different lending institutions, while Pence (2006) uses cross-sectional
variation at the state level. Similarly, Hilber and Turner (2012) and Hanson (2012) exploit
cross-sectional variation in state tax policy to study the MID, while others have studied the
removal of mortgage interest deductions internationally often using low-income households
or renters as a control group: Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) find no effect of removing the
deduction in Italy, while Hendershott and Pryce (2006), Fjærli (2004), and Saarimaa (2010)
all find reductions in mortgage debt in the U.K., Norway, and Finland, respectively.
To identify the effects of the MID and FIRREA appraisal requirements on home equity
debt, I exploit discontinuities in the applications of these policies by loan size. For home
equity debt, the MID allows only interest payments on the first $100,000 worth of debt to
be deducted (interest on the 100,001st dollar of debt is not deductible). This limit creates
a discontinuity in the marginal after-tax interest rate at $100,000, and this discontinuous
change in the price of debt creates a kink in borrowers’ budget sets at the cutoff. Similarly,
the FIRREA appraisal requirements are limited: independent licensed appraisals are only
required on home equity loans over $250,000, while below the thresholds banks may perform
an in-house “evaluation,” creating a discontinuity (or policy “notch”) in both the information
that banks are likely to collect and the cost to banks of underwriting a loan (appraisal fees
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are typically passed on to consumers).
I adapt non-linear budget set methods to exploit the threshold designs of these two poli-
cies. A clear benefit of these empirical methods is that they facilitate the study of policies
that do not vary across time or geography, as is the case with many mortgage regulations.
These techniques are commonly used to estimate behavioral responses to taxation by exam-
ining “bunching” of individuals at discontinuities in marginal tax rates (“kinks” in budget-
constraints) and average tax rates (discontinuities or “notches” in budget constraints)—
examples include Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), Ramnath (2012), Kleven and Waseem
(2013), Bastani and Hakan (2014), and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014). Unlike regression
discontinuity, which assumes no manipulation of the running variable (debt, in this case)
around the threshold, non-linear budget set methods explicitly study how economic agents
sort to one side of the cutoff. Specifically, these methods ask the question of how responsive
individuals must be to the given price or policy change at the threshold to induce the amount
of bunching seen at the threshold. Recent work studying tax notches (Kleven and Waseem
(2013) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014)) focuses not only on the excess mass bunching at
the threshold, but also distortions to the distribution just above the threshold. I argue herein
that the response to a notched policy (such as the FIRREA appraisal requirement) can be
estimated by comparing the size of the mass bunching at the threshold to a missing mass
above the threshold.
I find evidence of a substantial reduction of home equity debt in response to the removal of
the mortgage interest deduction and the imposition of the FIRREA appraisal requirements.
Bunching at the $100,000 and $250,000 thresholds imply that loans are reduced by 20%
in response to the removal of the MID and by 22% in response to appraisal requirements.
These estimates are robust to functional form assumptions, and I find no evidence of a
similar response at various placebo thresholds (including estimates at other round numbers
as well as estimates at the same thresholds in the distribution of refinances for which these
discontinuities do not apply).
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Studying the dynamics of the response to the FIRREA threshold over the late 1990s and
early 2000s reveals a limited relationship between this policy and the lending boom. I do not
find any evidence that FIRREA appraisal regulations have a dampening effect on lending
during the credit expansion; for example, if the policy is effective in sorting out lower quality
borrowers, then we might expect a larger response to the policy during the lending boom
when more low-quality borrowers were applying for loans.
In addition to understanding the distortionary effects of the MID on the size of home
loans, the response of home equity debt to the MID reveals information about the elasticity of
debt to interest rates, since the policy reduces the after-tax interest rate. This elasticity is of
considerable value for understanding the welfare costs of policies that tax or subsidize savings
and debt (Bernheim (2002)). However, there are few credible estimates of this elasticity
for the U.S. (see Bernheim (2002) for a summary of older estimates and the problems with
these). Gross and Souleles (2002b) study the response of credit card debt to quasi-exogenous
increases in credit limits and interest rates and find an elasticity between about -4.9 and -
9.1.95 Studying the market for auto loans, Attanasio et al. (2008) estimate an elasticity of
debt to interest rates between 0 and -14, depending on credit constraints.96 Relatedly, there
is an ongoing literature studying the response of household savings to various policies in
the U.S. (e.g., Duflo et al. (2006); Madrian and Shea (2001); Poterba et al. (1996); Weber
(2012)). My research contributes to this literature by using a novel identification strategy
to provide an estimate of the market-level response of debt to lending policies for the U.S.
for a different, but important, source of debt.
Converting my estimate of response to removal of the MID to a market-level elasticity of
95In their paper, Gross and Souleles (2002b) present elasticities relative to a change in r, while myself,
Attanasio et al. (2008), and others present elasticities relative to 1 + r. I rescale the elasticities from Gross
and Souleles (2002b) using the mean interest rate in order to compare them to elasticities relative to 1 + r.
For example, the estimates (with respect to r) from Gross and Souleles (2002b) range from 0.7 to 1.3 and
the average interest rate that they report is 16.6%. At this interest rate, a 1% increase in 1 + r requires a
7.02% increase in r—thus, I rescale the estimates by a factor of 7.
96Using an interest-rate offer experiment in South Africa, Karlan and Zinman (2008) estimate an elasticity
around -4, while Dehejia et al. (2012) find slightly smaller estimates studying variations in interest rates across
branches of lending institutions in Bangladesh.
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debt with respect to interest rates yields a relatively large elasticity. I first establish that the
response to the removal of the MID increases with proxies for the implied change in after-tax
interest rates at the kink: estimates increase with adjusted gross income (individuals who
face higher marginal tax rates benefit more from the MID), are positively correlated with
market interest rates over time (more interest payments means a larger benefit from the
deduction), and state-year estimates of response at the kink are positively correlated with
imputed state-year averages of the after-tax interest-rate change at the kink. Secondly, using
marginal tax and interest rate estimates from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I convert
the response to the MID kink to an elasticity of debt with respect to after-tax interest rates of
around -30.97 Interpretation of this elasticity estimate as a structural parameter representing
borrowers’ preferences relies on the assumption that there is no supply-side response to the
policy (I cannot observe lender behavior in my data) and that there is no shifting of debt to
other sources.98
3.2 Policies
3.2.1 The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction
The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID), which has existed in the U.S. since the
introduction of federal income taxes, allows taxpayers to deduct interest payments on loans
secured by primary or secondary homes from their taxable income.99 The MID is the second-
most commonly claimed tax deduction in the U.S., although the benefits of the deduction
mainly accrue to wealthier taxpayers (Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)). Moreover, the deduction
is the second-largest tax expenditure for the federal government, representing about 79.2
billion dollars of foregone revenue in 2010 (Office of Management and Budget 2012).
97While this elasticity may seem large, remember that this is the elasticity with respect to 1 + r. A one-
percent change in 1 + r is about a one percentage-point change in r. For example, if r is 5%, a one-percent
increase in 1 + r is equivalent to a 21% increase in r.
98While I can only observe home-equity debt in my data, I argue herein that debt shifting is not likely to
be very important since interest rates on home equity debt tend to be among the lowest.
99See Ventry Jr (2010) for a detailed history of interest deductions in the U.S.
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The MID is applicable to all loans secured by a home, which includes mortgages, re-
finances, and home-equity loans (HELs) and home-equity lines of credit (HELOCs), and
reduces the effective interest rate faced by borrowers.100 For every dollar of interest paid
on an MID-eligible loan, a portion of that dollar is returned to the borrower in tax savings.
Specifically, for an individual with a marginal tax rate of t borrowing at an interest rate of
1 + r, the after-tax rate of return faced by this borrower is (1 + (1− t)r).
There are limits on the applicability of the MID, which create discontinuities in the
marginal after-tax interest rate (budget-set kinks). Under the MID, home loans fall into two
categories that determine the limit on deductibility: home-acquisition loans and personal-
use loans. To be considered a home-acquisition loan, a loan must be used to purchase
a primary or secondary home (as in a first mortgage or a refinance of a first mortgage)
or used to build or improve a home (as in an HEL or HELOC specifically used for home
renovation/construction). Personal-use loans are all other loans secured by a home, such as
HELs used for personal consumption or consolidation of debt. Interest on home-acquisition
loans is only deductible on the first million dollars borrowed. The interest on any money
borrowed in excess of one million is not deductible. Similarly, for personal-use loans, only
interest on the first $100,000 is deductible.101 For example, if an individual borrows $50,000
for personal consumption, then all the interest is deductible. On the other hand, only 50%
of the interest paid on $200,000 of outstanding personal-use debt is deductible.102 These
100The IRS defines a “qualified home” as a main or second residence, including condominiums, coops,
mobile homes and trailers, house boats or “any similar property that has sleeping, cooking, and toilet
facilities.”(Internal Revenue Service 2011)
101Both limits are halved for individuals who are married and filing separately, allowing each half of the
couple to claim half of the interest.
102The limits apply to the average outstanding balance held by an individual over the course of the tax
year. As such, the limits at the time of borrowing will be somewhat higher than $100,000 and $1,000,000,
depending on whether or not enough of the balance will be paid down in the year. However, I find that the
bulk of response occurs at $100,000. This is consistent with individuals having only moderate information
about the deduction at the time of taking their loans—the MID and the limits of $100,000/$1,000,000 are
well advertised, whereas the details of how an average balance is calculated are much less visible. Moreover,
individuals may have difficulty calculating exactly where their limit will be given the proposed interest rates
and repayment schedules (if interest rates and repayment schedules are not certain until the loan is finalized
and there is a cost to mental arithmetic, individuals may prefer to go with the concrete limits of $100,000
and $1,000,000).
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limits create a jump in the effective interest rates that borrowers face from (1 + (1− t)r) to
(1 + r) at the thresholds, and, in turn, discontinuities in the price of borrowing create kinks
in individuals’ budget sets. I examine borrower behavior around the jump in the price of
home-equity loans to back-out the response of debt to the MID.
3.2.2 FIRREA Appraisal Requirements
The Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 was enacted to
tighten regulations of lenders (especially thrifts) in response to the Savings and Loan cri-
sis. A primary focus of the FIRREA was to restructure the regulatory system governing
thrifts.103 The FIRREA also tightened regulations on the origination of home loans, includ-
ing appraisal requirements. The act raised capital requirements for thrifts and established
concrete regulations on the appraisal of homes being used as collateral for loans. Title XI of
the act, which I focus on, requires that real estate appraisals of homes being used as collat-
eral in “federally related transactions” be conducted in writing by an independent, licensed,
appraiser. Title XI also provides minimum standards for appraisals.104
Appraisals are conducted to establish an estimate of the value of a home being used as
collateral for a loan, to ensure that borrowers have sufficient equity in their homes. Title
XI of the FIRREA requires that banks employ an independent licensed appraiser: the in-
dividual performing the appraisal must be entirely independent from all other aspects of
the underwriting process and must not have any direct or indirect interest in the property
or loan. Licensing requirements typically include completion of several courses, an exam-
ination, and two years of experience (for example, assisting licensed appraisers). By law,
appraisals are required to conform to the minimum standards outlined by the ASB.105 While
103Dissolving the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and putting the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) in charge of the Savings Association Insurance Fund, replacing the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and establishing the Resolution Trust
Corporation to facilitate the closure and liquidation of failing thrifts.
104Federally related transactions includes home loans made by federally regulated financial institutions (i.e.
regulated by the FDIC, OCC, OTS, or NCUA).
105Title XI established the Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council to oversee licensing and appraisal standards, which are the respective responsibilities of state regu-
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licensed appraisals reveal important information for loan underwriting—namely, the value
of the collateral—they are costly to lending institutions (around $400–$500 for a typical
residence), although this cost is typically borne by the borrower.
Like the MID, the requirement of a licensed appraisal depends on the size of the loan.
For loans less than $250,000, lenders have the option of completing an “evaluation” in lieu
of a licensed appraisal. Evaluations may be performed by the lending institution and do not
require the property to be visited or inspected—lenders have discretion in the methods they
choose to estimate a property’s value. Thus, the cost of underwriting a home-equity loan
(and the information uncovered in the process) jumps discretely at the $250,000 threshold.
To the extent that banks pass these costs on to consumers, for example through higher
closing fees, interest rates, or by altogether denying loans above the threshold, borrowers
also face a discontinuity at the FIRREA limit (creating a discontinuity or “notch” in the
borrower’s budget constraint). Unlike home equity loans, mortgage refinancing does not face
the FIRREA threshold. If borrowers refinance home loans with the same lender, no appraisal
is required under the FIRREA. Thus, mortgage refinancing provides a useful placebo against
which to check the effects I find for home equity loans.
3.3 Data
To study the market-level response of home equity debt to regulations, I use administrative
data on the universe of recorded home loans in recent years in California, Illinois, New
lators and of the Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of the Appraisal Foundation (a non-profit established by
the appraisal industry and authorized by congress to regulate appraisal standards). Appraisers are required
to identify the property and its intended use (e.g., residence vs. development) and establish an appropriate
value for this use. In doing so, appraisers must account for local regulations that may affect the value
(zoning, environmental or historical preservation, etc.) as well as anticipated neighboring public or private
developments that may affect the value. Appraisers must explicitly identify all assumptions s/he must make
to complete the appraisal. Appraisals generally require a visit to the property and the value may be based
on one (or more) of three approaches that they deem most appropriate: using the sales price of comparable
properties, based on the cost of the proposed use of the property, or based on the potential income stream
from renting the property. All details of the appraisal are required to be written up and returned to the
lending institution.
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Jersey, and New York.106 I study county-level home equity loan (including home equity lines
of credit) and mortgage refinance records collected from county clerks from at least 2002
through 2008, with the majority of counties going back through 1995 (all home loans and
deed transfers in the U.S. must be recorded with county officials).107 These records contain
basic information about each home loan, including the loan principal (rounded to the nearest
$100), type of loan (refinance vs. home equity), date, and zip code of the home being used
as collateral. This data provides accurate information on the date of origination, location
of property, and loan principal—the variable that determines the applicability of the MID
and FIRREA appraisal regulations with a sufficiently large sample to study distortions in
the distribution of loans around regulatory thresholds.
Table 3.1 presents the breakdown of loans by type. After cleaning the data, I am left
with 25,012,077 home loans.108 Of these, there are about 16.6 million refinances and 8.4
million home-equity loans (including home-equity lines of credit). As would be expected,
mean principal of mortgage refinances is larger than for home equity loans: $386,240 for
refinances (year 2000 dollars) versus $157,287 for home equity debt. For both types of loans,
median principal is smaller than the mean (e.g., $61,606 vs. $146,292 for home-equity loans),
suggesting long right-tails to the distributions.
Looking at home equity loans over time illustrates the magnitude of the lending boom in
the early 2000s. The upper panel of Figure 3.1 displays plots of the total amount of home
equity debt at origination (in billions) and count of originations by year. There is a clear
boom in lending in the early 2000s, as the total amount of debt originated per year increases
from about $50B per year in the late 1990s to more than $200B in 2005. Similarly, the
number of loans originated increases rapidly over this period from around 400,000 loans in
106These data were collected from county records by an anonymous data provider and made available to
me through the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at Columbia Business School.
107I discuss county-level entry into the sample over time in the data appendix. My estimates are generally
not sensitive to the inclusion of data prior to 2000 (when more than 75% of counties have data available).
108In cleaning the data, I drop all duplicate loans (in address, date, and amount), loans with missing
addresses, loans with loan amounts = 0 or missing, loans with non-rounded values, and all county-years
where more than 20% of records have no associated address. See the data appendix for more details on the
cleaning process.
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2000 to 1.2M in 2005. At the same time, the beginning of the bust is evident—lending drops
off after a peak in 2004/2005 falling somewhat through 2007.109 The size of loans increases
along with the volume of debt. The lower panel of Figure 3.1 shows that the median size of
a home-equity loan grows rapidly in the early 2000s, doubling from $50k in 2000 to $100k
in 2008.
Since the loan origination data does not include details about the borrower or about
interest rates, I rely on the Survey of Consumer Finances to impute how the MID influences
the cost of debt. The SCF is a nationally representative survey of households, conducted
every three years. The survey asks detailed questions about households’ income, wealth,
and use of debt. Details about home equity loans collected in the survey include interest
rates and loan principal. I restrict the sample to all households with a home equity loan,
and pool this data for 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 (leaving a sample of 4144 households).
Finally, I calculate marginal tax rates using NBER TAXSIM, accounting for the household’s
reported adjusted gross income, number of dependents, state of residence, and property taxes
(Feenberg and Coutts (1993)).
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Estimating Response to Policy from a Kink
The discontinuity in marginal prices caused by a tax or policy kink (e.g., MID deductibility
limit) may cause agents to bunch at this kink point. Existing work shows how the extent
of bunching can be used to uncover the behavioral response to the given tax or policy (Saez
(2010); Chetty et al. (2011); Weber (2012)). Intuitively, economic agents cluster just below
the kink to avoid the change in policy—if agents are unresponsive to the marginal incentives
that change at the threshold, then no one will bunch. The size of the mass bunching at the
kink point is, thus, proportional to how responsive agents are to the policy itself. I briefly
109Note that the number of originations in late 2008 is artificially low—many loans that originate in the
latter half of 2008 will not have been recorded until 2009 and will not be present in the data set.
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review the methodology herein.
Suppose that the MID applies everywhere (i.e., there are no limits to deductibility)—
individuals will choose their optimal debt, which will generate some distribution of loan
originations. Let q̃ represent the optimal loan an individual takes when there is no limit
to the deductibility of mortgage interest (and so the effective interest rate is 1 + (1 − t)r
everywhere), and f0(q) represent the distribution of these loans. This distribution of debt
may be generated by heterogeneity in income, need for debt (e.g., health shocks, children
going to college), or preferences.
Following the argument outlined by Saez (2010), if the government imposes a deductibility
limit at some level, q∗, individuals will either continue to choose debt equal to q̃ or reduce
their debt in response to the higher price, with some mass of borrowers reducing debt exactly
to the kink point. At q∗, the marginal cost of debt increases discontinuously from 1+(1− t)r
to 1 + r. This change in price is represented for a simple two-period decision in Panel (a) of
Figure 3.2, where qt is debt taken for consumption in the first period, Ct+1 is consumption
in the second period, and Y is exogenously given second-period income. Let q̌ denote the
optimal choice of debt under this kinked policy. Borrowers with q̃ ≤ q∗ are unaffected by the
kink and can achieve their optimal loan under the lower effective rate, 1 + (1 − t)r, giving
q̌ = q̃.110 This is illustrated in Figure 3.2 as the individual borrowing q̃A = q̌A. When q̃ > q∗
the optimal no-kink loan, q̃, is unattainable—individuals will reduce their demand for debt.
In particular, for q̃ sufficiently large, individuals will now choose q̌ = φq̃, where φ > 0 is a
reduced-form parameter capturing the response of the market to the removal of the policy.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2 for the individual who moves from q̃C to q̌C . Note, however,
that individuals who originally choose debt q̃ “just above” the kink point will bunch at the
threshold. Specifically, if q̃ ≤ 1
φ
q
∗, then borrowers will choose q̌ = q∗; once φq̃ drops below the
threshold, borrowers no longer face the higher marginal interest rate and choose the largest
110As discussed in Kopczuk and Munroe (2014), this relationship assumes that there are no general-
equilibrium spillovers of the policy on the availability or cost of debt to those borrowing below the kink
point.
210
loan (closest to q̃) that they can achieve without crossing the kink point. The “marginal
buncher” appears in Figure 3.2 as the individual who moves from q̃B to q̌B = q∗. Notice that
this creates a mass of individuals bunching at the kink point. Debt under the kinked policy




















The corresponding distribution of debt under the kinked policy will feature bunching at
the kink from which φ can be uncovered. Let f(q) denote the empirical distribution of debt
















), q > q∗
(18)
Two important features of the empirical distribution are evident from this expression. Firstly,




q∗ f0(x)dx. Secondly, there is a disconti-
nuity in the distribution above q∗: lim
q→q∗+






f(q). Thus, given an
estimate of the excess mass bunching at the kink point, B̂, and an estimate of the distribution





q∗ f̂0(x)dx (I use
the subscript k to denote the response estimated as for a kink (i.e., φ̂k), and the subscript n
to denote the response estimated as for a notch (φ̂n), which I define below). In other words,
the proportional response of debt to the removal of the MID can be estimated by answering
the question: how much of the mass above the threshold under the counterfactual no-kink
distribution is needed to explain the mass bunching at the kink?
As pointed out by Saez (2010), given an estimate of the function f0(·), B can be estimated
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by taking the difference between the observed volume of sales bunching at the threshold and
the predicted volume of sales implied by f0(·). In practice, I allow for individuals to bunch in









intuition is illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 3.2. Bunching below the threshold is estimated




∗ as the value of debt such that the integral under the counterfactual above the threshold
equals the excess mass.
3.4.2 Estimating Response to Policy from a Notch
The observed distribution under a policy notch is similar to that of a policy kink, but has
one important distinction—a gap above the threshold (see Kleven and Waseem (2013) for an
in-depth discussion of policy notches). Because there is a discontinuity in the average cost of
debt at the FIRREA notch, there may be a dominated region within which borrowers would
prefer to bunch at the threshold, q∗, even if φq̃ > q∗ (relying on the same notation from above,
where q̃ ∼ f0(q) represents optimal debt in absence of the stricter FIRREA policy, and φ
represents the response of debt above the threshold to the stricter underwriting standards).111
In particular, there will be a borrower who chooses a value of debt in absence of the notch,
q̃m, such that under the notched policy the borrower is indifferent between borrowing q∗ and
avoiding the policy change or borrowing φq̃m under the stricter policy (notice that a kink
is just a special case of the notch where q̃m = 1φq
∗). However, this borrower would always
prefer to borrow q∗ or φq̃m to q ∈ (q∗,φq̃m). This phenomenon is illustrated in Panel (a)
of Figure 3.3, where notation is as in Figure 3.2 described above and the FIRREA policy
increases the cost of debt by some fixed amount, k (although the discussion herein applies
to the general case of a discrete jump in r). As with the kinked policy, those who initially
111For expositional purposes, I discuss the response to policy as though lenders pass on the costs of the
FIRREA appraisals to borrowers (anecdotally, they do) and there is no lender response. Nonetheless, the
estimates outlined herein are general—in response to the stricter lending standards, debt (local to the
threshold) will grow or shrink by some factor, φ > 0, with the corresponding distortions to the distribution
(although φ > 1 will result in no bunching, but a depression around the threshold even for a kink). Thus, φ
represents the market-level response to the changing policy.
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borrow below the threshold do not change their behavior (qA in Figure 3.3), while those
borrowing well above the threshold reduce their demand for debt (qC in Figure 3.3). Those
who choose debt between q∗ and q̃m in absence of the notch will bunch at the threshold in










< q̃ ≤ q̃m
φq̃, q̃ > q̃m
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∗






), q > φq̃m
(20)
Thus, there is a gap above the threshold with a width of φq̃m − q∗. Like the kinked dis-




q∗ f0(x)dx, and a discontinuity between the distribution below the notch and the
distribution above the gap.
The response of debt to the FIRREA notch, φ, can be backed out by comparing the mass
bunching at the threshold to the width of the gap. Notice that in the case of the notch,
φ cannot be backed out from bunching alone. Rather, what is needed is knowledge of the
right-hand edge of the gap, the point q̄ ≡ φq̃m, which can be found by examining the gap,
and of q̃m itself, which can be inferred from bunching. In particular, given estimates of B̂
and f0(·), an estimate of q̃m can be found as solving B̂ =
´
q̂m
q∗ f̂0(x)dx. Then an estimate of
φ can be found by taking the ratio q̄
q̂m
.
In general, however, the gap above the threshold is not clean—q̄ cannot be observed from
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inspection. Kleven and Waseem (2013) point out that in the presence of heterogeneity in the
response to the policy (e.g., due to heterogeneity in preferences or in adjustment costs) the
gap is not simply an empty space above the threshold. Rather, there will be a depression in
the distribution above the notch that eventually disappears. In other words, there will be a
region above q∗ where the mass of loans is smaller than would be predicted by the distribution















To estimate the value q̄, I follow a similar procedure as that used to estimate q̂m. First, I
estimate the distribution far above the threshold (to avoid bias from the gap). For notational
ease, let f1(·) ≡ 1φf0(
·
φ
), and f̂1(·) be an estimate of f1(·). Second, I estimate the mass
“missing” from the gap by taking the difference between the predicted mass were there no









dx. Finally, I estimate q̄m by taking the integral under f̂1(·) up
until the point that the integrated mass equals the size of the gap: Ĝ =
´ ˆ̄q




. This is illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 3.3. I estimate the mass of sales missing
from the gap as the dark gray region below the dotted line (f1(q) = 1φf0(
q
φ
)) but above the
solid line of the observed distribution. I then integrate under f1(q) to find the point q̄ where
the integrated mass equals the missing mass.
3.4.3 Implementation
I approximate f0(·) and f1(·) by fitting a flexible global polynomial through the histogram
of home equity loans.112 There are several features of the empirical distribution that I
accommodate when estimating these functions. First, since loan principal in the data is
rounded to the nearest $100 I treat this as a discrete distribution (i.e., count data). For every
112Fitting a global polynomial in this way is a commonly used approach to bunching estimation (e.g.,
Kopczuk and Munroe (2014); Chetty et al. (2011, 2013); Ramnath (2012); Kleven and Waseem (2013)). An
alternative is to construct the counterfactual distribution locally by smoothing the histogram on either side
of the bunching region (e.g., Weber (2012); Saez (2010)). While this non-parametric approach is appealing,
it is impractical in cases where observations bunch at round numbers that coincide with the threshold—as
they do in the case of home equity debt at multiples of $25k—since it is not clear how to model this rounding
non-parametrically.
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$100 interval of loan principal, q, I generate a count of the number of loans at that value, Nq.
I use a poisson regression to relate these counts to a polynomial in loan principal.113 Second,
similar to Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014) I include a vector
of dummy variables, Rk = 1 [q = z · 100k : z ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}] for k ∈ {5, 10, 50, 250, 500}, to
pick up bunching at multiples of $500, $1000, $5000, $25000, and $50000. In the baseline
specification, I interact these dummies with loan principal to further control for this rounding.
Third, as noted above, there is a jump in the distribution at the policy thresholds (kink or
notch). I allow for discontinuity at $100,000 and $250,000 by including an indicator for loan
principal greater than each threshold, Dt = 1 [q ≥ 1000t] , t ∈ {100, 250}. I also allow for
a constant discontinuity at all other multiples of $50,000 to control for any possible jump
in the distribution arising from the natural rounding that occurs at these numbers. Taken
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In my baseline specification I use a second-order polynomial (j = 2). However, I explore
the sensitivity of my estimates to lower and higher order polynomials as well as varying the
order of the interaction of q and Rk. For all specifications, I restrict the sample to loans
between $30k and $475k.
I omit data around the MID and FIRREA thresholds so that the estimates are not influ-
enced by distortions near these cutoffs. In particular, I omit all data between $10,000 below
and $40,000 above each threshold when I estimate Equation 21 (i.e., I omit data between
$90,000 and $140,000 and between $240,000 and $290,000). This restriction is important for
two reasons. First, if bunching in response to a notch is imprecise, the distribution may be
113The estimates are generally insensitive to using the poisson regression vs. a log-linear regression, although
the log-linear specification tends to be less robust. Moreover, the log-linear regression performs poorly when
sub-setting the data—small subsets may have several $100 bins with no data, which the log model cannot
accommodate.
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elevated below q∗ and including this data would bias the estimate of f0(·), which is based on
the distribution to the left of each cutoff. Admittedly, this is unlikely to be a large problem
in this case since there are few frictions in determining the value of a loan (as compared
to bunching of taxable income—e.g., Saez (2010); Chetty et al. (2011, 2013); Kleven and
Waseem (2013)). Second, since the response to a policy notch may open up a gap in the
distribution above q∗, a range above the threshold should be omitted from estimation of the
no-notch counterfactuals. I choose the omitted region by inspection of the graph of the log
distribution of home equity loans and check the robustness of my estimates to the size of
this region.114
I use the estimate of f0(·) from Equation 21 to estimate the excess mass bunching below
and gap above each threshold. Given an estimate of Equation 21, I define the counterfactuals
for threshold q∗ as: f̂0(q) = N̂q for q ≤ q∗, f̂0(q) = N̂qexp(D̂q∗ ) for q > q
∗, and f̂1(q) = N̂q for
q > q
∗.115 I find the excess bunching at each threshold by comparing the observed mass to










I find the gap above the threshold in the same way. Since the gap is the missing mass below
the predicted distribution on the right of the threshold, I take the difference between the










114Since it is not necessarily the case that the excess mass at the threshold will equal the missing mass in
the gap, I cannot use the excess to determine where the end of the omitted gap region should be (unlike
Kleven and Waseem (2013)). Estimates of the gap region tend to be small, rarely larger than $10000 past
the threshold.
115Recall that the discontinuity, D̂q∗ , is included to allow for the shift in the distribution in response to the
policy. To achieve a proper counterfactual for f0(·) above the threshold, I must remove the discontinuity at
q
∗. Correspondingly, I define ˆf1(q) = N̂q · exp(D̂q∗) for q < q∗, although this is only relevant in cases where
the missing mass in the gap is negative.
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I estimate q̃m and φk by integrating under the relevant counterfactuals. To estimate q̃m,
I integrate under the counterfactual density, f0(·), up until the point where the integrated





Given this estimate of q̃m, I find an expression for φ̂k as φ̂k = q
∗
q̂m
. Notice that for a kinked
policy change, q̃m = 1φq
∗, and so this estimate of φ̂k corresponds to the estimate given above.
As discussed above (and at length by Saez (2010); Weber (2012)), in the case of a kink,
1− φ̂k, which is the quantity I estimate and present below, can be interpreted as the percent-
reduction in debt in response to the higher marginal cost of borrowing above the kink for
the marginal individual who moves to the threshold. In turn, this quantity can be used to
estimate the elasticity of debt with respect to interest rates. As pointed out by Kleven and
Waseem (2013) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014), in the case of a notch 1−φ̂k has an intuitive
interpretation, representing the average reduction in debt for marginal borrowers (i.e., those
indifferent between φq̃ and q∗) who bunch at the threshold—how much is the marginal
borrower willing to reduce debt to avoid the stricter policy? This stands in contrast to the
value 1− φ̂n, which represents the general response to the policy—how would the marginal
borrower respond if the stricter policy applied everywhere?
Given the estimate of Ĝ, I find q̄ by integrating under the predicted counterfactual for





N̂q · exp(Dq∗ · 1 [q < q∗]) (25)
Using my estimates of q̃m and ˆ̄q, I arrive at my estimate of the global response of debt to the




present below the quantity 1−φ̂n, which can be interpreted as the general percent reduction in
debt in response to the stricter appraisal requirements. Of course, this parameter is specific
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to those individuals borrowing in the neighborhood of the notch. I bootstrap standard
errors for my estimates by resampling the original data and repeating the entire procedure
999 times.116
The identifying assumptions underlying this procedure are standard for bunching esti-
mates. First, I assume that the observed data can be used to construct the counterfactuals
f0(·) and f1(·). In particular, what this assumes is that the presence of the policy discon-
tinuities does not create any general-equilibrium effects that distort the distributions away
from the thresholds (in which case the observed data away from the threshold would not
reflect the distributions f0(·) below the threshold and f1(·) above). Secondly, I assume that
f0(·) and f1(·) can be reasonably approximated by fitting a global polynomial through the
distribution, omitting data near the thresholds and allowing for discontinuity. I check the
sensitivity of this assumption by experimenting with different functional forms. Third, I
assume that the distribution, f0(·) would be smooth in absence of the policy change at the
threshold—if there is no kink or notch in the budget set then there is no bunching. In
this particular case, this requires the assumption that the round number bunching at other
multiples of $50,000 can be used to construct an appropriate counterfactual for the excess
mass at $100,000 and $250,000. I check the robustness of this assumption by estimating the
response for placebo cutoffs at other multiples of $50,000. I also estimate placebos using
data on mortgage refinances where neither policy threshold exists.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Graphical Evidence of Response
The empirical distribution of home equity loans displays distortions at $100,000 and $250,000
that are consistent with a response to the policy discontinuities. As outlined in Section 3.4,
116Owing to the very large sample size and a fairly stable distribution, my estimates of 1− φ̂k and 1− φ̂n
are all very precise, and are significant at the 1% level. This is true whether I resample the raw data or
whether I resample at a more aggregate level, for example resampling by zip code or year (i.e., randomly
choosing a zip code and all the observations associated with it).
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if the market for loans is sensitive to the removal of the MID at $100,000 or the requirement
of independent licensed appraisers above $250,000, then there should be bunching at these
threshold, with a possible depression (gap) in the density just above the thresholds, and a
shift in the distribution further above the threshold. Figure 3.4 presents the histograms of
home equity loan and mortgage refinance originations with $5,000 bins. The distribution
displays evident round-number bias; loans cluster at multiples of $50,000. Despite this, there
appears to be excess bunching of home equity loans at $100,000 and $250,000—the excess
mass at these thresholds is visibly larger than neighboring multiples of $50,000. Owing to
the scale of this figure, the gap above the threshold is not apparent.
Taking the log of the histogram with $1,000 bins, as in the upper panel of Figure 3.5,
makes the distortions in the distribution at $100,000 and $250,000 more apparent. While
taking logs compresses the excess mass at the round numbers, the bunching at $100,000
and $250,000 still appears out of line with that at other multiples of $50,000. Moreover, a
depression in the distribution is evident just above each policy threshold. At the same time,
only minimal depressions can be seen above other multiples of $50,000. As discussed above,
I allow for discontinuity at these other round numbers to capture any distortions due to
rounding at salient numbers. Finally, a salient feature of the log-histogram is that there is
rounding in loan principal at many levels, not just multiples of $50k. Hence, I include fixed
effects to control for distortion at round numbers when estimating the counterfactual. I also
estimate placebos at these other round numbers and find small or negative estimates.
One concern is that bunching at the policy thresholds is the result of behavioral rounding
on the part of consumers at particularly salient numbers—perhaps $100,000 and $250,000
are special and the bunching is unrelated to the policies. If this is the case, however, we
might expect similar behavior in the distribution of refinances. Refinances are loans taken to
replace original mortgages, typically with better terms. It is common for borrowers to take
a loan larger than the existing mortgage, using the difference both to pay for closing fees
associated with the new loan, and often for consumption (similar to a home equity loan).
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Thus, we would expect refinances to display at least some of the rounding behavior of home
equity loans. The histogram for refinances over the same period in the same states is also
plotted in Figure 3.4. While general bunching at multiples of $50,000 is present, $100,000
and $250,000 do not appear to be outliers. The lower panel of Figure 3.5 displays the log
of the histograms of refinances, which appears smooth throughout; there are no depressions
above $100k or $250k. Despite clustering of loans at salient round numbers, there is no
evidence of distortion at $100,000 or $250,000 in the distribution of refinances.
3.5.2 Baseline Estimates and Robustness
Using the approach described in Section 3.4.3, I find a significant market-level response
of home equity loans to the removal of the MID and to FIRREA appraisal requirements.
The first row of Table 3.2 presents the baseline estimates of response at both thresholds.117
The first two columns present the “kink” estimates ( ￿1− φk) for each policy change—the
percent reduction in the marginal loan that bunches at the threshold—while the third column
presents the “notch” estimate ( ￿1− φn) for the $250,000 cutoff. Recall that for the kinked
policy at $100k, the kink estimate can be interpreted as the general response to the policy for
the marginal borrower, while for the notched policy at $250k, the notch estimate represents
the general response (for loans in the neighborhood of $250k) were the tighter appraisal
requirements applied everywhere.
The baseline estimates suggest substantial reductions in loan size in response to the
policies. The estimates imply that loan principal drops by 19.96% at $100,000 in response
to removal of the MID. This suggests that the deductibility of interest payments encourages
home owners to borrower substantially more than they might otherwise. For the FIRREA,
the kink estimates imply that marginal borrowers face a reduction of about 23.53% to the
117In the baseline I fit a global 2nd-order polynomial through the count of home loans (in $100 bins)
by poisson regression, omitting data between $90,000 and $140,000 and $240,000 and $290,000. I allow
for discontinuity in the distribution at each of these thresholds as well as a constant discontinuity at each
multiple of $50k. I include fixed effects for multiples of $500, $1000, $5000, $25000, and $50000 as well as
interacting these fixed effects linearly with loan principal.
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threshold in order to avoid the more stringent appraisal requirements above $250,000. The
notch estimates imply that when borrowers do not (or cannot) avoid the policy by moving
below the threshold, the stricter appraisal requirements reduce the loan principal by 22.02%.
Clearly, these threshold policies distort the decisions of agents in this market—a substantial
amount of debt is foregone due to the policy changes. After discussing the robustness of
these estimates in the remainder of this section, I return to the discussion of these estimates
in the following two sections.
The estimates are insensitive to the specification of the model. I vary the order of the
polynomial in loan principal (j in Equation 21) and display the estimates in the second
panel of Table 3.2. At $100,000, the kink estimate varies between about 16.6% (for 1st,
5th, and 6th order) and 20% (for 3rd and 4th order). Estimates at the $250,000 threshold
are a bit more variable—ranging from a local reduction of 16.7% to 27% and between a
15% and 25.5% general response to the policy. Despite the differences in magnitude, the
estimates offer a qualitatively similar conclusion of a large reduction in debt in response to
the policies. I also vary the order of the interaction between the round-number dummies and
loan principal and display the estimates in the third panel of Table 3.2. Again, the estimates
are somewhat sensitive, although consistently display a large response of similar magnitude
to the baseline. The estimates are much less sensitive to varying the width of the omitted
region around q∗—see the third and fourth panels of Table 3.2. I estimate the model allowing
only for discontinuity at $150,000 and $200,000 to be used as a counterfactual for the two
thresholds, since visual examination of the histogram suggests that the discontinuity is more
prominent here than at other multiples of $50,000. I report these estimates at the bottom
of Table 3.2. This procedure results in a slightly larger estimate of the response at $100,000
(23%) and a slightly smaller estimate at $250,000 (18%).
I find no evidence that the response at $100,000 and $250,000 is driven by the salience
of large round numbers or is an artifact of the empirical approach itself. A concern is
that rounding at salient numbers—multiples of $50,000, in this case—is difficult to model.
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Since I am using the round-number bunching at other multiples of $50,000 to construct
a counterfactual for $100,000 and $250,000, the estimates I find could be spurious if this
round-number counterfactual is incorrect. To test this assumption, I estimate placebos at
other multiples of $50,000 where there are no policy thresholds. Specifically, I estimate the
baseline specification (Equation 21) treating the given placebo cutoff as the policy threshold
and report these estimates in Table 3.3. The kink estimates in the first column (the first two
rows replicate the baseline estimates for the sake of comparison) are consistently negative
(with the exception of local response for $200,000)—the empirical strategy tends to overstate
the excess mass at the threshold rather than understate. These negative estimates likely
occur because of, and provides additional evidence of, excessive bunching at $100,000 and
$250,000 that overstates the round-number counterfactuals for these estimates. While still
negative, notch estimates at the placebo cutoffs, presented in the third column, tend to be
close to zero (with the exception of a negative estimate at $150,000). Relative to these
placebos, the baseline estimates at $100,000 and $250,000 are clear outliers.
A similar concern is that $100,000 and $250,000 are “special” round numbers—individuals
(or lending institutions) round their loans to these numbers more than they would at other
multiples of $50,000, making the round number placebos uninformative. To address this,
I estimate placebos using the distribution of mortgage refinances. Since the MID cutoff
only applies to non-home-acquisition debt and since independent licensed appraisals are
generally not required when mortgages are refinanced, there should be no unusual bunching
or distortion around $100,000 and $250,000 in the refinance distribution. The second and
fourth columns of Table 3.3 display these placebo estimates for refinances at the various
cutoffs. Even though Figure 3.4 shows bunching at round-numbers in the distribution of
refinances, the estimation procedure finds no evidence of excess bunching or distortion at
$100,000 or $250,000 (or the other multiples of $50k): the kink and notch estimates range
between -2.9% and 4.7%. Thus, it does not appear to be the case that $100,000 and $250,000
are “special” round numbers in the context of home loans.
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3.5.3 Response of Debt to the Mortgage Interest Deduction
The kink estimates for the MID threshold imply a large (about 20%) reduction in debt in
response to removal of the deduction. This response suggests that, at least for those taking
home equity loans in the neighborhood of $100k, eliminating the MID will induce a substan-
tial reduction in the quantity of housing debt that individuals take on (or, conversely, that
the presence of the MID induces individuals to borrow substantially more than they oth-
erwise would). Of course, understanding the economic magnitude of this response depends
on how large the change in after-tax interest rates is when the MID does not apply. In this
section, I show that the response at the MID threshold covaries with marginal tax rates and
interest rates, and, thus, the magnitude of the kink. I then present implied estimates of the
elasticity of home-equity debt with respect to the after-tax interest rate.
I investigate whether the response to the MID threshold varies with the size of the kink
(i.e., the magnitude of the change in after-tax interest rates) by comparing the size of the
response to local measures of income. At the threshold, the effective interest rate on the
marginal dollar of debt increases from 1+(1− t)r to 1+r; the absolute size of this reduction
(−tr) is increasing in both the marginal tax rate and the interest rate. Correspondingly, the
kink estimate at $100,000 should be larger when this change in effective rates is larger. To
explore this, I estimate the percent drop in debt by quartile of adjusted gross income (AGI),
using this as a proxy for marginal tax rates—individuals in higher-income neighborhoods
will, in general, face higher marginal tax rates. I match home equity loans in each zip
code to data from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI), which reports mean zip-code-level
AGI among all tax filers within the zip code (the IRS SOI is only available for 1998, 2001,
2002, and 2004–2008). Within each year, I find the quartile of AGI to which each zip code
belongs. I then group all loans originated in each quartile and estimate the response to the
MID kink as in the baseline specification and present these results in Table 3.4. I find that
the estimated reduction of debt at $100k is increasing with AGI, from a reduction of 15.22%
in the lowest quartile to 19.94% in the highest. These effects suggest that the magnitude of
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the response may correlate with tax rates. Reassuringly, when I repeat this exercise (also in
Table 3.4) for the $250,000 threshold—where the magnitude of the policy change does not
vary with tax rates or income—the estimates do not display the same increasing pattern.
I also find that the response of debt to removal of the MID moves over time with national
interest rates. As with the marginal tax rate, a higher contract interest rate means a larger
change in after-tax interest rates at $100,000. In Figure 3.6, I plot annual estimates of 1−φk
against the national interest rate for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage.118 In general, response to
removal of the MID moves with the interest rate. Conversely, we see that the same baseline
estimates for the $250k cutoff (where the size of the notch does not depend on interest
rates) do not move with the rates and tend to grow over time. While there are certainly
unobservable factors that are changing over time and influence the borrowing decision, this
co-movement of the estimates with the interest rate and the positive correlation between the
response and zip-code-level AGI is consistent with bunching at $100,000 being caused by the
removal of the MID.
To investigate these relationships more formally, I relate state-year estimates of local
response to state-year averages of the imputed change in after-tax interest rates from the
SCF. For each state (CA, IL, NJ, NY) and each year from 1995 through 2007, I estimate 1−φk
as in the baseline specification.119 I then take the full sample of home-equity loan holders
from the SCF (pooling the 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 survey years) and use NBER TAXSIM
to impute the marginal tax rate for this sample were they residing in each state in each year.
By using the nationally representative sample, I isolate variation in marginal tax rates due to
differing state policies, rather than household selection into states/years (Currie and Gruber
(1996)). I then match the state-year tax rates to the annual 30-year fixed mortgage rate,
and calculate the average percent-change in after-tax interest rates at the kink. Variation in
118Mortgage rates are from the Freddie Mac mortgage rate survey
(www.freddiemac.com/pmms/index.html). I use the 30-year fixed rate because Freddie Mac does not
collect data on home equity loan rates. Nonetheless, home loan rates covary over time and so I do not
expect the annual pattern to differ substantially for home equity rates.
119As discussed in the data appendix, not all counties have data available in 1995 through 2000. I find
similar results for these state/year regressions using only 2000-2007, although the estimates are less precise.
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the rate change is thus coming from two sources: changes in interest rates over time at the
national level, and differences across states and over time in marginal tax rates.120 Finally, I
regress the kink estimates for each state/year on the average imputed after-tax interest rate
change. I find standard errors by bootstrapping the entire procedure 999 times (resampling
SCF data, estimating imputed change in after-tax interest rates, resampling home equity
loans, estimating state/year response, and then regressing estimates on imputed change).
Regressing state/year estimates at $100k on the mean change in interest rates shows a
positive relationship between ￿1− φk and the change in 1 + (1 − t)r. I present the results
of these regressions in Table 3.5. The first column presents a bivariate regression of the
state/year estimates on the state/year proxies for the change in after-tax interest rates and
shows a positive relationship between the two—a larger effect of the removal of the MID on
the marginal cost of borrowing means substantially more bunching at the kink. The second
and third columns include state, and state and year fixed effects, respectively, and again
show a large positive relationship.
I repeat this regression exercise for kink estimates at the $250k cutoff to confirm that this
correlation between bunching and the interest rate change is not spurious. Since the size of
the notch at the $250k cutoff does not depend directly on interest rates or tax rates, there
is no reason to expect a positive relationship between the imputed MID interest rate change
and the $250k kink estimates. Indeed, the estimates, presented in the fourth through sixth
columns of Table 3.5, show that there is not a positive relationship between the state/year
estimates of ￿1− φk and the imputed change in rates at the $250k cutoff.
Under the assumption that only the demand side of the market responds to the removal
of the MID at $100k, the response of debt at the kink can be reinterpreted as the elasticity
of home equity debt with respect to interest rates (Saez (2010)). In particular, the baseline
estimate suggests that the marginal “buncher” reduces his/her debt by 19.96% to arrive at
120An alternative is to use the reported interest rates in the SCF for each household, although this eliminates
any variation over time in interest rates (since households are only surveyed once and the survey is only
conducted every three years). Estimates using this approach are similar (although larger) than using the
30-year fixed rate.
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the MID threshold of $100,000. Given an estimate of the change in the after-tax interest
rate, this estimate of 1−φk can be converted to an elasticity. Since the loan records used in
estimation provide no information on interest rates, I turn instead to the SCF. I calculate
marginal tax rates for each household with a home equity loan using NBER TAXSIM, as
discussed in Section 3.3. For each household, I find the implied change in the after-tax
interest rate from a removal of the MID ( tr1+(1−t)r ) using the reported interest rate on their
home equity loan and the imputed marginal tax rate.
The elasticity of debt with respect to interest rates implied by the response to the removal
of the MID is large. Table 3.6 displays the interest rate and tax rate statistics from the SCF
as well as the implied elasticity. Taking the raw change in after-tax interest rates for the
home-equity loan households in the SCF, the implied elasticity is -10.505. Restricting the
sample to households with loans in the neighborhood of the threshold (between $75,000 and
$125,000) raises the implied elasticity to -12.475—while these households typically get lower
interest rates, they also face higher tax rates.
Although these estimates are on par with existing studies of the elasticity of debt with
respect to interest rates, they likely understate the true elasticity. Since the MID threshold of
$100,000 only applies to non-home-acquisition debt, loans being used for home improvements
will not be affected by the threshold. However, I cannot distinguish these loans in the
origination data. Thus, my sample is contaminated by such borrowers for whom the kink
does not apply and so are unresponsive to the threshold. To account for this, I use a question
from the SCF that asks borrowers what the primary use of their home equity loan is. I
calculate the share of home equity loans used primarily for home improvement as reported
by the household (52.5% to 60.5%, depending on the size of the loan) and adjust the average
implied change in after-tax interest rates, assuming no change for these home-improvement
households (see Table 3.6).121 This adjustment of the imputed change in interest rates implies
121The reports in the SCF may overstate the number of home improvers if at loan origination individuals
are either not aware of the exemption of limits for home acquisition loans or are not sure what they will use
the money for. The true elasticity likely lies between the unadjusted and adjusted estimates.
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substantially larger elasticities: -28.51 and -39.92 for the two samples.122
These adjusted estimates suggest a larger elasticity of debt with respect to interest rates
than has been found in existing studies. There are several reasons this may be the case.
Firstly, it may be that information about the cost of debt is more visible when borrowers
take home equity loans (e.g., required monthly payments are typically calculated for the
borrower) than credit card loans (as in Gross and Souleles (2002a)). Secondly, it may be
that individuals taking $100,000 home equity loans are less credit constrained than those
taking credit card loans or auto loans (as in Attanasio et al. (2008)). Both Gross and
Souleles (2002a) and Attanasio et al. (2008) find larger elasticities for individuals facing
lower constraints. Thirdly, it is possible that borrowers are shifting the marginal dollars
of debt to non-housing debt, and so this is not the response of all debt with respect to
interest rates, but of home equity debt to interest rates. However, contract interest rates for
home equity debt are generally lower than other sources of debt. In the SCF, the average
APR for housing debt is 7.9%, while the average for other lines of credit is 8.5% and for
credit cards is 13.9%.123 Finally, it may be that lenders are themselves responding to the
presence of the policy kink, perhaps by restricting access to or increasing interest rates for
loans greater than $100,000. Unfortunately, I do not observe lender behavior. Thus, a
conservative interpretation is that this is a market-level elasticity of debt to interest rates
rather than a structural parameter of borrowers’ preferences.
122However, as noted in the introduction, elasticities expressed with respect to 1 + r tend to appear quite
large, in part because a small change in 1 + r constitutes a large change in r, and consumers generally
observe r, although 1+ r is the relevant price in theory (Bernheim (2002)). Expressing my elasticities as the
change in debt relative to a percent-change in r gives -1.584 and -1.976 for the two samples (as compared to
elasticities around -0.7 or -1.3 with respect to r found in Gross and Souleles (2002b)).
123Brito and Hartley (1995) point out that even if rates are lower, if there are large origination fees for
home equity loans and uncertainty about the future, borrowers may prefer other sources of debt. However,
borrowers bunching at $100,000 are already incurring the origination fees, and so this is unlikely to be an
issue in this case.
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3.5.4 Response of debt to FIRREA Appraisal Requirements
The baseline estimates at the $250,000 threshold imply that stricter appraisal requirements
reduce the size of loans. The estimate of local response to the $250,000 FIRREA notch
implies that loans are reduced by 23.53% in order to avoid a licensed appraisal. The general
response is comparable—just above the threshold, there is a 22.02% drop in principal relative
to how much debt would have been taken in absence of the policy. Taken at face value,
requiring licensed appraisals of home loans appears to induce a substantial market-level
response of home-equity debt.
This response is large relative to the monetary cost of complying with the tighter appraisal
standards (around $400 or $500). However, it may be the case that there are non-pecuniary
costs to an appraisal. For example, a licensed inspection and appraisal of a home may cause
a costly delay in closing the loan (e.g., scheduling the appraisal, waiting for the report, etc.).
Moreover, the formal appraisal introduces uncertainty into the lending process if there is a
chance that the appraisal will return a home value different from the borrower and lender’s
prior (and, in turn, this different home value may affect the size of the loan available to
the borrower). Finally, an appraisal might reveal information about lower quality borrowers
that may cause lenders to increase interest rates or deny the loan altogether. Similarly, if
mortgage originators are planning on selling loans on the secondary market, as was common
during the lending boom of the early 2000s, they may avoid licensed appraisals in cases
where the appraisal might reveal information that lowers the value of the mortgage.124
However, the reduction in debt from appraisal requirements may be a desirable outcome—
if tighter appraisal standards are costly to low-quality borrowers (or lenders seeking to sell
low-quality mortgages on the secondary market), then this suggests that the policy is effective
in identifying risky loans. While this will have the effect of reducing access to debt for these
marginal borrowers, it may reduce the extent of subsequent loan defaults and foreclosures.
124Recent research has focused on whether mortgage securitization led to lax underwriting standards; see
Bubb and Kaufman (2009), Elul (2011), Jiang et al. (2010), and Keys et al. (2010).
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If requiring licensed appraisals successfully weeds out risky borrowers and there are rel-
atively more such borrowers taking loans during a lending boom, then we would expect the
response of loans at the notch to be cyclical—costs are higher to these borrowers or lenders
hoping to sell the loans on the secondary market. On the other hand, if the response to
the FIRREA notch is purely due to the cost of appraisals, we would expect little movement
in the response over time. However, I find the opposite—response at the threshold appears
counter cyclical during the lending boom of the 2000s. I estimate the general response to
the FIRREA policy at the $250k threshold for each year from 1995 to 2008 and plot the
estimates along with the total value of home equity loan originations (in billions of dollars)
per year on Figure 3.7. The percent reduction in debt in response to the tighter appraisal
requirements is negatively correlated with the number of home loans.
The FIRREA appraisal requirements may fail to dampen lending during a boom because
the policy is ineffective in sorting out marginal borrowers. For example, it could be that
appraisals exclusively reveal home value and nothing about borrowers’ ability to repay (and
during the boom home values were increasing sufficiently rapidly that this information was
not a strong constraint on lending). Or it may be that during the boom, lenders concealed the
information revealed in appraisals from the secondary market (e.g., fraudulent appraisals).
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a policy kink and a policy notch to estimate how home equity debt
responds to two mortgage policies: the home mortgage interest deduction and the licensed
appraisal requirements of the FIRREA. Using administrative data on home loan origina-
tions, I find evidence of substantial bunching at the limit of mortgage interest deductibility
at $100,000, and at the threshold of $250,000 beyond which home equity loans require a
licensed appraisal of the associated property. The corresponding estimates suggest a sub-
stantial reduction in debt in response to these policies: removing the mortgage interest
deduction reduces loan size by about 20% at origination (for those who take loans in the
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neighborhood of $100,000), while requiring licensed appraisals reduces loan size by about
22% (for those in the neighborhood of $250,000). Interestingly, I find that response to the
tighter appraisal requirement decreases during the lending boom of the 2000s, suggesting
that licensed appraisals were less effective during that period.
Relating my estimated response of debt to the removal of the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, gives a large elasticity of debt to interest rates. I use data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (and NBER TAXSIM) to impute the change in the after-tax interest rate that a
typical home-equity borrower would experience. The implied elasticity ranges from -28 to
-40, which is substantially larger than estimates the few existing quasi-experimental studies,
and suggests that there may be substantial welfare costs to the taxation or subsidization
of savings. However, this interpretation relies on the assumption that lenders are not re-
sponding to the change in policy, which I cannot explicitly verify. Nonetheless, my estimates
suggest a large market-level response of debt to the mortgage interest deduction and ap-
praisal requirements.
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Figure 3.1: Data Over time
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Kink Figures
(a) Kinked Budget Set
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Figure 3.3: Conceptual Notch Figures
(a) Notched Budget Set
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Notes: Histogram ($5k bins) of home equity loan and mortgage refinance originations for
CA, IL, NJ, and NY (1995–2008). Dashed lines represent the mortgage interest deduction
($100k) and FIRREA appraisal ($250k) thresholds.
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Figure 3.5: Log of Histogram of Home Loans
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Notes: Histogram ($1000 bins) of home equity loan (upper panel) and mortgage refinance
(lower panel) originations for CA, IL, NJ, and NY (1995–2008). Dashed lines represent the
mortgage interest deduction ($100k) and FIRREA appraisal ($250k) thresholds.
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Notes: Baseline estimates of 1 − φk over time for the $100k and $250k thresholds plotted
against the 30-year fixed rate mortgage interest rate.
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1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
$250k Cutoff Total Home-Equity Debt
Notes: Baseline estimates of 1 − φn over time for the $250k thresholds plotted against the
annual total of home equity debt originations (in billions).
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Table 3.1: Home Loan Statistics (1995–2008)
Home Equity LoansMortgage Refinances
Number of Loans 8,405,850 16,606,227
Loans ∈ 90k–110k 135,134 546,085
Loans ∈ 240k–260k 58,527 705,495
Mean Loan Principal (Nominal) 174,985 436,130
Mean Loan Principal (2000 Dollars) 157,287 386,240
Median Loan Principal (2000 Dollars) 62,288 173,207
Notes: “Loans ∈ 90,000–110,000” presents the number of the given loan type with (nominal-valued) principal
at origination between $90,000 and $110,000.
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Table 3.2: Baseline Estimates and Sensitivity
( ￿1− φk) ( ￿1− φn)
$100,000 $250,000 $250,000 n
Baseline 0.1996000 0.2353085 0.2201608 4201901(0.0000167) (0.0030037) (0.0030477)
1st Order 0.1661398 0.2423946 0.2123417 4201901
Polynomial (0.0000211) (0.0020500) (0.0021275)
3rd Order 0.1998311 0.1666250 0.1546645 4201901(0.0000173) (0.0000046) (0.0011514)
4th Order 0.1998019 0.1666340 0.1522683 4201901(0.0000177) (0.0000048) (0.0012373)
5th Order 0.1663140 0.2752993 0.2552296 4485418(0.0000455) (0.0061452) (0.0059724)
6th Order 0.1660396 0.2259143 0.2106439 3797876(0.000864) (0.0049487) (0.0049402)
No Interaction 0.1994315 0.2707455 0.2184322 4091119
with Round #s (0.0000157) (0.0030040) (0.0031018)
2nd Order 0.1664815 0.1666452 0.1651159 3602382(0.0000323) (0.0000036) (0.0016347)
Omit $10k Below 0.1689187 0.2039459 0.1953821 4485418
$20k Above (0.0020895) (0.0023308) (0.0023596)
$35k Above 0.1994503 0.2282727 0.2160060 4260866(0.0000152) (0.0025010) (0.0024762)
$50k Above 0.1995467 0.2307022 0.2155439 3797876(0.0000165) (0.0009471) (0.0010025)
Omit $40k Above 0.2288825 0.2519205 0.2371248 4331271
and $5k Below (0.0019185) (0.0026387) (0.0026761)
$15k Below 0.1994722 0.2306717 0.2154378 4091119(0.0000188) (0.0008504) (0.0008563)
$25k Below 0.2258464 0.1934624 0.1775133 3602382(0.0030612) (0.0015077) (0.0015316)
Discontinuities at $100k, $150k, 0.2306726 0.1495348 0.1663582 4201901
$200k, and $250k only (0.0005878) (0.0020271) (0.0021039)
Notes: Baseline specification omits data in the ranges $90,000–$140,000 and $240,000–$290,000, and esti-
mates counterfactual by poisson regression of the count of loans per $100 bin on a 2nd-order polynomial in
loan principal, allowing for discontinuity at $100k and $250k as well as a fixed discontinuity at multiples of
$50k, and fixed effects for multiples of $500, $1000, $5000, $25000, and $50000 plus linear interaction with
loan principal. Bootstrap standard errors with 999 repetitions. As described in the text, kink estimates
are found by taking excess bunching at kink (difference between mass of observed loans and loans predicted
by counterfactual) and integrating under the no-kink counterfactual above the threshold to the point where
integrated mass equals bunching (1−φk is the percent reduction from this bunching point to the threshold).
Notch estimates are found by finding the “bunching” point as with kink estimation, finding the missing mass
from the gap by comparing the counterfactual above the notch to the observed mass of loans above the notch,
integrating under the counterfactual above the notch to find the point where this integrated mass equals the
missing mass, and comparing this gap point to the bunching point (1−φn is the percent reduction from the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Estimates by Quartile of AGI
￿1− φk ￿1− φn
Quartile of AGI $100,000 $250,000 $250,000 n
1 0.1521923 0.1665482 0.1555081 192099(0.006671) (0.0027971) (0.0027699)
2 0.162068 0.1933219 0.1791202 368878(0.0027061) (0.0038922) (0.0045289)
3 0.1663083 0.1709739 0.1546283 831104(0.0049238) (0.0035651) (0.0043205)
4 0.1993969 0.1721729 0.1523333 1488503(0.0000995) (0.0035921) (0.0046358)
Notes: Estimates as in baseline specification from Table 3.2, except restricting sample to zip codes in the
given quartile of adjusted gross income based on the IRS SOI (1998, 2001, 2002, 2004–2008). Quartiles are
calculated within the given year.
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Table 3.5: State-Year Regressions of 1− φk on Percent-Change in After-Tax Interest Rate
$100k Threshold $250k Threshold
Coefficient on Percent- 0.844*** 1.634*** 7.705*** 0.120*-0.706***-0.463
Change in (1 + (1− t)r) (0.060) (0.106) (1.003) (0.064)(0.101) (1.131)
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X
Notes: Regression of state/year estimates of 1−φk on average imputed state/year change in after-tax interest
rates at the MID kink. Estimates of 1−φk using the baseline specification from Table 3.2, except restricting
sample to each state in each year. Imputed state/year change in rates from the SCF—marginal tax rates for
all households with home equity loans (pooling 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 survey years) imputed from NBER
Taxsim for each state and year (i.e., assume all households live in given state and given year); yearly interest
rates for the 30-year fixed rate mortgages as reported in the Freddie Mac mortgage rate survey. Standard
errors are found by bootstrapping over the entire procedure (resampling SCF data and home loan data) 999
times.
Table 3.6: Implied Elasticity of Debt to Interest Rates at $100,000
All Home-Equity Loans Between
Loan Households $75,000–$125,000
Mean Interest Rate 0.087 0.076
Mean Marginal Tax Rate 0.229 0.197
Percent Change in After-Tax Interest Rate 0.019 0.016
Implied Elasticity -10.505 -12.475
Share Home Improvement 0.525 0.605
Adjusted Rate Change 0.007 0.005
Adjusted Elasticity -28.514 -39.920
SCF Sample Size 4,144 397
Notes: Average interest rate and rate of use of home equity loan for construction from Survey of Consumer
Finances (1998, 2001, 2004, 2007); marginal tax rate imputed for SCF sample using NBER TAXSIM. “All”
denotes all SCF households with a home equity loan, $75k–$125k denotes all SCF households with a home
equity loan in the given range. Marginal tax rate is calculated from survey data (household income, number
of dependents, survey year) using NBER TAXSIM. “Home Improvement” indicates that the home equity
loan was used for home repairs—change in rates for these households is set to zero to estimate the average
adjusted rate change. Percent change in quantity is estimated as in the baseline case of Table 3.2.
242
3.7 Data Appendix
My main data set is a collection of home equity loan and mortgage refinance origination
records. These records have been collected by an anonymous private firm and made available
to me by the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at the Columbia Graduate School of
Business. The data indicate the size of the loan at origination, the date the loan is made,
and the address of the associated property (including zip code). I drop all transactions
with missing address or loan principal. I drop county-years in which fewer than 20% of
records have valid addresses and counties that are not observed through 2008 (suggesting
irregularities in data collection). I also drop duplicate records—multiple loans with identical
principal that occur at the same property within 30 days of one another. I keep only loans
on residential property.
One concern examining the data over time is that the county-year panels are not balanced—
data for some counties is available as of 1995, while others are not available until the mid-
2000s. Figure 3.8 presents the cumulative distribution of start dates for the counties in the
sample (i.e., one observation per county). As of 1995, about 35% of counties are in the
sample, and by 2000 more than three quarters of counties have data available. To explore
county selection into the dataset I consider three distinct samples: the overall unbalanced
data, home-equity loans from counties with data available as of 1995, and home-equity loans
from counties with data available as of 2000. Panel a of Figure 3.1 presents the total number
of loan originations by month. This figure demonstrates the dramatic increase in lending
over this period—the number of loans increases over time with a slight dip through the
2000/2001 recession followed by a large run-up peaking in 2005. The two balanced samples
track the unbalanced sample quite closely. Panel c presents the median loan principal (in
year-2000 dollars) by year. Again, there is minimal difference between the total sample and
the two balanced samples. Loan principal appears to increase steadily over time—the boom
of the early 2000s is not as obvious here, suggesting that the credit expansion operated pri-


























Notes: Historical availability of data varies by county. This figure presents a cumulative
count of county start years by state. Each point represents the number of counties in the
given state with data available as of the given year.
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Figure 3.9: Loans over Time by Sample
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